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JPRS Report

Near East & South Asia

1 SEPTEMBER 1987

NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

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PUBLISHERS ANNOUNCE SUSPENSION OF PUBLICATION OF ARABIA

East Burnham ARABIA: THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English Jul 87 p 4

[Editorials: "The End of Arabia" and "Editor's Farewell"]

[Text]

Arabia - *The Islamic World Review*, is now forced to exit and the reasons are economic. Six years ago, when it started publication, we were determined to be in the vanguard of Islamic issues, report fearlessly and objectively, assess judiciously and be sincere to the commitment of being the Ummah's mouthpiece for its reforms. We had vowed we would never be daunted by circumstances that ever come in our way of honest and committed journalism. We did our best to achieve our goals. We had come on the scene to set trends for others in Islamic journalism, and be torch-bearers for those who follow. But in so doing, we came face-to-face with insurmountable odds since the truth was harsh and cold for many, and instead of facing it and extending support to an organ propagating such a noble cause, hurdles were numerous. With a really sad heart we announce the suspension of publication of *Arabia - The Islamic World Review*, but we announce, rather commit ourselves, to revive it as and when we are in a position to do so. We will be marking time to emerge on the Islamic world's journalistic scene, all with new spirits and vigour of a mission that is so dear to us. Perhaps the suspension of *Arabia - The Islamic World Review* may succeed in awakening the Ummah and may inspire all of use to redouble our efforts with a renewed sense of belonging to a cause and mission, so important and necessary for all of us.

We would have been the last to mention the personal agony or

the losses incurred in bringing out and running *Arabia - The Islamic World Review* for the last six years. Suffice it to say here that we lost tremendously, both materially and physically. Losses of all kinds continued and culminated in a stage beyond our limited resources. But we are immensely satisfied that we did not waver from the right path and objectively adhered to the mission we had undertaken for the resurgence of the Ummah. We thank our readers and well-wishers and pray for their well-being and Iman. *The Publishers* ■

Editor's Farewell

On behalf of all my colleagues on the Editorial Staff I feel deeply grateful and obliged to all the readers of this magazine for their enormous enthusiasm and encouragement and their constructive response to what has been published in it since its first issue appeared in September 1981. Now, unfortunately, this issue will be the last because of insurmountable material difficulties. May Allah guide and help us all to do our best to serve the cause of Islam whenever and wherever we can. Goodbye and Salams.

Fathi Osman

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CSO: 4500/123

ASTRONOMER OFFERS SOLUTIONS FOR CONFUSION OVER LUNAR CALENDAR

East Burnham ARABIA: THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English Jul 87 pp 50, 51

[Article: "The Islamic Lunar Calendar"]

[Text]

Every year, the Muslim World is in disarray about how to read the lunar clock - especially with regard to the beginning and end of Ramadan. *"They will ask thee about the new moons. Say: 'They indicate the periods for (various doings of) mankind, including the pilgrimage.'"* [2:189] Thus the new moon has no mystic significance. The Prophet (Peace be upon him) corrected those followers who said that the sun darkened because of the death of his infant son Ibrahim with the admonition that the sun and moon are signs of God and do not eclipse for the death of human beings. When the moon lines up between the earth and sun that is the *astronomical new moon*. At that time the moon cannot be seen from the earth, because it is too close to the sun and is lost in the glare of the daylight scattered from the sun by the air. It is not until many hours later that the new moon is actually visible.

It takes the Moon approximately 29.5 days to travel its orbit around the Sun. Thus the month may be 29 or 30 days long. The Prophet warned his Companions that they were an unlettered people who could "neither write nor count" and that they must therefore opt for physical sighting of the moon rather than calculate its position - although if the 30th day were cloudy, they could rely on calculation that the new month would begin the next day. Later when Islamic civilisation flourished and the Muslims could not only read and write but had invented spherical astronomy, the scholars were able to calculate with impressive precision the time when a new moon could be sighted. Today we

can calculate the time of sighting of the new moon to within a few hours (for most places on the earth), and the exact time of the *astronomical new moon* to an accuracy of seconds.

Confused dates

Given the fact that this problem was solved by ancient Babylonian scholars, refined to the level of a modern science by the scholars of the Islamic civilisation, and further refined to unprecedented precision by the Western heirs of Islamic inductive science, it is distressing that every year Muslims around the world are thrown into confusion over the dates of the Eid Festivals.

Some have argued that the confusion is due to the fact that most Muslims are unaware that the crescent of the moon cannot be sighted until many hours after the *astronomical new moon* (technically called a *conjunction* of the sun and moon) is born. The problem is much more profound than that. This year a claimed Saudi sighting of the new moon, made hours before the conjunction, was accepted by many Muslims despite its physical impossibility. The International Institute of Islamic Thought called a conference of astronomers on 6-7 June 1987 at Herndon, Virginia (USA), to discuss the problems of the Islamic Lunar Calendar. It was aimed at bringing Muslims up to date on the state-of-the-art of calendrical calculations.

Methods of sighting

There are three principal systems which Muslim societies claim to use:

- Calculation of the time of conjunction (used in Malaysia)
- Reports of actual sighting, unconstrained by calculation (as used in Saudi Arabia)
- Reports of sighting constrained by the requirement that sightings before the time of conjunction, or some reasonable time after it, be rejected (as used in Egypt).

The first system is the least confusing, but is objected to by *fuqaha* (jurisprudents) who claim that the sightability (or even actual sighting) is a necessary requirement. The second system has been a failure in practice because false sightings are frequently – perhaps even usually – accepted, resulting in an invalid calendar. The third system is an improvement over the second, but also permits false sightings to be accepted (or actual sightings to be rejected) unless the lapse after conjunction until sightability is carefully computed, with allowance being made for the time and place of claimed observation. Some have alleged that the result of limiting acceptance to sightings after the conjunction is that one ends up with a string of false sightings near the time of conjunction with the first false sighting after conjunction accepted as real.

Unless Muslims turn to a calendar based on the unambiguously calculable time of conjunction, the use of actual sightings or sightability requires a sound algorithm for calculating the time of sightability.

Sources of confusion

Some of the sources of confusion are subtle and will require thoughtful discussion, but some are simple points that everyone should know, such as the difference between astronomical new moon and first sightable crescent (both are confusingly called *hilaal* by Arab speaking astronomers):

- It is impossible to see the new moon before the conjunction because it does not exist. Even if one could see the crescent before conjunction, it would be the old moon crescent and not the new one.
- The only way the moon may be seen from the earth at conjunction is if the earth, moon and sun line up to form a solar eclipse. In that case the moon would be seen as a dark disc and not as a crescent.
- The moon is not a smooth sphere, but has irregularities such as mountains and craters which create shadows and which can block the view of other parts of the moon. This results in a phenomenon called the Danjon Effect: the moon's crescent seems shortened when it is very close to the sun. Although there is some

question as to the details of Danjon's theory, one can conservatively say that when the moon is less than 6 degrees from the sun one cannot see a crescent from the ground.

- The brightness of the sky at sunset is a critical factor in trying to see a new moon. One must wait until the sky has begun to darken before the new moon may be detected. Thus, if the new moon sets very soon after the sun it cannot be seen. The calculations of the times of moon set are very well known and should not be a source of dispute.

- If the new moon is sightable at a given place, it is sightable at all points west at that Latitude, but not necessarily at other latitudes.

Practical example

The first day of Ramadan this year provided an opportunity for observers on the East coast of the United States of America to resolve a dispute as to when the first time of sightability is. Dr Muhammad Ilyas, in his book *A Modern Guide to Astronomical Calculations of Islamic Calendar, Times, and Qibla* gives an algorithm (called the "moon set lag criterion") for calculating the time when sighting of the new crescent becomes possible. By this algorithm, the new moon of Ramadan had a better than even chance of being seen from the American eastern seaboard on the evening of Tuesday, 28 April. By contrast, Dr Bernard Yallop of the Royal Greenwich Observatory had been advising Muslims in the United Kingdom as to sightability using an algorithm that, according to him, showed that it was "impossible to make the observation at more easterly longitudes" than 86.25 degrees West. Yet the new moon was observed from a suburb of Washington, DC some 9 degrees to the east, as well as from a number of other eastern locations, according to reports from Dr Bradley Schaeffer of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and Dr LeRoy Doggett of the US Naval Observatory.

The method detailed by Dr Ilyas which was so successful in predicting the first sighting for Ramadan is a simple one. One calculates the time that lapses between the time of sunset and the time of moon set for a given observing site. One then consults a table to gauge the possibility of an observation of the crescent for the latitude of the observing site. This method appears to be valid at latitudes below 60 degrees.

For example, on Sunday, 26 July, 1987 the moon sets approximately 42 minutes after the sun in Mecca. Sighting this moon would be very difficult, but may not be the impossibility

implied by Yallop's predictions (Yallop calculated that observation of the new moon east of the Western Atlantic is impossible). Thus, the *earliest* date for the first of Dhu-l Hijjah would be Monday, 27 July, making Wednesday, 5 August the date of Eid Al Ad'ha. By a coincidence, dating by means of conjunction gives us the same result. Conjunction takes place at 12:37 am standard time in the Saudi time zone on 26 July. Thus, on the system based on conjunction, the first day of Dhu-l Hijjah in Saudi Arabia would be Monday, 27 July. Neither system would permit Dhu-l Hijjah to begin on Sunday, 26 July or earlier, since the moon sets before the sun on the previous evening. ■

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ARAB LEAGUE UNDERSECRETARY DISCUSSES MEETING WITH EEC HEAD

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 20 May 87 p 19

[Interview with Dr 'Adnan 'Umran, assistant secretary general of the Arab League, by Najib al-Furayji in Brussels, date not specified]

[Text] In an interview with AL-QABAS after his meeting with the current President of the EEC 'Adnan 'Umran, assistant secretary general of the Arab League, emphasized that there is now a deep appreciation by the EEC president of the fact that Palestinian national unity strengthens the legitimacy of the PLO and allows it to speak with one voice. He denied reports that have come out about the resolutions of the recent Palestine National Council meeting as posing obstacles to peace efforts.

Mr 'Umran said that his meeting with Leo Tindemans was successful and amicable. During it he was able to present the Arab point of view and demonstrate Arab efforts toward achieving peace in the Middle East. He indicated that he found deep appreciation by the EEC president with regard to the Arab perspective. 'Umran pointed out that the issue of Palestinian representation in the international conference is a matter to be decided by the Palestinian people and the Arab nation. Regarding the idea of establishing a council of regents to administer the West Bank and Gaza Strip, he said that this idea has not been raised and is the province of the international conference. The text of the interview follows.

Responsibility of the Palestinians

[Question] Europe in particular and the West in general are trying to put the responsibility for any failure in current efforts to hold an international peace conference on the Palestinians, especially after the 18th session of the Palestine National Council, which passed resolutions to reject UN Security Council Resolution No 242 and to abrogate the Amman accords, and conditioned relations with Egypt in accordance with the decisions of the 16th PNC. Did you relay these feelings to the Belgian foreign minister and the current president of the EEC Council of Ministers?

[Answer] The first and immediate impression of the Belgian president regarding the meeting of the PNC in Algiers was that the PNC produced stern results for the international conference and peace efforts. How I

informed the European president clearly that this opinion was a hasty one and that they, that is, the Europeans, after objective study and deepening their grasp of the results, should believe that the unity of the Palestinian factions can only strengthen their ability to make peace and take credible positions. They should believe that the function of this unity is to lead to discussion at the Palestinian-Arab levels with a single voice. I discussed with Mr Tindemans all developments in the efforts to hold an international conference and I left satisfied that the European president does not believe that the Arab side is at fault with regard to efforts to hold this conference. The president also sees that the developments that took place at the PNC in Algiers are not responsible for obstructing these efforts. To the contrary, the unity of the Palestinian factions, as has been seen, will enable the PLO to speak with one voice, and this is what strengthens its credibility.

Examination of Positions

[Question] Has there been an examination of the positions of the other Arab governments on this subject?

[Answer] With regard to the positions of the other Arab governments, there was deep understanding on the part of the European president for the sincerity of the Arab efforts and the sincerity of the direction that the Arab League has taken in this framework toward the convening of a serious international conference under the auspices of the United Nations. That is, holding a conference not for pronouncements, but rather a conference attended by all the concerned parties, including the PLO at the same level as the representation of the other concerned parties, a conference founded on all UN resolutions relevant to the Palestinian problem in the discussion it undertakes.

Deception

[Question] Statements that the media attributed to Tindemans during his recent visit to Israel regarding the lack of enthusiasm in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt for the participation of the PLO in the international conference provoked various reactions. Did you seek a clarification from the Belgian minister regarding the truth of these statements?

[Answer] Indeed, Mr Tindemans spoke on this point and corrected this erroneous impression that was carried in the media. Tindemans emphasized to me that he perceived in the Arab countries that he visited, including Saudi Arabia and Jordan, a firm position in regard to their adherence to representation of the Palestinian people by the PLO. He said that Saudi Arabia confirmed to him that any efforts to solve the crisis and achieve peace must be founded on the Fes summit resolutions and that representing the Palestinian people is a matter for the Palestinians and the Arabs and is an Arab decision, that is, a decision taken by the Palestinian people and their Arab brethren.

Regency Council

[Question] There is another statement attributed to Tindemans regarding the idea of forming an international regency council to oversee the occupied territories for a transitional period between the Israeli occupation and the era when Palestinian control is achieved. Did you take up such a topic with the Belgian foreign minister and what are your comments on that?

[Answer] There was no discussion on this topic because it has not been tabled in our view. When the basic principles for achieving peace are established, the specific steps and details are matters for the international conference, and that is what will determine how to move from the stage of occupation to that of independence. This is a matter we did not discuss and one the European side did not table for discussion.

[Question] You are the first Arab personality to meet Tindemans after his visit to the Zionist entity. What were his impressions of that visit and does he have a new point of view?

[Answer] Of course, the discussion was on all the efforts the Belgian minister had undertaken for all sides, including the Israelis, and on all the impressions that emerged. But I am not here to get into details on that point. We value the European president for the sincere efforts he is undertaking in order to strengthen efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East.

Suggestions on the Dialogue

[Question] What suggestions did you make to the EEC president for repairing Arab-European relations, which is the Arab League's condition for resuming the Euro-Arab dialogue?

[Answer] First, I want to say that, when they set up frameworks of cooperation, the Arab nations [do] not do so according to fixed conditions. Rather, they establish them according to principles, and we in our relations with the European economic group, for example, since the establishment of these relations, have founded them on principles, and we discussed the principles that must be fulfilled for the European-Arab dialogue and the proposed tripartite ministerial meeting to succeed. I can say that I explained to the minister the Arab position regarding this matter and that our goal is not the holding of this meeting but rather that this meeting lead to the desired success. This requires overcoming all the impediments and obstacles that might affect the success of a meeting like this. I believe that the European president fully understands this Arab position. I also stressed that for the Arab nations, the European-Arab dialogue is a strategic political stand that goes back to the early part of the century and strives for solid relations based on a shared understanding of the Arabs' just concerns and their participation in achieving peace in the region. I can say that I presented to the European president the Arabs' current concerns in

their totality, from the Palestinian problem to the Iran-Iraq war and the Lebanese crisis.

The Iran-Iraq War

[Question] How was the Iran-Iraq war treated with the Belgian minister, and what role was sought from Europe in stopping this war?

[Answer] The discussion dealt with the Arab position according to the resolution adopted recently by the foreign ministers on the Iran-Iraq war and the solution that was unanimously adopted in Tunis, which included an appeal to Iran to stop the killing, in addition to suggestions for ending the war. I also discussed the resolutions that included a call for the UN Security Council to convene an international meeting so that this apparatus that is responsible for international security and peace might assume its full responsibility. Likewise, I emphasized to the EEC Council president that the Arab nations these days are exerting great efforts through contacts they are making with all the permanent and non-permanent Security Council member nations in order to hold an emergency session of the Security Council to adopt effective executive resolutions that will set up a mechanism for implementing Security Council Resolution No 582 pertaining to the Iran-Iraq war.

[Question] What are your views on Tindemans' visit to Tunis and Algiers and have the dates been set?

[Answer] We did not discuss this meeting because it is supposed to be handled within the framework of bilateral relations.

Joint European-Arab Meeting

[Question] Did Tindemans express his deep desire to convene a meeting between the Arab League Council of Ministers and the EEC Council before the end of his presidency, that is, before June, and will a meeting of this sort take place?

[Answer] In reality, the important thing is that there be a successful meeting. It is not the goal that there be a specific time, but we shared the opinion that a meeting must be considered, and its timing will be determined in light of the surrounding circumstances, when there are ample possibilities for success. Therefore, there was no discussion of the timing of the meeting. There was a friendly atmosphere and complete understanding for the Arab point of view, which stresses the desire to achieve the success of the European-Arab dialogue by overcoming all the obstacles that impede the achievement of the conditions necessary for a European-Arab dialogue meeting to succeed, like those measures adopted by some European parties against certain Arab countries and also the continuation of some European states in providing arms to Iran.

Syrian-British Relations

[Question] Did you touch on any signs pointing to the probability that the tension between Great Britain and Syria will definitely ease?

[Answer] We did not discuss this topic because, as I have said, the meeting was to discuss European-Arab issues, and we did not get into any matter pertaining to any particular country. We left this matter to be discussed within the bilateral framework. The European nations continue to be convinced of the need to strengthen their relations with all the Arab states. For our part, we blessed this direction in their thinking, because any friendly, healthy tie between countries from this group and countries from the other group supports the goals of dialogue and cooperation between the Arabs and Europeans.

'Arafat-Tindemans Meeting

[Question] Tindemans said that he did not regard a meeting between himself and Mr Yasir 'Arafat as unlikely. Will this meeting be a mere protocol gesture in response to several Arab requests, or will it mean a new European position toward the PLO?

[Answer] I believe that an 'Arafat-Tindemans meeting must take place on the basis of Yasir 'Arafat's capacity as chairman of the PLO and must be an official meeting examining all the issues related to the positions of the PLO and the Palestinian people.

9614/9599

CSO: 4504/258

BANKING AGREEMENT SIGNED WITH YUGOSLAVIA

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 26 Jun 87 p 3

[Text] Belgrade; APS Bureau: Mr Abdelaziz Khellef, member of the central committee and minister of finance, yesterday completed the official three-day visit which he made to Yugoslavia at the invitation of his counterpart, Mr Rikanovic.

During his stay, Mr Khellef held a number of meetings with the vice-president of Yugoslavia and various government officials, as well as with the chief government officers in charge of the economic and financial sectors. An interbank agreement defining the methods of financing the Yugoslav enterprises in Algeria was signed at the conclusion of this visit.

With the Yugoslav vice-president the ways and means of implementing the expansion and diversification of bilateral cooperation were discussed. Dr Andrey Orcvirk, president of the federal energy and industry committee, as well as Mr Kerroum, the Algerian ambassador to Yugoslavia, were present at these sessions.

The discussions between the two countries also bore upon the preparation of an agreement of non double assessment. The experts of both countries have already met several times and have arrived at an agreement on a large number of details contained in the contract agreement that is to be implemented.

The two parties agreed to finalize this agreement of non double assessment as soon as possible before the next meeting of the joint Algerian-Yugoslav commission.

Parallel to the agreement and within the interbank framework, the two parties studied the finalizing of a line of short-term credits agreed to by the Algerian banks, and it was decided by common accord to resume the meetings between the experts next 8 July for the definitive drafting of this agreement.

The short-term agreement will serve to finance the exchanges between the two countries, which will allow for the development of Yugoslav exports to Algeria and the increase of Algerian exports to Yugoslavia within the framework of the dynamic equilibrium of bilateral cooperation.

During the meetings, both sides emphasized that bilateral cooperation has attained a quantitative, appreciable level and that it must direct itself toward

qualitatively superior forms, notably through the implementation of joint corporations which will intervene on the bilateral level, but also in third countries.

The development of such cooperation has been considered by the two parties as the beginning of a new approach that will allow them to render still more dynamic the relationships between the two countries while remaining an example of South-South cooperation through joint efforts to improve the factors of production or the means of financing.

Before leaving Belgrade for Algiers yesterday, Mr Khellef met with his counterpart, Mr Stetizar Svetozar Rikanovic and a number of Yugoslav CEOs who are engaged in projects being carried out in Algeria, for a final series of talks.

8117

CSO: 4519/128

GUARANTEED LOAN PROGRAM TO BENEFIT FARMERS

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 28 Jun 87 p 8

[Text] By virtue of Decree 87-22, dated 14 April 1987, an agricultural insurance fund was created, with the express purpose of guaranteeing and assuring the reimbursement of investment credits or agricultural seasons, granted to members in danger of declaring bankruptcy. The fund stocks complete the warranty furnished to the bank by the borrower under the form of real or personal sureties.

It does not guarantee the reimbursement of damages flowing from acts of God or natural catastrophes. One may subscribe to the fund upon presentation of any document verifying that one is a member of any of the professions described under Article III of the said decree, that is cattle-farmers, agricultural workers, whether independent or collective, from the private sector, and such persons as may hold parcels of land by title of accession granted by an agricultural landed property.

The resources are made up of membership dues and contributions from the bank's share of the amount of the interests associated with the credits granted to the farmers, the share of the insurance holdings from the various premiums and any other contribution or subsidy, etc.

As far as the amount of the methods of payment of the membership dues and contributions are concerned, it will be set by interministerial decree.

The organs of the fund are the central security commission and the governorate commissions, which meet once each quarter or as often as necessary.

The governorate security commission is responsible for following up the development of the members with the study of requests for insurance or warranties and for keeping close tabs on the risks flowing from the authorization of the insurance fund at its level and finally for the examining of the implementational files to make decisions regarding the said requests. The decisions are subject to appeal with the central commission.

As far as the practical methods are concerned, it is fitting to emphasize that the requests for authorization of insurance or warranty are introduced by the bank to the governorate commission.

With regard to the implementation, it must indicate that the requests come into play after the ordinary means of recovery provided by the laws in force have been exhausted. This fund covers only the credits subsisting in the principal at the bank, up to 70 percent of their total amount.

Status of Investment Credits by way of Accession to Landed Property

FISCAL 1985

Amount of Payment Credits (CP):

130,000,000 Algerian Dinars (DA)

Total Amount of the Credits Granted on Moderate Long Term (MLT)

88,671,545.58 DA (or a rate of 69 percent)

Total Amount of the Credits Received by 31 December 1985

Dossiers Financed: 732, including 17 Interaid Farm Groups (GEP)

Surface Financed: 2130.83 hectares

Number of Governorates Involved: 14

Prognosis for 1985 (source: MAP):

+ number of hectares: 55,389

+ number of beneficiaries: 15,308

FISCAL 1986

Authorization of Program: 155,700,000 DA

Amount of payment credits: 110,700,000 DA

Total Amount of Credits Granted in MLT: 171,186,092.68 DA

Total Amount of Credits Received: 70,883,206.02 DA

Dossiers Financed: 1 665, including 6 GEPs

Surface Financed: 5573.71 hectares

Number of Governorates Involved: 24

FISCAL 1987

Authorization of Program: 150,000,000 DA

Amount of CP: 49,000,000 DA

Total Amount of Credits Granted in MLT up to 15 June 1987: 55,689,954.44 DA

Total Amount of Credits Received up to 15 June 1987: 2,423,559.07 DA

Number of Governorates Involved: 28

Prognosis beyond 1985 (Source: MAP):

Number of hectares: 171,409
 Number of beneficiaries: 43,209
 Year 1987: 46,316 hectares
 Northern Governorates: 9 712 hectares
 Governorates of the Steppes: 18,100 hectares
 Southern Governorate: 18,504 hectares

Development of Agricultural Season Credits (1982-1986)

Unit: Millions of DA

	1981-82	1982-83	1983-84	1984-85	1995-86
Credits Granted	139	172	259	819	745
Credits Received	85	106	160	648	611
Received and Granted: in percentages	61	62	62	79	82
Number of Farmers Financed:	10,025	9 548	12,970	36,483	23,963

(Source BADR)

PRIVATE SECTOR: AGRICULTURAL

DEVELOPMENT OF INVESTMENT CREDITS PLANNED

	A	B	C	D	E	E/D	E/C
	CP	remain- der	attri- bution	notifi- cation	achieve- ment	(percent- age)	(percent- age)
1982	110	185	61	246	110	45	180
1983	207	132	361	493	141	28	39
1984	369	335	255	590	271	45	106
1985	305	312	207	519	281	54	135
1986	729	217	338	555	224	40	66

8117

CSO: 4519/128

POLICE FORCES IN GOLAN DESCRIBED AS INSUFFICIENT

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 19 May 87 p 15

[Article: "Different Kinds of Police in the Golan]

[Text] The government decided long ago that the Golan Heights were part of Israel, and that, therefore, the laws of Israel apply to the Israeli and Druze settlements in the Golan. The body expected to enforce the law in the Golan is the Israeli police. For various reasons, historical and practical, and perhaps also because of lack of foresight (the official explanation will almost certainly be lack of manpower and funding), the Israeli police were not able to set up the same kind of system that they have in other parts of the country. The basic problem was revealed by the riots that took place several weeks ago in the Druze villages in the northern Golan, when a force of a few policemen was almost taken hostage by an enraged group of hundreds of residents who threatened to take revenge on the police.

The photographs televised on Syrian television did not do credit to the Israeli police or to the government's rule. A special recruitment and a show of force on the part of hundreds from the police and border patrol were necessary to restore order in the Druze villages. The government offices and security forces have drawn the necessary conclusions, however belatedly, and several weeks ago it was decided that a new border patrol unit would be set up. It would be composed of more than 100 policemen and would be permanently installed in the northern Golan. This unit would carry out all the regular police functions to maintain order and fight crime. The standards for the unit have already been approved, and it is hoped that it will start functioning within a few weeks.

Meanwhile, legal rule in the Druze villages on the Golan Heights is merely theoretical. At the police post in the Druze village of Mis'ada (which, at this stage, is the arm of the law in the region), less than 10 policemen cover 3 shifts. It is hard to expect them to exercise their authority and enforce the law with all its ramifications. The incident that took place with a private contractor who tried to activate the law last week in Mis'ada Village, as he does everywhere else in the country, typifies what happens in this area in the northern Golan.

The Israeli contractor, a former police officer, received the go-ahead from the court to carry out a foreclosure and remove movable property within a wide radius around the house of a Druze, a soil contractor living in Mis'ada. The foreclosure order was taken out because the Druze contractor owed the sum of 180,000 shekels to a large Israeli financial institution. Last Wednesday, the Israeli contractor came with some other workers to the house of the Druze contractor to carry out the foreclosure. Within moments, he was surrounded by dozens of enraged residents. According to his testimony, the residents threatened to kill him, prevented him from taking out the property, and yelled at him, among other things, that "if all the Israeli policemen and border patrol personnel came to the village, blood would be shed, and not even an ashtray would be taken from the house."

The contractor hurried to the police post in the village, complained about the threats, and asked for help from the sergeant, who was the post commander, to enforce the court order. The policeman explained to the contractor that "there were problems," that they would have to bring in forces and organize the action. According to the contractor, he asked the post commander to coordinate the action with his superiors. The sergeant did so. He spoke numerous times on the telephone and informed the contractor that everything was set and that at 9:00 the next morning, he should be ready with a truck and workers and he would receive help from the police. The contractor and his workers had no choice but to spend the night in the region.

The next day, on Thursday, the contractor was at the police post at the appointed time. This time a senior officer appointed to the Golan was there. There was no police force. The contractor and his workers did not even try to get close to the house they were to foreclose. The police actually forbade them to do so and told them to let the police deal with the matter. A mobile police force that arrived at the house to be foreclosed barely escaped the enraged mob. The Druze soil contractor was brought to the police station, interrogated, and held for 2 days, but the foreclosure could not be carried out.

The police again explained to the implementing contractor, as did the officer from the Qiryat Shmone police department (appointed over the Mis'ada police post), that such an action would require a big police force "because of the sensitivity in the region and the local government policy." The foreclosure has still not taken place, and it is questionable now if there is any point in carrying it out. According to the implementing contractor, it is likely that the guilty contractor has probably already removed most of his possessions from the house and hidden them. Every day that goes by plays into the hands of the guilty contractor, who can take various steps to prevent the foreclosure.

The implementing contractor, who carries out foreclosures in many parts of Israel, argues that everywhere else, when problems come up and the work is disturbed, the police rush in to help. They send a police unit and help enforce the law. In the Golan, however, things are run differently. At the police station in the Galilee area, they say that the one who was in the wrong was the implementing contractor. He got himself into an impossible situation. He should have known from the start that in places like the Druze

villages in the Golan, there is a lot of feeling about actions like the one he was trying to carry out. He should have coordinated any action well in advance with senior-level forces among the police in the area. One cannot force the police to go up against the realities in the region.

The police emphasize that by coordinating actions in advance, the implementing contractor is likely to get all the help and police backing that he requires. Nevertheless, the police agree that the kind of permanent police staffing that is now being planned for the northern Golan will help solve even situations like the one described above and will avoid the need to organize special set-ups and big police units in order to carry out routine actions in this area, especially in the northern part of it.

9348/13046

CSO: 4423/34

FIERCE COMPETITION EXPECTED WITHIN ARAB ELECTORATE

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 20 May 87 p 9

[Article by Ilan Shehori: "New Forces in the Arab Sector"]

[Text] Perhaps more than ever before, a fierce struggle is expected within the Arab sector in the slate for the upcoming election. Included in the competition, apart from RAKAH and the Progressive List for Peace (PLP), will be new political forces, such as movements with a distinctly religious character as well as nationalistic lists. It will also be characterized by the usual mixture of Likud.

The Islamic revival in the Arab world has already made itself known in Israel and, against this background, it is likely to sharpen the competition between RAKAH and the Progressive List for Peace, which stands to gain from this revival. The PLP, composed of an "alternative" Jewish movement and a "progressive" Arab one, is currently going through an upheaval because of the split within the Arab flank of the list, a serious battle in the Jewish flank, and longstanding tension between the two groups. Of the 35,000 votes that the PLP received in the previous elections, only 3,500 came from the Jewish flank, and this has already upset the Arab component of the movement. They argue that MK Mati Peled got into the Knesset because of them and that the contribution of the Jewish part of the list was negligible. The tension continues today along with the demand, coming from the heads of the PLP, that the movement dispense with the Jewish component and emerge as completely Arab in the upcoming elections to the Knesset. Those arguing against this approach in the Arab sector argue that it was only because of Peled, Uri Avneri, and their friends that the PLP was able to take part in the elections after being disqualified earlier by the election committee, and that it is only because of the Jewish faction that the Arabs are currently allowed a clear political expression for their views.

The Jewish-Arab battle really stands in the shadow of internal battles within the Arab and Jewish factions. A few weeks ago, reports were circulated that a group of Jewish activists from the "alternative" movement led by Hayim Bar'am, brother of MK 'Uzi Bar'am, had left the movement and joined the Labor Party. The reports were denied, but this did not put an end to the serious differences of opinion.

The controversy, which is likely to hurt the movement seriously, has been left in the Arab court. At bottom, it involves competition between the group of activists led by the past director of the movement, Dr Rashid Salim, and the faction led by MK Muhammad Mi'ari and by the secretary general of the movement, the Anglican priest from Nazareth, Ri'ah Abu al-'Assal. Those who oppose al-'Assal, an ardent supporter of the PLO whom security forces did not permit to leave Nazareth, say that he leads the movement in a dictatorial manner by shutting people up. As for MK Mi'ari, the complaints say that in the past 2½ years that he has led the movement, he has been a disappointing political leader, lacking in organizational ability and not responsive to the needs of a nationalist political movement. Dr Rashid Salim and his supporters have decided to leave the PLP and, apparently, will try to find expression for its political motivation with a new organization within the Arab sector.

The PLP plans to have its conference in about 2 months. It appears now that the Arab-Jewish partnership will not break up, and MK Mati Peled, who has distinguished himself with his parliamentary activity, will continue to lead the Jewish faction. In the Arab sector, the charismatic figure of Abu al-'Assal is expected to replace Muhammad Mi'ari. They are working in the progressive Arab movement to compensate the faction that split by a close political alignment with the Islamic revival, thus ensuring a substantial advantage in terms of size.

Similar problems characterize RAKAH these days too, but while the Communist list is still carrying on a struggle to the bitter end with the progressives in the Arab electorate, no great shake-ups are expected in the leadership of the movement. Me'ir Wilner, Tawfiq Tubi, and Tawfiq Ziyad, mayor of Lower Nazareth, will continue to head RAKAH, and, if the elections are held early, Charlie Biton's place will not be taken in the opening quartet. The main problem in RAKAH, the most important component in the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, is the closed leadership and the lack of access by leftist groups which have joined the movement in recent years to the top ranks. According to research carried out not long ago by Middle East expert Dr Eli Rekhes from the Dayan Center at the University of Tel Aviv, it appears that at least Me'ir Wilner, longtime leader of RAKAH, has been trying to keep out new leaders as a way of offering something to his two sons to get them to join RAKAH. Tawfiq Tubi is also holding on to his position, but in the Arab faction in RAKAH, some young people are advancing, such as Tawfiq Ziyad, Salim Abran, and Assad Kana'ana, who may try to attain a real place on the list of the Front.

It is no secret that a rejuvenation of the Communist Party is expected if Israeli-USSR relations improve, and in RAKAH, they are alert to this possibility. A special unit for propaganda and information has been operating for a few months already and is concentrating its activity in the Arab electorate with attacks on the Progressive List and on the organization of religious groups which are getting special treatment in AL-ITTIHAD, the mouthpiece of RAKAH. For now, RAKAH is making progress in the Arab electorate, and attesting to that fact are the results of recent elections for Arab student councils at the universities.

In light of the upcoming election campaign, some new entries are expected to take part in the competition for the Arab electorate in which some new outstanding Arab personalities will appear, such as MK Abd Wahab Darawsha, who is likely to leave the Labor Party and establish a new movement in northern Israel. It is likely that MK Muhammad Watad from MAPAM will also join this framework. The upcoming election campaign will be characterized by an energetic involvement of the Likud in the Arab electorate. Since the rotation, Minister Moshe Arens, appointed to handle minority issues for the government, has been working in a substantial way in the Arab sector and, particularly, with the Druze and the Moslems. Within the Arab electorate, Arens' work is highly regarded, and there is hope that he can be influential in improving their situation.

According to Dr Eli Rekhes, this is the first time that a serious effort has been made to deal with the problems of the Arab public and this is likely to have an effect on their political stance in the upcoming elections. Rekhes anticipates a big surprise for the Labor Party, especially in face of the lack of activity within the Arab population in recent years, Minister Weizman's neutralization with regard to this subject, and the minimal functioning for a long time of the Division of Minority Matters within the Labor Party.

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LIKUD ALLEGEDLY SCOFFS AT ACADEMIA, INTELLIGENTSIA

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 22 May 87 p 2a

[Editorial by 'Uzi Benziman: "The Ivory Tower"]

[Text] There is no irony in the fact that the Likud chose a man like Gid'on Patt to be minister of science. This choice accurately reflects Likud's attitude toward higher education, the academic world, and the Israeli intelligentsia. Likud is estranged from this community and makes fun of it, either because this attitude represents the natural leanings of its leaders or for cynical political reasons. This week's initiative on the part of Likud--to administer two levels of tuition and to reject the requests of its administrators for government assistance--just adds strength to that view.

At first glance, it seemed that things might be different. When Menahem Begin came to power, it seemed that, finally, a man of education had arrived at the head of the government. Although the intellectual world of the Likud leader was one-dimensional, to a certain extent, and conservative, still it appeared that he represented a change for the better over his predecessors. After Levi Eshkol, Golda Meir, and Yitzhaq Rabin, Menahem Begin was a man of learning, familiar with the history of other nations, an expert in Jewish sources, not to mention his legal expertise. Begin would, apparently, be able to open up a rich and stimulating dialogue with the Israeli academic world. He was not a stutterer nor was he limited in his interests like his three predecessors. He was a prime minister who had had 30 years to read and enrich his learning.

Whatever the problem, the chemistry did not work. Begin did not speak to the heart of the Israeli intellectuals and they, apparently, did not succeed in capturing his attention. There were no meetings between him and them. No interest on his part in writers and artists was noted. No one ever saw him at the opening of an important art exhibit or at a concert.

Begin set the tone for Likud generally. During his tenure and afterwards, Likud never did succeed in encouraging the growth of any major personality who would be identified with the interests of the Israeli intelligentsia. There is nowhere in Likud--not even in the youngest group of its leaders--a man who surrounds himself naturally with artists or writers or professors. When you hear the word professor coming out of the mouths of one of the Likud

leaders, it usually has negative connotations (see, for example, the expressions of David Levi or Arik Sharon).

From Estrangement to Hostility

Obviously, this phenomenon has practical reasons. The heads of Likud say to themselves: "How many divisions are there in the Israeli intelligentsia?" And they draw the correct mathematical conclusion. There is no point investing in this community. There is a further reason for this estrangement. The majority of the academic and artistic community is leftist, and the heads of Likud shrink from having contact with them on the assumption that the dialogue would be unproductive. There is also, however, a deeper reason, a feeling of foreignness, of different mental worlds, of a lack of common language which distances the Likud political leadership from the Israeli intelligentsia.

Likud's renunciation of the option of working to gain followers among the intellectuals is unfortunate because it passes up the chance of carrying on a dialogue with those who set the tone in the world of political thought in Israel. New ideas, items on the public agenda, and social and ideological movements are born in universities or in places where intellectuals gather. That is how it goes in the world at large, and so it goes with us too. It should be pointed out that the intellectual community in Israel has not made a real effort to initiate a dialogue with the heads of Likud either.

It has only taken a few weeks for the estrangement to turn to hostility translated into damaging government decisions. The refusal of the government, i.e., the Likud ministers and the religious parties, to extend financial assistance to the universities and to respond to their suggestions concerning student tuition is rooted in the background described above. Although academic institutions do need to learn a lesson about how to manage their finances, and certainly the government does not have to fulfill all their hopes for handouts, it does not make sense to turn their backs on them completely. If the heads of Likud had a greater affinity for the Israeli academic world, they would find a different way to deal with the universities' financial troubles. They would experience more deeply the concern due to the drop in the scientific level in the country as a result of the financial crisis. They would get to know the exceptional youth who find respected positions abroad, and they would identify with the gloomy mood of intellectuals whose research funds have dried up.

This kind of intimacy exists between Likud leaders and Haim Shiff, not between them and the university rectors. The Likud takes pains to help out on the projects of the hotelier but cares nothing about what is happening in institutions of higher learning. And the minister of science sets the tone for this approach.

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PSYCHE OF AIR FORCE PILOT EXPLORED

Tel Aviv BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR in Hebrew No 57, May 87 pp 16-17

[Article by Roni Alro'i: "Inflated Ego: The Anatomy of a Squadron Member"]

[Text] This is an attempt to understand the "head" of an air force pilot, an attempt to look at the kinds of people at various levels and in various functions who join the air force and to see what motivates them.

What moves the young pilot to sign up for 5 more years of service? What motivates the technician to perform such thankless work? What moves the air force clerks to choose such tiring work, around the clock? What motivates the commanders to devote their entire lives to the air force?

The squadron from which the "research mice" are taken is a very operational force of Phantoms. The commander of the squadron told us: "I myself do not fully understand what goes on in the heads of air force people. Everyone works like crazy around the clock. Why? I do not have an answer."

The prevailing opinion is that the ground crew performs very hard work, without which the plane could not take off, but their work is thankless. All the glory belongs to the pilots, and sometimes we forget to say thank you even to them. Is there really no return? And if that is the case, how do they deal with it? What motivates them to continue to perform their difficult work? The first person of whom I asked the question was Private Yo'av Shakel. His function: ordnance. From 5:45 in the morning Yo'av is on his feet. He has to be ready and able to service the aircraft at any moment. "I give 99 percent of myself to the military," said Yo'av. "At first, it was difficult for me to get used to jumping out of bed. I would get angry when they woke me up at night. Now I've gotten used to it. What holds me together is the tie with the people of the squadron. I do not have a relationship with the air crew, but I have a very good relationship with the ground crew, and that keeps me here."

From the Ground to the Sky

Eyal Sason also belongs to the ground crew. His function: acting platoon commander. Eyal is a veteran. He has been in his job for 2 years already. "Even if they offered me the chance, I would not change places," he said.

Eyal was once given the task of finding metal to repair the wing of a plane. "Here you learn to deal with problems. Overcoming problems is a daily task, so the solutions have to be quick. What keeps me here are the challenges. I have a big ego. I like the responsibility. There is always something to wait for. When the planes come home without bombs after a successful attack--those are the high points. That, too, keeps me here. It is just a pity that there is no relationship with the air crew, which would increase motivation still further."

At the end of regular service, the ground crew spreads out, so social ties cannot be the motivation for signing up for career service. Could the challenge and job pressure be a sufficient cause? What motivates the ground crew?

The commander of the ground crew has to be ready to receive telephone calls even in the middle of the night. The family pays a heavy toll, because these men are "Sunday fathers." Three of them tried to respond to the question of why they stayed in the career military. "There is strong pressure from the family to get out," said Captain Uri. "I am in mechanical engineering. I get a lot of attractive offers from the outside. The salary offered is considerably higher than today's salaries." Like a chorus, the officers--Uri, Reuben, and Eli--say: "We must be masochists, because once a month, every month, we get an attack of melancholy."

So why stay in?

Captain Reuben, an ordnance officer, said: "One of our compensations is that we know things before everyone else. We make the news." Captain Eli, a technical officer, said: "You are tied to the framework, tied to the unit in which you 'grew up.' You also become addicted to the action and to the constant tension."

There is a prevalent saying among the ground crew: "From sunrise until your last breath." This sentence defines the feeling shared by soldiers in the ground crew. "There are many moments of crisis," said Reuben. "At these moments, we are the parents of soldiers. Each person gives completely of himself, because we are not trained in education or psychology. When a new pilot arrives, and after a while he goes out on his first operational run, we know that we, too, have played a significant role in his training."

A Strong Desire To Contribute

"Perhaps it is hard to see from the ground, but even among pilots there are ups and downs. There are not always opportunities to contribute to the fullest. Sometimes, when looking ahead to the rest of one's service, it is somewhat frustrating. The only thing that really makes me give 100 percent," said Lieutenant K, a pilot, "is the love of flying. Anyone who is not crazy about it will not hold up. Anyone who is crazy about it will give 100 percent." But, from a conversation with Deputy Commander A, a young NCO, a slightly more complex picture emerges. "It depends on how much responsibility

they give you. If they depend on you and give you a responsible position, you do things much more seriously. You feel a sense of belonging, you feel like part of the scene, and then you contribute more. If they do not rely on you heavily, you feel superfluous and sometimes you may feel that time is slipping away and you are just counting the hours until your release. Everyone enjoys the flying itself. Last week, we had a week of construction. We did not fly, we just fixed up the squadron. Perhaps it can be said that we are fools, but I do not see it that way. I think it shows a sense of belonging and the desire to contribute. Only rarely will you hear a pilot say: 'I'm bored. I've had it'."

The issue comes up more frequently among the women on the clerical staff. But, as they confirm about themselves, they do not take it seriously. "The squadron is the family," said 'Arba, an assistant squadron commander's clerk. "The atmosphere in the squadron is very special. Everyone knows everyone else's weaknesses." 'Adi, an operations clerk, said: "The work is really hard. We are a valve, through which all the pressure is released. The pressure falls on us. But they treat us like equal partners. During an operation, we follow the pilots closely on the radio. After a mission, we sit down with them and know that we, too, had a part in its success. There is never a time when we feel superfluous. This creates a sense of infinite belonging. In other words, it does wonders for motivation."

Three operations clerks agreed among themselves that the squadron commanders have a tremendous influence on the atmosphere in the squadron and also, therefore, on the motivation of the people.

Looking Forward

What is required of a commander in order for him to have such great influence? Does the commander see himself as having such a powerful influence in his hands? These questions were asked of Assistant Squadron Commander A and Captain H.

[Question] What do you do to develop your soldiers' motivation?

[Answer] In general, the people who come to fly have a high level of motivation, otherwise they would not be able to stand it. That is already a good start. But there are obviously ups and downs. We run into problems, especially with NCO's who are about to be released. But my relationship with the pilots is so close that I feel changes immediately. If you discern a change over time, you can deal with it, but the way you deal with it is obviously on an individual basis. It is very important that the people feel good.

On an ongoing basis, there are a number of ways in which I have an influence on motivation. The first, as I said, is through the good relationship I have with the people. The second is methodological, relating to the way I give instructions and briefings. I give a lot of thought to that. It is important to me that things penetrate. But there is also an element of imitation. I

cannot allow myself not to succeed at doing things I say I am going to do. I have to create an image worthy of imitating. Then role modeling becomes a stimulus in and of itself.

One thing that should not be taken lightly is the events. They say that the parties we have in our squadron are the best. They contribute a lot to a sense of togetherness, and always give us an added push to continue. The last thing is that I myself am full of motivation. That gets passed on. It is contagious.

A Special Meaning to Life

[Question] What gives you strength? What strengthens your motivation?

[Answer] All the people with whom I work, especially the commander of the squadron, Brigadier General R, but some of the young people also contribute, with the new spirit they infuse and with their enthusiasm. The kind of work I do makes me look always ahead. I tend to set goals for periods of up to half a year. I do not neglect the many areas of the squadron. This method varies the work and also presents new challenges every day. There is always something to look forward to. Even the knowledge that everything I do in the squadron will have an influence over the next 10 years stimulates me. It is true that there is a problem with material compensation. This would not bother me so much if it did not affect my family.

But the pressure in the work, the kind of pressure that even an owner of a big company has not experienced, the pace of life--these things hold me tightly to the squadron. I also feel that I carry an educational burden on my shoulders. I admit my influence on the people of the squadron and this gives the job a special meaning, which no company manager has. All this causes me to enjoy every moment. I do not feel that I am paying a price.

After the cards were exposed, the impression was that the squadron is a kind of incubator, into which the concept of a "small ego" never infiltrated. The mind of a pilot is a different mind. The attempt to expose the cards only proved that anyone who has not experienced life in a squadron will never in his life understand the mentality.

9811/9599

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UPGRADE OF PHANTOM DESCRIBED

Tel Aviv BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR in Hebrew No 57, May 87 pp 48-49, 79

[Article by Dror Merom: "A New Opera for the Phantom"]

[Text] First Publication: In addition to installing Lavi engines in the Phantom (see page 57), which is an experimental project, a plan to upgrade the Phantom is being implemented in the air force, including changing the radar system, improving aeronautical and aviatational operations, changing the wiring, and more. In exchange for about \$5 million per plane, the Phantom is changing its skin and is being made ready for confrontations in the year 2000.

Next summer, the first prototype of the improved Phantom will take off from an air force base in the center of Israel. It will have the original J-GE-79-17 engine and on the outside it will still look like the familiar Phantom. But several systems in the plane will be completely new, some made in Israel by the air force or other enterprises.

The development of the Phantom 2000 began in 1982. The Phantom has served in the air force since 1969. The plane arrived in the air force at the end of the war of attrition and in operational activities contributed greatly to the Israeli advantage in the campaign. In its day, the Phantom was used mainly for air-to-air missions. Its strong engine, with a "dry" capacity of 12,000 pounds, gave it excellent maneuvering ability that left all other planes it encountered in its shadow. The wide-bodied construction allowed the Phantom to carry heavy artillery, which also increased the plane's ability to conduct air-to-ground missions.

The Phantom was considered a highly reliable plane. The percentage of encounters in which it was hit made it one of the most reliable and safest planes in the air. Over the years, new planes appeared in the international arena which pushed the old "work horse" to the side a bit.

Every Phantom flying in the air force had tall tales to tell. In operational activities, each accrued thousands of air hours.

Leave It On the Front Line

However, although the Phantom was and still is a front-line aircraft in the air force, over the years, signs of fatigue were discovered in the Phantom, signs which grew worse with time. The years began to bite into the bodies of the Phantoms, and technical problems became more frequent and interfered with the planes' continued activities.

Over the course of the Phantoms' operational activities, the following came manifest:

- Gas leaks from various gas tanks on the plane's body.
- Problems with the hydraulic systems.
- Fatigue in the plane's structure (wings, stabilizers).
- Numerous electrical problems which became worse following environmental changes (for example, warnings appeared during flights).
- Maintenance problems increased, thereby increasing the time required to maintain the planes.

In addition to all these problems, the Phantom is designed with relatively outdated technologies, as compared with the next generation of planes. Analogous avionic systems appeared to be treading water and affected the ability to perform the missions demanded of the aircraft. Rapid advancements on the other side caused the Phantom, which was flying in place, in effect to fall behind.

However, the air force was not ready to give up on this excellent airplane. Thus it was decided to improve the plane and make it suitable for the battlefield of the 21st century. In the beginning of the 1980's, exact details were defined for the upgrade to be performed on the Phantom airplanes. A decision was made to begin a giant overhaul project, which in the end will put an up-to-date, strong, and effective plane on the runway.

The plan is defined as one of the largest development plans in the history of the air force. Its essence was concretized after long testing and based on long experience acquired through years of flying the Phantom in various squadrons:

- To equip the planes with advanced technologies by removing outdated technologies;
- To improve avionic and aeronautic performance;
- To provide effective treatment of breakdowns that occurred in the plane over the years which are likely to recur in its new format;

- To reduce life cycle costs by introducing new, original parts that will be relatively cheaper than their predecessors.

The work on the Phantom 2000 plane began in 1984. The plane has been placed in an air maintenance unit for the purpose of making improvements. The engineering people worked on the plane with the goal of defining in detail every improvement planned. The plane was examined as a whole. Then, every piece and its function were examined fastidiously.

The Phantom, it turned out, was created to survive. It has a strong platform that lends itself well to improvements. Many of the advantages it has over other planes are related to the fact that it is a two-seater, and that the work load and operation of the craft are divided between two crew members. The problems that arise during night flights or flights in bad weather conditions can be dealt with effectively by two crew members. The plane's strong engines give it great maneuverability. Its structure, engine, and two-person crew allow for superior performance in air-ground and air-air missions. Its special wide construction allows it to carry considerably more gas than average as well as artillery designed for long-range missions.

Box--To Be Included

The Phantom 2000; One Step At a Time

The planning of the initial systems for the improved Phantom aircraft began in 1980. After making operational assumptions and conducting final programming testing, the upgrade entered its first stages of development, including work on two levels: Level A--the development of primary systems (radar, communications, fire control systems); Level B--integration of the aircraft (electrical design, mechanical design, navigational systems).

The first stages of planning and development were completed in 1983. In January 1983, the aeronautical planning crew members moved on to the area of unit upgrades and the actual development work began. Further recommendations and plans from various air force branches were added to the planning network and were implemented on the plane. From this stage onward, the development activities were outlined in stages.

During the first stage, development work reached an advanced level: The mechanical planning continued and, simultaneously, work and preparations in the field to disassemble the plane were begun. In the middle of the year, the electrical design was implemented, and the initial mock-up installations were made.

During the next stage, new systems were introduced to the plane. The planning project was closed and from there on in the only changes made in the plane were those required for the implementation of the project.

Another step: All the sketches related to the plane and its new systems were released. The process of mechanical production entered an advanced stage.

After the advanced mechanical production stage began the assembly of a braid-like network in the plane (with qualities similar to real braids but having an electrical function).

Upon completion of this stage, the process of producing harnesses for the prototype began at the air command in Jerusalem. Following final structural changes, conducted during the first 6 months of the year, the assembly of the harnesses was begun and the temporary braids were disassembled.

In June 1986, the assembly of the electronic system began and checks on the connections among the plane's new systems were accomplished. The examination of the electronic system was begun and implemented by an electronic scanner which was attached to the plane's skeleton and to its internal systems via more than 100 coordinated harnesses. The scanner is the product of planning by air force engineers and was used for the first time on this project.

The effectiveness of the examination of new systems in the plane by a computerized apparatus led, toward the end of the year, to the closing of the electrical circuits and the installation of all systems in the aircraft. After the installation, the process of integration among systems began and design errors in the electronic system and avionic systems of the plane were "corrected."

The plane was finished.

Following the initial stage of tests that were conducted on the Phantom, the improvements required were defined in greater detail:

- Improved operational capabilities.
- Improved flight safety.
- Improved human engineering.
- Improved performance in direct relationship to the cost of maintaining the plane.
- Increase in life of the plane, with appropriate maintenance.

The goal of the project to upgrade the Phantom planes is defined as extending the operational life of the plane until the year 2000 and beyond. Structural changes constitute an important part of the improvements made in the aircraft. These changes emerged from long experience in the air force over the many years in which the planes were in action. Engineers and maintenance experts were involved in the planning and the operational experience of the air crews themselves as fully exploited.

The two main improvements in the body structure of the plane were changes in the electronic system and changes in the entire hydraulic pipe system. These changes were made in consideration of the contribution they would make toward

facilitating the introduction of new systems within the aircraft. When making these changes the relative cost versus the possible benefit was also considered, as is true of most of the other changes made over the course of the project.

The fact that most of the planning for the upgrade and the new systems was conducted mainly within the air force lowered the cost of the entire project and created a certain balance between the investment and the benefits to be reaped from the finished product.

Maintenance for a New Era

Special consideration was given to maintenance when choosing new systems for the Phantom 2000.

A heavy emphasis was placed in the planning stages on easy access to all the plane's parts and components. The objective: to reduce maintenance work at every level including pre-flight checks, routine checks, and periodic checks. A major improvement related to maintenance was made in the avionic system. The new avionic systems that were installed in the Phantom will be able to conduct a large percentage of checks independently, as compared with the old systems: breakdowns will register on the plane's computers for repair after a flight, breakdowns that will be reported to the pilot during flight, and breakdowns that will appear during routine checks. The new systems allow access to the plane with electronic checking equipment that registers breakdowns quickly and reliably.

Over all, the operational reliability of the plane and other flight safety aspects have been improved significantly. Systems with low reliability were changed and replaced with new, more effective and reliable systems. A savings in hours required for various maintenance functions was achieved. Similarly, the possibility of planes going out of service due to systems malfunctions was reduced.

The Phantom's interior was replaced in its entirety. In the new plane, a new and original avionic system is in place. Also installed were control systems with greater operational capabilities; big, fast computers with more memory and greater computational abilities; systems for transferring data among the plane's systems; an advanced visual system with multi-purpose scopes that are capable of choosing the appropriate system depending on the nature of the mission or its various phases; and wide-angle radar and improved fire control.

Overall, the architecture of the improved aircraft is based on modern, state-of-the-art avionics.

Among the possibilities being examined for improving the plane's maneuverability is the installation of rudder-like wings on the sides of the nose. These will increase the plane's maneuverability (which is somewhat clumsy) and also increase the plane's stability at high altitudes.

Ongoing Controls

The plane's human engineering has been the subject of deep thought on the part of the Phantom 2000 planners. The new planes, especially the multi-purpose ones, are loaded with many sophisticated and important systems which require effective and ongoing operation by the crew during the entire flight in an effort to extract the best possible performance.

At this stage of the planning, there was close cooperation between the planners and the air crews. This cooperation contributed to the design of completely new systems whose purpose was to reduce the operational burden on the pilot and the navigator by giving a certain "autonomy" to the plane itself.

In the new Phantom, the operational functions for the avionic systems are concentrated on one panel. The pilot and navigator's panels were redesigned and the interior architecture was made more efficient. The placement of flight devices was changed with the goal of contributing to the ease of operation and to extract much greater efficiency than before.

The Phantom 2000 closely resembles newer planes from the point of view of both instrumentation and maintenance planning.

Prolonged maintenance activities had in the past been a burden on the ground crew in order to get the plane ready for take-off in a short amount of time. This activity has been reduced to a minimum. The computerized systems and the reduced complexity of the plane (which reduced the difficulty of finding a part in the belly of the plane when a breakdown occurred) facilitate the pinpointing of problems and the crews ability to deal with them, making for faster maintenance.

The training of qualified manpower to operate the new systems is now being conducted at a fast pace in the air force. The modern training is being conducted with the support of literature (printed and computerized), veteran trainers, and detailed and complex technical instructions, all of which were prepared by the planners of the new systems.

The configuration control of the Phantom 2000 is based mainly on computerized data. The future, which knocked on the door, was welcomed with open arms. The checking equipment was prepared using modern means and at a high operational level--entirely in keeping with the new systems installed in the plane. At the same time, the air force is preparing appropriate support in the reserve and among technical trainees.

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WESTERN GALILEE WATER CONTAMINATED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 27 May 87 p 2

[Article by Eli El'ad: "There Is a Noticeable Deterioration in the Quality of the Water in the Springs of the Western Galilee"]

[Text] A noticeable worsening of the quality of the waters streaming through the Western Galilee has been noticed recently. So said Dr Ya'acov Eren, who is in charge of the quality of water in the northern region, at a conference of the Israeli Society for Ecology and the Quality of the Environment. Until a few years ago, those waters were considered to be among the best sources of drinking water in Israel.

Four springs are in question. They include those of Kabri, Ga'ton, and 'En Ziw and Hardelit, which flow through the natural reserves in the Kziv Valley. The annual flow of the Western Galilee streams amount to about 15-20 million cubic meters of water every year, and they represent one of the main sources of drinking water in the region.

Dr Eren reported that the results of bacteriological studies of the Western Galilee springs showed that their quality is deteriorating due to an increase in the level of bacteria. He pointed out that, for the first time this year, the water supply people had to discard about a million cubic meters of water that used to be of excellent quality because of large amounts of bacterial contamination measured in them.

This water was funneled to the sea because the water supply people could not let it get into the drinking water supply system, which is disinfected and chlorinated. This treatment is given to all the springs which supply drinking water for the area.

There is a serious problem in the Western Galilee of poorly organized sewage water, which is seen as the probable major source of contamination of the springs. Of concern are the sewage waters of Ma'alot and other settlements which pour untreated through channels or into absorbing wells of other settlements whose waters permeate the layers of underground water.

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REPORT REVEALS SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITIES AT ISRAEL LAND ADMINISTRATION

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 21 May 87 pp 1, 2

[Article by Baruch Me'iri: "Report Reveals Suspicions Concerning the Integrity of the Head of the Israel Land Administration"]

[Text] An in-depth investigation conducted by the assistant Attorney General Yoram Bar-Sel'a, revealed bad news about deviant activities being conducted by the Israel Land Administration, especially on the part of the man who heads that organization, Moshe Lipke.

The assistant attorney general investigated four complaints out of six that reached him. Several days ago he handed his findings over to the attorney general, Yosef Harish.

In his conclusion, Yoram Bar-Sel'a stated categorically: "It appears on the face of it that the basis of the complaints points to a blot on the administrative functions, improper practices, deficient management, possible preferential treatment, and more--activities indicating a possible lack of integrity."

Notwithstanding, the assistant attorney general, who in the meantime had left his position, pointed out that the essence of the complaints indicates disciplinary aberrations as opposed to any fear of criminal wrongdoing. Against this background, he decided to pass the information on for examination by the attorney general.

Paragraph one of the report summarizes the main points of the assistant's findings:

- It may be said that there is a common thread in all the files that were examined.... At issue are incidents in which the Israel Land Administration was saddled with people working against the interests of the administration, or breaches of contract, or incidents in which plans were not implemented or land was trespassed upon....

- At first, the administration worked against these people, as required. However, at a later stage, for reasons which are neither clear nor detailed, there was interference in the regular work process. In most of the incidents,

the interference was from the head of the administration.... The burning question why and how the situation suddenly changed...."

In another place in the report, the assistant attorney general criticized the intervention of the former minister of agriculture, Pesah Gruper, saying: "The agriculture minister's interference, and that of the head of the administration in all these files, stimulated a vested interest in the file. Its not clear what the motives for intervention were and it is difficult to follow up."

One of the six complaints that were submitted to the Justice Ministry was related to a dispute between two factions in Moshav Poria, over the land rights of the village. The issue was litigated and it was decided that the administration would appoint a committee to investigate the subject. The conclusions of the committee were authorized by a ruling of the district court in Haifa in December 1984. However, to date the recommendations have not been fully implemented. "The picture is one where one side has not succeeded in implementing its rights and receiving the land area that was allotted to it," stated Yoram Bar-Sel'a.

The head of the Israel Land Administration responded yesterday, via the administration's spokesman, 'Amikam Shapira, with these words: "There is no factual basis for these claims. Everything that was done by the administration was proper and authorized by the parties agreed upon."

The head of the administration further claims that he is not familiar with the report and that his response relates to statements published in the media. According to him, for every incident mentioned in the report there is an explanation anchored in the decisions of authorized parties within the administration.

Lipke harshly attacked what he called "Justice Ministry leaks." "I take a very negative view of the fact that legal parties, who are supposed to be engaged in proper administration, leak internal reports that were given to the attorney general for consideration."

Yoram Bar-Sel'a summarily dismissed Moshe Lipke's response, saying that the tactic of personally attacking the complainant "appears to be unacceptable, and to be worthy criticism on the part of the Justice Ministry.... The question to be asked in each incident examined is why the head of the system deviated from the recommendations and from the routine and ongoing operative mode of the apparatus he was obligated to run."

There is also discussion of land being held illegally by the Swititzki family. In 1965, the head of the Israel Land Administration filed a claim for removal against the Swititski inheritors. While legal proceedings were under way, and when it was finally likely that the case would be won, negotiations were conducted between the administration and the inheritors. The negotiation itself and the settlement in April 1982 raised some doubts. However, according to the assistant to the attorney general, it was the implementation

of the settlement that was most gregious, and caused for much astonishment and suspicion.

Following the findings of the assistant attorney general, MK Ran Kohen (RATZ) turned yesterday to the minister of agriculture, demanding that he take a stand regarding the findings of the Justice Ministry's report. "I am convinced that it is your obligation to take immediate steps to relieve the head of the Israel Land Administration of his duties and to conduct an investigation regarding his involvement and the involvement of MK Pesah Gruper in activities that caused serious damage to the administration. Both evidently aided people whose interests stood in opposition to the interests of the state and the defense of its assets," claimed MK Kohen.

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ECOLOGICAL PROBLEMS PLAGUE METROPOLITAN AREAS

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 27 May 87 p 13

[Article by Professor Lev Fishelzon: "They Are Destroying You, Israel"]

[Text] This article comes in the aftermath of two reports which appeared concerning the deliberate dumping of lindane poison into the Kineret, once along the beach and once near the pumps of the water conduit, in order to kill fish which are then collected and sold in Israeli markets. Such reports have been repeated every few months for many years. The Kineret serves as a dumping place for various poisons dumped by the fishermen in the area. And we, the residents of Israel, do not pay any attention to it, and the establishment satisfies itself with a little report and, perhaps, here and there, with a token meeting and a low-key police investigation.

It is understood that, at times, as in Eli El'ad's article of 14 May, a spokesperson argues that "there is no cause for concern. The amount spilled (as if he had measured it) is diluted in a huge quantity of water, and there is no danger in using it." I am willing to agree that there is probably no danger, but where does this sense of certainty come from? The poison under discussion lasts a long time, mixes easily with various solvents, and was removed from human use (against lice) because of its carcinogenicity.

Perhaps we citizens ought to bless the fact that they are only spilling a "small" amount. And what is a small amount? We know that there are creatures who react to just a few molecules in the environment. I am reminded of the experts at Chernobyl who argued after the accident that there was nothing to worry about, that it was just a local problem. And what did we see later? We saw far-reaching danger and damage.

Widespread Echo in the World

The dumping of poisons in water sources would have caused loud rumblings in other modern countries and would have brought about energetic intervention on the part of those appointed over those areas. This would be true especially when one of the main victims of these poisons in the water is man. The Kineret is a source of water for most of Israel's population, and whatever is in its waters eventually reaches the pipes in people's homes. It turns out that poisons, in various forms and shapes, reach the drinking water. True, they

are very diluted, but who among us knows how even a few molecules of this or that material, a poison to the system, will affect the organs of our bodies?

Now I want to extend the presentation of the acuteness of the problem connected with harming the natural waters of Israel and the living world and what grows on it by "environmenticides" (an international nickname for this phenomenon) who, intentionally, by various activities fill the environment with foreign substances. The Kineret is an example of the systematic way that a small and irresponsible group, out for profit, can poison a natural environment and damage the water and the life in it. Such damaging activities take place in various parts of the country, intentionally or through negligence. Airplanes which spray insecticides fly over rivers and streams; the trail of poison released falls on the water and kills animals and fish, and part of it is absorbed by other living things and remains in the system.

And again we have the phenomenon on the Kineret of a small group of people doing exactly as they please, and the public as a whole, because of ignorance or indifference, swallows their their actions together with the poisons. Thus the leaders of Tel Aviv permitted planes to fly over the city spraying poison against mosquitos. Such a thing is unheard of in other developed countries. They think that if such poison is released quickly, it disappears. In fact, it remains in the system, and we have no solid knowledge of where it eventually settles.

From DDT to Mosquito Control

I will mention only that, not many years ago, when Israel was among the main producers and users of DDT, the percentage of the poison in cow's milk and even in the milk of nursing mothers was among the highest in the world. Thank heaven that this is no longer a problem. It is clear to everyone that such aerial spraying, in most cases, leaves many foci of mosquitos untouched and only improves the situation temporarily. I am certain that we will have to deal with the problem of mosquitos again this year. Along with this, generalized spreading of poisons also hurts the life that we are supposed to protect, whose growth we are supposed to watch over, life which also includes the predators of mosquitos.

So you get the sad picture of everyone doing what they like. And we, because we are busy with various problems, real or imagined, watch silently from the sidelines. Once in a while, there is a protest or a little article. Don't we care what kind of environment we live in? Don't we care what kind of water we drink? If we go back to the Kineret issue, let us not forget that we have nothing like it from the point of view of the life that is in it or as a national reservoir.

The gradual erosion of naturally existing ecological systems in Israel is stripping the land and causing it and us environmental damage whose long-term effects no one knows. The time has come to think about it. We do not need an international conference to know this.

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ISRAEL

NEAR EAST

BRIEFS

INFLATABLE COMBAT BOOTS--The IDF recently developed inflatable combat boots. The inflatable boots were developed with the intent of solving the problems of volume and rapid deterioration inherent in the boots currently in use, which are made with polyurethane. The size of the new boots, when folded, allows them to be easily and comfortably carried, without interfering with the soldier carrying them. Using the boots is simple and easy--one must first open the metal frame and then inflate them with several puffs. [Text] [Tel Aviv BAMAHAHE in Hebrew No 34, 20 May 87 p 6] 9811/9599

CSO: 4423/33

CABINET SUBMITS AMENDED CITIZENSHIP BILL TO NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 22 Jun 87 p 10

[Article: "New Amended Bill Permits Jordanians To Have Dual Citizenship"]

[Text] Amman--AL-DUSTUR--The government has submitted to the Chamber of Deputies a bill amending the 1987 Jordanian citizenship law. Following is the text of the bill:

Article 1. This law shall be called the Law Amending the 1987 Jordanian Citizenship Law. It shall be read with Law No 6 of 1954, referred to hereafter as the original law, and with its amendments as a single law, and it shall go into effect 30 days after its publication in the OFFICIAL GAZETTE.

Article 2. Article 4 of the original law shall be amended by adding to it the phrase "on a cabinet decree at the recommendation of the minister of interior." This phrase shall be inserted after the phrase "to acquire Jordanian citizenship" contained in Article 4 of the original law.

Article 3. The text of Article 8 of the original law shall be deleted and replaced by the following text:

Article 8.

1. A foreign woman married to a Jordanian may acquire Jordanian citizenship with the interior minister's approval if she makes known her wish known in writing and citizenship shall be granted in accordance with the following:

A. If she has been married for 3 years and has Arab citizenship.

or:

B. If she has been married for 5 years and has non-Arab citizenship.

2. A Jordanian woman married to a non-Jordanian who acquires her husband's citizenship may retain her Jordanian citizenship unless she relinquishes it in accordance with the provisions of this law. She may regain her Jordanian citizenship on request if the marriage is terminated for any reason.

3. A Jordanian woman whose husband has acquired or is in the process of acquiring the citizenship of another country under special circumstances may retain her Jordanian citizenship.

Article 4. The text of Article 10 of the original law shall be deleted and replaced by the following text:

Article 10. An underaged child whose Jordanian father has acquired foreign citizenship may retain his Jordanian citizenship.

Article 5. The text of Paragraph A of Article 13 of the original law shall be deleted and replaced by the following text:

Article 13A. The cabinet may grant or withhold a naturalization request submitted to it in accordance with the provisions of Article 12 of this law.

Article 6. The text of Article 14 of the original law shall be deleted and replaced by the following text:

Article 14. A naturalized Jordanian shall be considered a Jordanian in all respects. However, he may not hold a political or diplomatic position and may not be a National Assembly member for at least 10 years after he acquires Jordanian citizenship. Moreover, he shall not be entitled to run for office in municipal and rural councils and in labor unions for at least 5 years after he acquires citizenship.

Article 7. The text of Article 15 of the original law shall be deleted and replaced by the following text:

Article 15. Any Jordanian may relinquish his Jordanian citizenship and acquire foreign citizenship after getting the cabinet's approval.

Article 8. The text of Article 16 of the original law shall be deleted and replaced by the following text:

Article 16. Any Jordanian may relinquish his Jordanian citizenship and acquire the citizenship of an Arab country.

Article 9. The text of Article 17 of the original law shall be deleted and replaced by the following text:

Article 17. A Jordanian who has acquired foreign citizenship shall continue to retain his Jordanian citizenship unless he relinquishes it in accordance with the provisions of this law.

Compelling Reasons

1. Article 4 of the original law has been amended to define the authority to grant Jordanian citizenship to an Arab who has lived in Jordan for 15 years, and it has given this power to the cabinet on the interior minister's recommendation.

2A. It has been shown that to consider a foreign woman a Jordanian citizen immediately upon her marriage to a Jordanian man has its perils. Thus an Arab woman must retain her non-Jordanian citizenship for 3 years after her marriage so that she may be entitled to declare her wish to acquire Jordanian citizenship. The amendment mandates that a non-Arab wife wait for 5 years. The reasons for discriminating thus are obvious.

2B. The amendment permits a Jordanian woman who is married to a non-Jordanian and has her husband's citizenship to retain her Jordanian citizenship. Should she relinquish Jordanian citizenship, she may regain it if her marriage is terminated for any reason, including the husband's death or on divorce (Article 3 of the bill).

3. Article 10 of the original law has been amended so that the underaged child of a Jordanian father may retain his Jordanian citizenship if his father obtains foreign citizenship. This is done to preserve the child's citizenship rights, which are part of the general law.

4. Paragraph A of Article 13 has been amended so that the cabinet's right to reject a naturalization request, regardless of whether submitted by an Arab or a non-Arab, may not be restricted, considering that citizenship is a function of sovereignty and that granting citizenship must be subject to the government's authority.

5. Article 14 of the original law has been amended so that a naturalized citizen may not be entitled to hold a political or diplomatic position or be a National Assembly member for 10 years after he acquires citizenship and may not be entitled to run for office in a municipal or rural council for 5 years after he acquires citizenship. These restrictions have been imposed to entrench the naturalized individual's citizenship, to enable him to adapt to his new society, and to make sure of his loyalty to this society. This is a principle observed in other countries.

6. Articles 15 and 16 of the original law have been amended by omitting the phrase "from non-Arab extraction" from the first and the phrase "from Arab extraction" from the second so that a Jordanian wishing to acquire the citizenship of a non-Arab foreign country may do so with the cabinet's approval and a Jordanian wishing to acquire Arab citizenship may do so without the cabinet's approval.

7. Article 17 has been amended to stress the provision that a Jordanian acquiring the citizenship of another country continues to retain his Jordanian citizenship unless he relinquishes it in accordance with the provisions and procedures stipulated in this law.

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SA'ADAH COMMENTS ON POLITICAL, ECONOMIC SITUATIONS

Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 20-26 Jul 87 pp 14-15

[Article by Nadim Abou-Ghannam]

[Text]

The ideas expressed at the rally in Tripoli marking the 40th day after the assassination of Premier Rashid Karami were quite different from the beliefs which the late prime minister himself held, according to Phalangist Party President George Saade. Speaking to *Monday Morning* last week, he said that the utterances of some speakers at the rally — which took place on July 12 — were such as to give offense to the majority of the Lebanese people.

Saade stressed the need to speed up efforts to unmask the killers of the prime minister and those who had instigated his murder. The results of the investigations now under way, he said, should be made public as soon as possible.

Asked to comment on the proposed «Front for Unification and Liberation», which is seen as a grouping of figures opposed to the regime of President Amin Gemayel and the Lebanese Forces militia and in alliance with Syria — the principal external player in Lebanese affairs —, Saade replied that he supported unification and liberation «in their true sense». He had, he recalled, previously called for the formation of a broad Christian front which would have as its counterpart an enlarged Moslem grouping, and these together would work to end the Lebanese tragedy.

He said that if an invitation to meet

Syrian leaders in Damascus were addressed to him as leader of the Phalangist Party, he would readily accept it.

Saade denied reports that there were conflicts within the party, stating merely that the organization was currently «considering replacement of membership cards on a statistical and technical basis, and at the same time as measures against those who have damaged (the party's) reputation.»

In a reference to the continuing paralysis of the Council of Ministers, which has not met since 1985, owing to the boycott by opposition ministers of President Gemayel following his rejection of the Tripartite Accord of that year, Saade called for the formation of a new cabinet, suggesting that the present crisis had nothing to do with the approaching end (in September, 1988) of the president's term of office. The crisis, he said, was caused by regional and international rivalries and the interventions of outside powers on the Lebanese scene.

Here is a translation of the interview, which ... as conducted in Arabic :



How do you evaluate the speeches delivered on the occasion of 40th-day observance of Premier Karami's death, and what is your response?

It is regretful to see the commemoration of Premier Karami's assassination become an occasion for stating proposals in which he, personally, did not believe. A commentary made Monday, said that the greatest absentee from Karami's rally, was Premier Karami himself. His thoughts were also absent. The proposals made were not new. What was astonishing was that many declarations and proposals made on the occasion, were always rejected by the prime minister, as everybody knows.

Many of the slogans that were voiced were completely different from what Karami wanted. We and the majority of the Lebanese reject those proposals. Insulting the Lebanese flag is unacceptable, and insulting the Lebanese martyrs, whom the Lebanese unanimously honor is also unacceptable. So is the case with the numerous proposals that have become familiar to us. Our response is not new, but will harm everybody.

Let us reach an understanding that will rescue Lebanon, and let us agree on proposals that the Lebanese will unanimously approve. Proposals which will estrange the Lebanese are to be rejected. It is sad that some are being accused of working for partition, while the proposals currently made are partitionist. To us, the Army is the way to salvation, and we should all work for restoring the brigades which were separated from the Army to help it play its effective role.

Reports were circulated during the rally that there were threats of a military «explosion.» In your opinion, were those of a serious nature? If yes, what are the measures which you would take?

These threats are not new, and for a certain period we were hearing such threats. Those behind them know very well that these threats would frighten nobody.

How do you see the phase that will follow the 40th - day observance?

We have condemned Premier Karami's assassination, I was the first one to call for a general strike in condemnation. I have asked and still

asking for speeding up efforts to unveil the culprits and to announce the outcome of the investigation as soon as possible to put an end to all accusations. Some people lament Premier Karami and ask for a ransom but we do not support them. We prefer to identify the real instigators and assassins, without taking this as a pretext to accuse others.

What is your viewpoint regarding the formation of the «Front for Unification and Liberation,» and will it be met with a unified Christian front?

Unification is the goal for which we aim, and so is liberation for which we will exert all efforts possible. If these terms are interpreted in their real sense, there will be no need for the formation of numerous fronts.

For a long period of time, we have been calling for the formation of a broad Christian front, in which all the Christians will agree on specific proposals, that will be met, on the other hand, with a global Moslem front. These two fronts will put an end to Lebanon's tragedies.

This proposal was recently made by former President Suleiman Franjleh are you in other words reiterating his call?

I made this recently. I also support President Franjleh in his proposal.

Who is behind the present economic deterioration, and how can it be tackled amidst rumors of possible popular upheaval in both East and West Beirut?

The economic situation is greatly deteriorating. The people will not remain silent for a long time. The resentment is tremendous, and the rebellion of the hungry is the true rebellion. It is regretful that certain leaders who are trying through all means to pretend to be defending the poor and the deprived, to be making grandiose declarations and acting irresponsibly, thus aggravating the economic deterioration. Ways of tackling the situation include technical and economic means, as well as political means. Boycotting of cabinet sessions is not the means to halt the deterioration. The best proof is that

since the political boycott started, the Lebanese currency tremendously declined, and the economic situation started deteriorating, until we reached the present conditions. Treatments are either economic and technical, or political. Everybody knows how these issues can be tackled, if they are really serious. Anyone who believes that through the economic war he can achieve political goals, is mistaken.

Reports are circulated about conflicts within the Phalangist Party, that might lead to division within the Party. To what extent are these reports true?

These reports are the wishful thinking of some and are far from reality. The Phalangist Party is proceeding in accordance with the principals of the Party founder (Pierre Gemayel). Now we are starting the Party membership card on the basis of true Lebanese Phalangist principles.

What are the reasons for issuing a new Phalangist card?

The issue is not related to the form or color; it is a matter of content. There are intrinsic and basic causes for changing the card. After new members are enrolled in the Party, party cards should be changed to determine the ranks. Following the 1958 events, the Party adopted this measure. Since the civil war which started in 1975, many partisans who were not qualified to join the Party, have done so, because the Party was not able to rehabilitate them on the party level. In view of the preoccupations in military and daily - living problems that the country was facing. So, the Party has decided to change the cards, to avoid sifting the Phalangist ranks.

We are not going to replace the cards of certain Phalangists who disgraced the Party's reputation. On the other hand, the replacement of cards is a comprehensive, statistical and a technical measure, through which the Party can have full information of all its members. This information will later be computerized on the basis of vocation, age, regional membership and other issues requested during the present circumstances.

If the cabinet situation remains the same, would you support the appointment of a new cabinet?

I would, definitely. Everybody should ask for this new appointment, because it is not acceptable to have a country without a cabinet.

If difficulties faced the formation of a new cabinet, would you call for the appointment of a military cabinet?

A military cabinet is unacceptable in Lebanon. This experience did not succeed in the past, so why ask for a military cabinet? Politically, it is not possible to agree on a cabinet that will manage the affairs of the country and people.

Will the current political impasse continue until the end of President Gemayel's term in office, or is there any glimpse of hope for a solution through other means? And what are these means?

The people have the right to give up all hope in view of what is taking place. As for the current impasse and whether it will be resolved before the president's term in office expires or not, it is obvious that the crisis has accompanied many presidents, and towards the end of each term, it was reported that the crisis would not end before the end of that president's term.

Many used to ask for shortening the term of the president's office, and everybody remembers that at the beginning of the civil war, the Constitution was amended, to allow a new president be elected prior to the end of the term of the one in office. This was made on the basis of solving problems, but the crisis continued.

Thus, the crisis has nothing to do with the end of the president's term in office. It has become well-known that the crisis is caused by regional and international interventions on the Lebanese scene. It is regretful that some of the Lebanese have paved the way for outside forces to play freely with our fate.

If an invitation was addressed from the Syrian authorities to the Phalangist Party, would you accept it?

We were the first to visit Syria and to maintain relations with the Syrian

regime. I was the one to hold contacts with a number of the -comrades- on behalf of the Party. But if an invitation was addressed to us, we have no complex against responding to it. However, if we receive an invitation from Syria to visit it for the mere cause of a visit, so that it will be a new visit added to the number of previous ones. I believe it is not for our interest, nor it is for the interest of the country. If the visit was aimed at resolving problems, then we are ready to make this visit. ●

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AID TO AFRICAN NATIONS GENEROUS, UNCONDITIONAL

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 7 Jul 87 p 11

[Interview with Badah 'Abdallah al-Badah, former director of Saudi relief in the Sudan and director of the al-Quway'iyah branch of the Red Crescent, by 'Abdallah al-Fawzan: "Bridges of Human Contact: Saudi-African Cooperation To Combat Famine Began 2 Years Ago"; place and date not given]

[Text] Hardly a day passes without our seeing, hearing, or reading reports about Saudi relief trucks going to the African countries suffering from drought, countries which God has willed to be subject to drought even though most of them lie within the zone of constant rain throughout the year. Drought and intense heat have joined with hunger to decimate the people of these countries. Most countries of the world, especially the rich ones, stood by as spectators, evidently thinking about what they would gain if they offered their assistance to these suffering countries. Most of the inhabitants of these countries would have been on the verge of death from hunger, had God's favor not provided for them and engaged on their behalf the hearts of the leaders and people of Saudi Arabia. As a result, everyone hurried to rescue these suffering nations and relieve their people, based on the noble principles of Islamic law and in accord with the deep-rooted values and traditions that have distinguished Saudi Arabia over the years.

Whoever contemplates the quantity and content of continued Saudi aid to the suffering countries of Africa will perhaps discern that there are high purposes and noble goals behind this aid. The rulers and people of Saudi Arabia did not intend to impose their hegemony upon these countries. They did not intend to establish military bases on their territory, obtain naval privileges on their coasts and in their harbors, or open new markets for their products. They did not even think about gaining the support of these countries in international gatherings, tying them to their sphere and to their policies, or including them within military pacts, as some of the great powers do. Rather, the kingdom sought to extend bridges of friendship, strengthen relations with these countries, and support the bonds of friendship and cooperation with these countries and their people out of a desire to please God and acknowledge His favor and grace.

In this interview with Professor Badah 'Abdallah al-Badah, former director of the Saudi relief office in the Sudan and director of the al-Quway'iyah branch

of the Red Crescent, we throw more light on the history and nature of this aid, how it is distributed to the citizens of these countries, and the impressions the people of these countries have of Saudi Arabia's assistance as a government and as a people.

[Professor al-Badah] said: "I had the honor to represent my country and the Saudi Red Crescent Society as director of the relief office in the Sudan during the period from 6 Rabi' I 1407 to 10 Jumada II 1407 [9 November 1986 to 10 February 1987]. As everyone knows, Saudi aid to the African countries goes back to the year 1405 AH [September 1984 to September 1985], when famine became severe in such countries as the Sudan, Somalia, Mali, Mauritania, Djibouti, and Niger. At that time, the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques [King Fahd], God save him, issued a royal order to the government and generous Saudi people, urging them to hurry to the aid of the people of these famine-stricken countries. The Saudi people came forward as one man, responding to the royal invitation, inspired by their Islamic conscience, and the mosques filled up with citizens' contributions of food and clothing. A royal order was later issued for the Saudi Red Crescent to take charge of distributing this aid. Accordingly, officials of the Red Crescent Society set out to open offices to distribute relief materials in the suffering countries in coordination with the Saudi Ministry of Health."

We interrupted the director of the relief office with a question about the source of this aid: Was it only from citizens? He replied: "Most of the aid came from contributions, gifts, and freewill offerings from citizens. However, the government deserves thanks for bearing the costs of transport by the airplanes of the Royal Saudi Air Force, with two flights a week, especially to the brother country of the Sudan. The government also pays the salaries and expenses of Saudi relief workers."

In our conversation, we touched on the circumstances that led these countries to ask for aid. He explained that desiccation, drought, and the continued failure of rains caused these countries to lose the basic elements of their economy: agriculture and livestock raising.

We had a question about how relief materials are distributed to suffering citizens of these countries, especially the brother country of the Sudan. He answered: "There is constant coordination between Saudi relief personnel and officials in these countries. Also, the Red Crescent offices include some subjects of these countries. As for the Sudan, there are no difficulties in distribution. God be praised, our brothers in the Sudan gave us every facilitation. Because the Sudan is large in area, we opened a number of different centers in all the regions of the Sudan, including Kassala, Port Sudan, Derudeb, and Tahamiyam in the east, and al-Junaynah and Nyala in the west. Distribution also took place at al-Ubayyid and the Kordofan Region, and in the al-Dabbah area in the Northern Region. This is in addition to what was distributed at Madani, al-Duwaym, al-Qutaynah, al-Majallah, and at Babanusa and a large number of areas. What was distributed in the Sudan amounted to more than 200,000 tons of relief material, even though there were some difficulties not worth mentioning, such as internal transportation, unpaved roads, and high fuel prices."

This led us to another question: Some scientists blame the climate as being primarily responsible for the indolence of the people of these countries toward working and catching up with the march of civilization, because extreme heat and humidity cause the body to become slack and sluggish and consequently limit the productivity and energy of individuals. He replied: "With the amazing modern development in science, climate no longer has a great influence on shaping the personal factors of societies and directing human activity in them. To take Saudi Arabia as an example: the kingdom is known for its hot weather and desert land on account of sparse rain. Nevertheless, it has been able, with God's help and with the availability of resources and use of scientific methods, to overcome harsh conditions and establish a number of agricultural projects. The kingdom has gained a significant position in agriculture, especially in wheat growing and production. It has achieved self-sufficiency, and there has come to be a large surplus for export." He went on to say, "As for the Sudanese people, it is a noble and energetic people; however, the difficult economic circumstances it has experienced and that were affected by the international economic crisis caused the Sudan to pass through this temporary crisis. With God's permission, it will end."

Replying to a question about the nature and goal of Saudi aid and the difference between it and the aid offered by other countries and organizations, he said, "Saudi aid flows from the spirit of brotherhood and Islamic solidarity. It is done only for the sake of God. As for the aid offered by other agencies, behind it there are well-known reasons of which no one is ignorant."

Replying to a question about the Sudanese people's impression of the aid and of the kingdom as a government and as a people, he said, "Throughout our stay among them, we sensed that they harbor great appreciation and respect for the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and the entire Saudi people because of their humanitarian and noble positions."

Our final question was whether it would be preferable to conceal or publicize reports of this aid. He said, "God Almighty says in the unambiguous verses [of the Qur'an], 'If you publish your freewill offerings, it is excellent; but if you conceal them, and give them to the poor, that is better for you' [Qur'an 2:271]. Publishing them is not done to gain favor, but in order to incite everyone to offer assistance to their suffering brothers." He ended by saying, "God willing, this aid will continue as long as there is need for it. The request of our brothers in these countries is sufficient. And God is the granter of success."

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SUPREME COUNCIL MEMBER GIVES REASONS FOR HIS RESIGNATION

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 6 Jul 87 pp 14-16

[Article by 'Abd-al-Qadir Hafiz]

[Text] A decision has been issued in Khartoum accepting Mr Muhammad al-Hasan 'Abdallah Yasin's request to resign from his post as member of the Supreme Council, which is entrusted with the functions of head of state in the Sudan and is composed of two Democratic Unionist Party [DUP] representatives (one of them the president of the council), two Ummah Party representatives, and a fifth member representing Southern Sudan. Sudanese political circles view Mr Yasin's retirement from many angles and raise many questions about unseen developments in the current relationship between the two parties within the ruling coalition, and about developments the DUP is undergoing. AL-DUSTUR met with Mr Muhammad al-Hasan 'Abdallah Yasin before he left the Presidential Palace in Khartoum. This was the conversation that took place with him.

To begin the interview, AL-DUSTUR asked about the real reasons that led Mr Yasin to offer his resignation in a manner that looked as if it were a decision to abandon or break the governing agreement between the two parties, at a time when not a month has passed since Prime Minister al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's government formation removed the previous government after it had been in office a year. These things give the impression that the resignation represents a new division within the ranks of the DUP, which nominated Mr Muhammad al-Hasan to his post in the Supreme Council.

Muhammad al-Hasan says that his resignation from the Supreme Council was no surprise, neither was it unexpected, at least within the sphere of the party. Many factors intertwined in the recent period and hastened his decision to withdraw from his government and party responsibilities. He adds: "To be precise, I actually presented my request to be relieved from the Supreme Council in May. Some of the reasons that moved me at that time lay in the area of public activity; others were personal and related to my family situation. In the request to be relieved, I expressed this to Supreme Council President Ahmad al-Mirghani. At that time, he rejected my request. After discussion, he asked me to put off the matter of resignation. In addition, I had previously spoken about this matter with the party's overseer and leader Munammad 'Uthman al-Mirghani. At that time, I asked that the party apparatus begin working as soon as possible to fill the gap that would arise after my

resignation, and that they prepare to choose someone to succeed me in my position."

Moving to the reasons that made him decide to resign, Mr Muhammad al-Hasan said, "I have a particular vision of the current political situation in the Sudan and a definite point of view on many political issues. I find myself unable to deviate from the political policy in which I believe. It would be inappropriate for me now, while still a participant in the government, to speak about this in as much detail as you want. However, what I should like to reveal here is that something recently happened--something that was like the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back. It induced me to hasten to offer my resignation directly to the Constituent Assembly, bypassing all ordinary party channels within the DUP or within the organs shared by the two parties. What I am referring to--and it decided the issue--was the fact that we in the Supreme Council were informed of a decision by the heads of the two parties, Muhammad 'Uthman al-Mirghani and al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, forbidding council members from interfering in general political and party matters, on the ground that the Supreme Council is a national institution that ought to remain aloof from such activity. At the present time, I have no comment on this decision, other than my having expressed my rejection of it by resigning." Mr Muhammad al-Hasan went on to say, "The matter of my resignation was settled when the Constituent Assembly accepted it. As I specified in my resignation request, I shall remain at my post until 10 July, when the return of the Supreme Council president and one of the council members from outside the Sudan gives the council a full quorum of members."

[Question] What about your withdrawal from political activity on the DUP party level, or your reported request to be relieved of your leadership responsibilities in the party?

[Answer] I did express this wish to the party leadership, but received many wishes from party leadership echelons or from my home bases in Kordofan Region, asking me to continue carrying out my party responsibilities, particularly given these circumstances through which the DUP is passing. I will tell you that I expressed my agreement to stay, but on certain conditions. I see that many unionist leaders have moved away, whether or not they formed political parties. I see that today a considerable number of young people in the party are standing up and taking notice. There are a very large number of people who sympathize with our party and hope for performance that rises to the level of its memorable nationalist history. I ask that my hands be freed to work for a rapid unification of everything we today call the Unionist factions, so that these people can return to the umbrella of our one party. I ask for the spread of democracy in all party organs, and that party conferences be held at the earliest opportunity to prepare for the convening of a general convention which will choose the leadership organs of the party. If the current party apparatus agrees with me and gives me a firm mandate on this matter, I will devote myself to this task and give it all my time. By a mandate, I do not mean merely announcing agreement with this direction. It means that the granting of this request should be formalized by the party apparatus. Agreement only by the head of the party is not enough for me; the matter should come out in a decision from a joint meeting of the party's political bureau and parliamentary group.

[Question] You have spoken about uniting the Unionist factions. Everyone knows that this subject is beset with many difficulties and that such a task does not appear to be an easy matter that can be accomplished overnight, given the specific viewpoints these factions propose regarding party unification, some of which may be completely opposed to the strategy of the present DUP leadership and some of which are connected with rebuilding the party through its conferences.

[Answer] I do not believe such a task is impossible. First, however, the intentions have to be present. If the intentions are good and there is sincere dedication to the national question, the unification we desire will take place at the first available opportunity. I do not deny that there are real obstacles to reaching party unity; however, I am confident that I shall succeed in removing those obstacles. As for this talk about why holding the party conferences and the general conference has been delayed, on the assumption that this has come to constitute an obstacle to unification, I say that if we are really serious about holding these conferences, it will not take long--not more than a month. The facts today confirm that the party masses are eager to hold these conferences and are actually ready to hold them. All that we lack is for the leaders to go to the provinces to supervise holding the conferences and choosing the regional representatives who will form the party general convention that will elect the Central Committee and the leadership apparatus. With all clarity, I say that Khartoum's tutelage over the provinces has ended.

[Question] It has recently been said that the division within the party has taken a new form. People point to the so-called "Birri" group said to be headed by the party secretary general, al-Sharif Zayn-al-'Abidin al-Hindi.

[Answer] Such talk is incorrect and inaccurate. My comment on it is, first of all, that al-Sharif Zayn-al-'Abidin and myself are joined by long-standing comradeship and friendship. I can tell you that al-Sharif Zayn-al-'Abidin has refused to attend or talk at the "Birri" club whose establishment has been announced and about which some people have spoken. I fully know that al-Sharif Zayn-al-'Abidin would never lead a faction. I believe that the reform revolution which some speakers at the club have mentioned should never have been discussed by means of symposia and political soirees. This was a great mistake. In my view, any attempt at division within the party constitutes a crime against the party and the country. I think the best thing is for people in opposition to come and speak their opinion through the organs of the party and from its recognized centers. I do not deny that there have been mistakes; however, they will never be treated through political soirees and symposia. Personally, I will carry on debate, disagreement, and the expression of my viewpoint within the existing organs of the party. If I am unable to do so, I ought to give up my party responsibilities and stay home. I will certainly not be a cause of the party's division and dismemberment.

[Question] We would like to ask you about much that has happened in party politics recently--specifically, about a reported dispute between you and Dr Muhammad Yusuf Abu-Hurayrah. It has been said that you personally were leading a class-oriented movement within the party working to aid elements of

the commerce and business sectors, and that you were the foremost opponent of the policies of the former minister, and one of the people most enthusiastic about removing him from the ministry.

[Answer] I would like to say that I have not seen Dr Abu-Hurayrah in the party and do not know him from before. I first became acquainted with him when he was nominated for the deputyship. I saw in him a particular example of the type of people who the party ought to make use of--he could be considered one of the party's educated young men--and who ought to be given the opportunity to hold leadership positions in the party. For all these reasons, I personally nominated Dr Abu Hurayrah for a ministry. I was among five persons who recommended this nomination, including Muhammad 'Uthman al-Mirghani, Ahmad al-Mirghani, al-Sharif Zayn-al-'Abidin, and myself. As for my position regarding the business sector in the party, many people perhaps do not know that at a meeting in Mr Muhammad 'Uthman's garden I led a concentrated attack on certain merchants in the party. I explicitly accused them of having among their number weak-spirited men who were running after making money for themselves. Things got so bad at the meeting that I withdrew. I want you to know that I have not worked in business since 1974. Furthermore, I do not know many of the big businessmen in the Sudan. I do not have ideas that are class-oriented or partial to anyone; I have ideas that are truly Unionist. Anyone in the party who knows the reality of these principles and goals agrees and stands with me. Therefore many members of the party Political Bureau have lined up with me. Certainly, the merchant and business class includes people who have done good things and have good intentions, just as it includes the opposite. Our brother, Dr Abu-Hurayrah, is making war on all businessmen here, while he goes to negotiate with businessmen outside the Sudan! All his commercial negotiations in Kuwait and Jordan were with the private sector, not the public sector. The results of this disturbed me and made me in fact the most eager man to oppose Dr Abu-Hurayrah and to demand his removal from the ministry.

I have seen with my own eyes how quantities of crops valued at about 1 billion Sudanese pounds never left the places where they were produced--the fall season came and they were still in the open--and all because Dr Abu-Hurayrah's policy monopolized the whole crop trading operation for one company, and not a public-sector company, but rather a joint public and private sector one. Since this company was not notified early enough to prepare for such a great task, the well-known fiasco took place. The second mistake was Dr Abu-Hurayrah's decision to import meat from outside the Sudan, although the Sudan as a country is a source of this commodity. The country suffered a great loss as a result of this. In my view, the revenue that went abroad could more advantageously have been diverted to the Sudanese producers. The third mistake in Dr Abu Hurayrah's policies was to lock up sorghum exports and restrict them to the Sudanese Agricultural Bank. The result of this policy has been the now well-known situation: the piling up of large quantities of last season's large crop, which is still stockpiled. This has led the producers to turn away and delay the harvest of large quantities of sorghum, due to these marketing and monopoly policies. Furthermore, there are the mistakes in crop pricing policy. These mistakes have harmed the real producers and brought the greatest profits to a small number of buyers who benefit from this situation against the welfare of the farmers. I took my

position toward Dr Abu-Hurayrah for all these reasons. I am not against the public sector. In my opinion, what was needed was for the ministry's policies to take many factors into consideration and to balance the circumstances one lives with in the Sudan.

Furthermore, I believe the DUP is not a party for a particular class, but rather should express the interests of many classes. The party's real base is composed of workers, farmers, merchants, and intellectuals. These characteristics demand to be known in practice by those who are in charge of leading the party and who set the policies of the party in accordance with these balances. It is not in the party's interest that these balances become disturbed. I think these ideas were new to Dr Abu-Hurayrah. I do not doubt his learned credentials or that he has his political ideas that he held even before entering the party. But I doubt that he fully knows the party in a way that would shape his decisions and policies as is desirable.

Joint Errors

[Question] Doesn't it seem illogical to say that Dr Abu-Hurayrah was responsible for everything you consider wrong in the policies he followed? Is it not the case that ministers act in accordance with definite policies laid down by the party to which they belong, not to mention the fact that responsibility for these policies cannot be separated from joint responsibility within the Council of Ministers, or from what can be assumed to be agreed upon within the framework of the two parties?

[Answer] True, it might seem illogical, if we were talking about political and trade policies as a whole. However, what I am saying applies to Dr Abu-Hurayrah and to his handling of his executive responsibilities for implementing these policies. Therefore, when the government's economic policies were under discussion and debate within the committee to evaluate the actions of the government during its first year, it was my opinion that the blame fell on the economic sector committee, which included a number of ministers as a group. At that time, I registered this opinion when I was asked in the aforementioned evaluation committee to participate in evaluating economic performance. I refused to participate because I hold a particular point of view which might have an effect on the two things. I do not deny that the error was jointly that of Abu-Hurayrah and those who were with him on the ministerial committee formed by the Council of Ministers for the economic sector.

[Question] Now that the coalition between the Ummah Party and the DUP has been mentioned, we would like to hear an evaluation from you of the present and future course of the coalition and whether there was a connection between this and your leaving your post in the Supreme Council.

[Answer] I was responsible jointly with my colleagues during the first year of the life of the coalition government. Naturally, I am responsible for any successes or failures, and I do not wish in this conversation to repeat what has been said about the failures. However, I want to say that I have definite positions and a definite vision of national problems as a whole. I can say that what we need at this stage, as the Unionist Party and as partners in the

existing government, is to announce our political and national policy. I believe we have now moved away from thinking about this because of our current situation. We have not moved away from the goals and principles that our party has continued to raise. We ought to ask ourselves whether we are proceeding with the national policy on which our party grew up, whether we are advancing the goals and principles that were held by the first contingent of Unionists, and whether we are adhering to this policy that makes us know where to set our feet. In my opinion, the DUP today is not taking time to look into these things and evaluate its performance from this perspective. We entered the whirlpool of government; many routine questions occupied us which did not serve these goals and principles busied us. What is required immediately--today, not tomorrow--is that we review our policies and programs in all areas, both our domestic and our national Arab political policies. I think that if our party succeeds in pulling itself together and uniting ranks, and if its conferences are held, it will be easy for us to put our hands on the places that need treatment.

Defense Agreement

[Question] It seems we cannot refrain from asking for a specific response on many of the conspicuous issues regarding relations between the two parties, which is reflected in contradictory policies. We are referring particularly to the question which has arisen about relations with Egypt: specifically, the subject of cancelling the joint defense agreement and the differing viewpoints in each of the two parties on this issue. Also, there are many other points of difference which may constitute a danger for the existing coalition between the two parties.

[Answer] I shall limit myself to answering the first half of the question. I agree with you that the disagreement which has begun to emerge in the coalition may constitute a danger for it in the future. I cannot go beyond that. About the joint defense agreement with our sister country Egypt, I say that the agreement exists; it has not been cancelled, for the simple reason that its cancellation has not passed through the constitutional channels represented by the Council of Ministers, the Constituent Assembly, and the Supreme Council--unless during his recent visit to Egypt there was an unannounced agreement between Prime Minister al-Sadiq al-Mahdi and Egyptian Prime Minister 'Atif Sidqi that what preceded the Brotherhood Charter is necessary--but that is another matter.

[Question] Finally, we ask who will succeed you in your position on the Supreme Council.

[Answer] Since the office of a Supreme Council member is filled according to a predetermined geographical distribution, it can be assumed that a candidate from Kordofan Region will succeed me. As far as I know, the matter has not been discussed yet. If I had someone to nominate, it would take place through the DUP Political Bureau. At the present time, I am taking care of this. What I do know is that my successor will be a native of Kordofan, inasmuch as the party bases in that region propelled me to my leadership responsibilities.

NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT LEADER DISCUSSES CURRENT ISSUES

Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic 8 Jul 87 pp 16-17

[Interview with Dr Hasan al-Turabi, leader of the National Islamic Front, by Hamid Sulayman: "Frank Conversation With Dr Hasan al-Turabi: What Is Behind the Recent Cabinet Change in the Sudan?"; place and date not given]

[Excerpts] What is behind the surprising recent cabinet change in the Sudan? What are the real circumstances confronting the progress of Sudanese democracy under the surface? Why has the military and security situation degenerated in the South, so that it constitutes an obstacle to constitutional progress in our brother country, the Sudan? How did the economic and security problem in the Sudan come to a head and how did security conditions in the capital degenerate? What is the specter that threatens the Sudanese scene, now that Libyan weapons have spread to the tribes of northern and western Sudan?

These sharp and heated issues that form the present anxieties of Sudanese citizens were the subject of our conversation with Dr Hasan al-Turabi, who is leader of the National Islamic Front [NIF] and has assumed the tasks of leadership of the parliamentary opposition in the Sudanese Constituent Assembly. He answered AKHIR SA'AH with a frankness reflecting his spirit of liberalism, political openness, and enlightened culture.

[Question] The recent cabinet change has raised uneasiness in Arab circles generally and in Egypt particularly--especially since the previous ministry came in the wake of free elections and a popular uprising, at the end of which the military handed over power to the representatives of the Sudanese people. What then are the real reasons behind this sudden change?

[Answer] The reality is that the conjectures about a dispute among the ministers represented the surface of these disputes. The reality is that the performance of al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's recent cabinet was much less than the extent of the economic and security problems that had accumulated during the period of military rule. No one denies the prime minister's ability; however, he found himself in the end working alone, whether because of the nature of his personality, or because of the lassitude and nondescript nature of some of his ministers. The economic situation therefore deteriorated to such an extent that it induced the World Bank to refuse even to begin negotiations. As a result, the exchange rate of the dollar rose to over 6 Sudanese pounds.

The security situation also became more serious due to the infiltration of light weapons from the "Libyan military pocket" in northwest Sudan, not only to some of the militias connected with political forces, but also to ordinary individuals in the capital and to thousands of unemployed Southerners wandering the back streets of Khartoum. You can picture what might happen when weapons reach some of these unemployed people. We are already suffering from thefts and burglaries in the outlying suburbs.

The coalition with the DUP into which al-Sadiq, head of the al-Ummah Party, was forced, imposed substandard ministers upon him. The result was that the Foreign Ministry, under the administration of its former DUP minister, passed through a period of hibernation, not accomplishing any positive step in any area of foreign affairs. The former commerce minister, the subject of the dispute, turned his attention to personal material gains. Being unfamiliar with world market prices, he failed to take advantage of the abundant sorghum harvest and market it abroad, which caused the sorghum to pile up in the storage depots. Finally, the prime minister was forced to announce the dissolution of the ministry and acknowledge the weakness of the government's performance.

Dimensions of the Constitutional Impasse

[Question] Apart from this weakness that you see, what is your view of the present political, constitutional, and economic situation in the Sudan?

[Answer] I shall not be exaggerating if I say that the flame of optimism that accompanied the democratic popular uprising has begun to go out. The people of the Sudan, who twice saved democracy from the hands of military men, and who later saw democracy collapse twice at the hands of military men led by 'Abbud and Numayri--the fears of this people have begun to return, and they talk about the possible collapse of democratic government a third time, perhaps once again at the hands of military adventurers. People's fears do not usually arise from a vacuum. The reality is that the composition of the cabinet all three times, including the most recent one, was subject to the traditional formula relying upon a majority cabinet from the al-Ummah Party or the DUP. Because they are traditional parties dependent upon sectarian groupings and tribes, they exude a leadership that the modern age, with its sharp and varied problems, has passed by. These traditional leaderships thus become an encumbrance in these problems, even allowing them to worsen and accumulate without solution, because problems are not confronted with a comprehensive programs and policies. Thus they lacked innovative means and methods able to create modern and decisive solutions.

The result has been that in the area of domestic policy the Sudan is now living in the midst of a whirlpool of constrictions which has led to a rise in the cost of living.

In the area of foreign policy, which has fallen victim to unexpected one-man decisions--such as the decisions to cancel integration and cancel the Joint Defense Treaty with Libya and Egypt, as well as the inability to hold on to a card with which one could put pressure on Ethiopia to convince her of the need

to stop supporting the rebellion in the South--all this has led to the displeasure of many parties now surrounding the Sudan. In the absence of clear political policies, the Sudan has begun to experience a state of virtual isolation, whose dimensions the prime minister himself is trying to fathom.

Moving to the present constitutional situation: the constitutional convention has not been held because of the war in the South, elections not having been held in its three regions. As a result, some of the temporary constitutional institutions, such as the institution of the presidency, have remained in a shaky form, at a time when the constitutional status of the president of the republic should have been determined. The same holds for the nation's other constitutional institutions. The Constituent Assembly, whose task was temporary and concentrated on drafting the country's permanent constitution, is still carrying out the country's legislative activity, standing in for an absent parliament, the length of whose absence we do not know.

In the face of all this, the security situation is worsening in a vast country--a million square miles, with many nationalities and races and far-flung borders--which needs a strong central government to confront the specter of action by these many forces in the South, West, and East under the temptation to impose their racial or ethnic control and encouraged by external forces plotting against the unity of the Sudan and taking advantage of the engagement of most of the striking forces of the Sudanese army in the forests of the South. In my opinion, the continuance of this weak constitutional situation, under which the Sudan's present government is operating while it waits for a solution of the Southern problem, has led only to further breakdown and more concessions to Garang, who would like to create a new Sudan that would discard its Arab character, history, and religion.

The government can stop this waiting. It can call for a draft national constitution and discuss it with the present parties, in order to get out of the current constitutional impasse into which we have been thrown by our waiting for a solution to the Southern problem.

The Situation in the South Is Serious

[Question] Inasmuch as the South constitutes this huge obstacle to the Sudan's constitutional, political, and economic development, what has now become of the situation in the South? What is the solution from your viewpoint?

[Answer] The situation is extremely serious and is worsening day by day. Garang's forces have begun to seize entire cities close to the Ethiopian border, with the direct assistance of bombs from Ethiopian airplanes. The influence of his forces is not limited to Equatoria Province, which is controlled by the Dinka, Garang's tribe; he has military forces in many locations in the three provinces of the South.

The forces of the Sudanese army suffer from lack of military reinforcement, which would protect its personnel during confrontations. Furthermore, they feel that cancellation of the military defense treaties has exposed their back. As a result, Sudanese army units feel they have been isolated from

lines of rapid reinforcement after railway and river communications lines were cut by Garang's forces and have come to be supported by air by helicopter.

You can picture the condition of civilians in the South: how they are attempting to flee because needed food supplies cannot get through, how they are rushing to migrate to the North and the capital. All this is happening in spite of the concessions the government has made to satisfy Garang by cancelling the September Laws and the joint defense treaties--to no avail. The solution to this problem, in my opinion, will not be achieved only through a peaceful solution, initiated by the Sudanese Communist Party, or by offering more concessions.

Rather, in my opinion the solution lies in pursuing a military and peaceful solution together. We cannot reach any agreement with Garang's forces without establishing military deterrence in the South, which will work to the advantage of the Sudanese government when it sits down at the negotiating table with the rebels.

Although Egypt, which understands the Sudan's circumstances well, has dealt very patiently with these one-man decisions, they have had negative effects on the morale of the Sudanese army, whose leaders believe that these decisions may lead Garang to take tougher positions--even though we all know that Egypt will not be slow to help the government and people of the Sudan or to give them any aid they request.

However, the Southern problem has a third important dimension which must be dealt with in order to solve the problem. I mean the international dimension.

The policy of the Soviet Union, which wants to impose its control and influence in this region through a "communist belt" beginning in South Yemen and ending in Libya, still stands behind encouraging Ethiopia to support Garang's rebellion. The policy of the United States, which wants to stop communist influence in the Horn of Africa, is also trying to court Garang through aid from the World Council of Churches.

Any wise government desiring to deal definitively with the problem of the South must deal with this international dimension and try to convince these international parties to keep hands off and stop supporting Garang's movement. On that day, Garang will have no card to play, even if the military or peaceful solution has been unable to arrive at any result.

The NIF and Participation in Government

[Question] Both times that a coalition cabinet was formed under al-Sadiq's leadership, the NIF was outside the cabinet. Why?

[Answer] The first time, the intention was to form a national cabinet from the three blocs that had won the majority of seats in the Constituent Assembly (al-Ummah, DUP, and NIF). When the al-Ummah and DUP set forth a charter not in accord with our principles, we did not enter the cabinet.

The most recent time, we asked for a detailed charter dealing with solutions to the problems of applying Islamic law, the constitution, the economic problem, and the war in the South. Again, this did not materialize because of the DUP's misgivings about us and al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's desire to govern by himself. We therefore refused to participate and preferred to remain in the ranks of the opposition.

[Question] In the press conference that followed your not entering the cabinet and the NIF's assuming leadership of the Sudanese opposition, you said that there was nothing tempting you to participate in governing the "problem-laden" Sudan now, and that this would make it possible for your front to widen the circle of its mass following throughout the Sudan. Has this goal been accomplished?

[Answer] Yes, it has been accomplished to a great extent. In particular, the front's principles, with the enlightened Islamic thought they represent, have been able to attract large numbers of educated people. We won 90 percent of the votes of university graduates and a majority of the constituencies in the capital. In addition, these principles were able to attract a large number of traditional religious people, who found in these principles a modern form of the ideas they were following by inheritance. Even in the South, the Islamic ideas of our front have been able to spread widely among the pagan tribes through the social, educational, and medical service societies that have confronted European Christian missionary teams with their own methods. With the Islamic ideas we bear, calling for equality between whites and blacks, we have surpassed them. Many of the pagan tribes have embraced the enlightened ideas of the NIF and have joined the Islamic fold in throngs.

Even women in the capital, whom the intellectual ideas of narrow-minded [Sufi] orders had led to believe Islam's position toward women was "reactionary," joined us in enormous numbers after we made Islam's progressive and revolutionary position toward women clear to them. Thanks to the enlightened nature of our Islamic front, women have become leaders, preachers, and organizers of women's conferences. Thus I can say to you that the NIF has gained a great deal by not participating in the government to date.

[Question] As the opposition, what role has the NIF played in parliamentary activity within the Constituent Assembly?

[Answer] In spite of all the obstacles the government is creating and its using the weapons of the majority resulting from the al-Ummah-DUP alliance against us, the opposition has been able to halt a proposal allowing amendment of the constitution by a mere one-third majority, another proposal that would have lifted judicial oversight over the actions of the government, and a third proposal that would have given the government the right to issue laws in the absence of government officials. [as published] We made an exception regarding the government's right to issue legislation on [civil] liberties and criminal laws, even in the absence of government officials.

Outside the assembly, the NIF has been able to embody its principles in programs, and to build up a cohesive pyramidal structure in the Sudan for the party, beginning with an advisory conference in every constituency, and ending

with the election of a board to manage the affairs of our front in every constituency in the Sudan.

We have based our activity on front-related work, establishing youth centers, social service institutions, and financial and productive economic institutions. The scope of our popular appeal is now widening with the increased number of educated young people. We do not base our activity on a narrowly partisan concept resting merely on struggling and fighting to reach power, but rather on creating Sudanese national loyalty supported by ideological affiliation to enlightened Islamic principles.

In short, the job is to establish a central national loyalty based on democracy and consultation. We are doing so by means of social, cultural, and economic programs and activities that serve the masses of Sudanese, and not by means of mere commitment to historical and sectarian memories.

Dangers Facing the Sudan

[Question] What are your most serious worries now about the Sudan in terms of domestic affairs?

[Answer] That tribal loyalties may replace the traditional sectarian religious loyalties that are now collapsing, together with the infiltration of weapons into the hands of these primitive tribes, as I mentioned to you.

[Question] And regarding foreign affairs--what is your opinion?

[Answer] The hasty decisions that are influencing our historical relations with certain brother countries: for example, the decisions to cancel integration and the defense treaties.

[Question] In your opinion, what is the difference between the integration plan and the Brotherhood Charter?

[Answer] Names and forms do not mean much. The important thing is that historical relations with neighboring countries must develop and be embodied in realistic projects beneficial to both parties.

The integration plan, for example, could have developed into something which would have served the two countries' interests practically--without changing the names. There are national projects that must not be jolted by changes of leadership.

As for the Brotherhood Charter, I would say that in terms of form we have historically gone beyond the word "brotherhood." Indeed, there were more advanced unification plans between us. The important thing is that something be realistically accomplished now so as to harmonize with the stable and permanent geographical facts that have always linked the territory of the two nations.

Separating Religion From State

[Question] As an Islamic leader, you have been able to bring your front to leadership of the parliamentary opposition in the Sudan. Don't think you have involved religion in politics, as some argue?

[Answer] Islam is a comprehensive religion. The Messenger of God was a political leader who sent his ambassadors to the kings and heads of neighboring states and empires. He was a military commander and diplomatic leader who concluded many treaties for purposes of peace and war. Enough, finally, has been said, and we should end this debate about separating religion from the state. It is a proposition imported from the European experience, with which we have no connection. The Messenger of God said: "Whoever is not concerned about the 'affairs' of the Muslims is not one of us." In Islam, the word "affairs" means "politics," in its contemporary meaning. The Qur'an [42:38] says: "And their affairs are counsel between them."

[Question] But does Islam forbid the formation of political parties?

[Answer] According to the literal, European concept of them, based on conflict and distortions produced by election propaganda media under the incentive of material support from the competitors. No, of course. But Islam does not forbid the establishment of a party to express the other opinion--but under the umbrella of Islam's highest values. In the end, Islam even allows the multiplication of parties, but within this sphere.

[Question] What is your reply to those who say Islam is without an economic theory?

[Answer] Islam has a general economic orientation, based on universal fundamentals and principles. These have no connection with the right, which allows the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few wealthy people at the expense of the downtrodden, nor have they a connection with the left, which allows the state to intervene continually to stop the free economic activity of individuals and companies. The basic rule in Islam is economic freedom, limited by the progressive taxes imposed by zakat [Islamic alms]. If there occurs a disequilibrium in the distribution of wealth to the advantage of the wealthy and detriment of the poor, the state intervenes decisively on the basis of the principle laid down by 'Umar Ibn-al-Khattab: "If the Muslims are hungry, no one has any wealth."

[Question] What about the assertion made by leftists who say that the Islamic system produces totalitarian and fascist governments and dictatorship?

[Answer] The communists are the last people who can talk about totalitarian systems and dictatorship. Such systems are part of their basic principles and implementations. Islam, however, which chose Abu-Bakr by free election at the hall [of the Bani Sa'idah], was the first in the world to plant the first seeds of democracy and of the citizen's freedom to choose the ruler, before humanity knew anything about democracy.

Terrorism: the Greatest Affront to Islam

[Question] What is your opinion on the Islamic revival movement in the Islamic world, and on its interaction with other movements?

[Answer] It is a spontaneous movement. After the Islamic states freed themselves from the domination of colonialist forces over the Islamic world, it was only natural that a movement should arise to attempt to remove the vestiges of the movement to estrange Muslims in their own homelands from the principles of their religion.

Because most of the government leaders of the Islamic states are people who received their education in the universities of Europe and are still influenced by the saying "separation of religion and state," they have unintentionally and unwittingly fallen into a position hostile to the growth of Islamic political thought. Thus the clash occurred. But this clash will not last. In the end, there will be a rapprochement, because both sides belong to Islam. The problem is a misunderstanding between them that will inevitably pass with the growth of moderate and enlightened Islamic thought. An indication of this is the fact that your constitution officially says that Islamic law is the principal source of legislation.

As for the unity between these movements, it is going to be misunderstood. Since they are at work in different countries and under different circumstances, each movement has to work within its borders to bring about reconciliation between the two sides of the conflict. Afterwards, mutual acquaintance between the Islamic nations as a whole will be possible without obstacles and borders.

[Question] What is your opinion about certain incidents of terrorism engaged in by some extremists in the name of Islam?

[Answer] What these few extremists are doing must be studied objectively by governments. However, whatever the reasons may be, these various terrorist incidents are in general the greatest affront to the Islamic revival movement and the greatest affront to Islamic preaching, which in principle rejects terror as a means of spreading the principles of Islam. These young men need to have their thoughts guided by legitimate parties, rather than being left to work in the dark!

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AL-DUSTUR SCRUTINIZES, CRITICIZES MTI'S TRUE GOALS

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 13 Jul 87 pp 8-10

[Article by al-Salami al-Hasani: "The Islamic Tendency Dissociates Itself from Its Own History"]

[Text] Although the Islamic Tendency Movement [MTI] in Tunisia did not reveal any of its true goals in the statement it issued recently "to respond to all charges which had been made against it," those who scrutinized that statement discovered right away that that "religious tendency" had lost the argument now that its true goals and objectives have been exposed. MTI's true goals and objectives were exposed in an operation in which AL-DUSTUR played a major part, and MTI leaders themselves admitted AL-DUSTUR's role in that operation.

The statement offered a shadowy response to the facts which AL-DUSTUR had revealed about that tendency's outside connections, particularly with Iran, and it addressed its practices and methods, some of which hide behind a mask of innocence to spread the movement's political propaganda. Some of the movement's other practices and methods are violent, and the effects of those can still be seen in Tunisia and abroad.

When one reads that religious tendency's statement, the characteristics of its new tactics become evident. The aim of these new tactics is to set the movement apart from the obvious facts. Anyone who reads the statement will have to wonder: has the religious tendency in Tunisia resolved to dissociate itself from its history and from its former alliances and goals so it can conform to and work within the legitimate system in the republic?

Persistence and Contradiction

The statement starts out with what is obviously intellectual terrorism, declaring to the people and to "public opinion in Tunisia and all over the world" that "it is not its intent to persuade the authorities since that would be unattainable." It states that Tunisia "is experiencing difficult conditions and is being subjected to the most recalcitrant and the most vicious attacks whose real target actually is the foundation of Islam in Tunisia." Thus, leaders of this tendency think that the detention of tendency members and exposing the

truth about this movement and its foreign connections pose a threat to Islam in Tunisia. MTI thus views revealing where weapons are being hidden, prohibiting street demonstrations and breaking relations with Iran because of the blatant and open intervention of its embassy in Tunis in Tunisia's internal affairs as most recalcitrant and most vicious attacks on Islam. This indicates that MTI leaders believe that they themselves are Muslims but that the rest of the Muslim people are clients of the regime because they have no interest in those demonstrations. Nevertheless, the statement which pays little attention to its own contradictions, does not hesitate to declare that "no one can claim to be the sole representative of Islam, no one can claim to speak definitively on Islamic beliefs and laws, and no one can claim a monopoly over promoting Islam." This does not mean, however, that the tendency has finally understood that it cannot be the sole representative for Islam. The tendency's intent here, rather, is to express its objection to the establishment of the Supreme Islamic Council, whose existence it refuses to recognize.

A Special Concept

The statement also says, "Our movement is a political movement that adheres to Islamic thought and practices and has aspirations for comprehensive change. To achieve such change the movement depends upon the legitimacy in the eyes of the masses." This legitimacy would manifest itself in "democratic change, which rests basically on the free choice made by the people. Such change would enable the tendency to attain power, and it would give it the right to confer about power and negotiate for it." The statement then goes on to emphasize that movement's concern on more than one occasion with requesting a permit for "organized public action." In making such an assertion, the statement naturally wants to suggest that MTI does not use violence and is not trying to use violence to overthrow the government. However, the statement was careful to avoid specific terms. It made no mention of the legitimacy which is acquired from the electorate, from the legitimate establishment in the republic, or from the law. Instead, it spoke of legitimacy which is acquired from the masses. That could mean--and that may be what is intended--a general uprising which could also represent "the people's free choice to attain power." An uprising is an action in a country that does not employ elections but rather general disobedience. It is that for which MTI is laying the groundwork through what the statement calls, "the movement's total involvement in general actions and activities to promote Islam and educate the people" and "to spread Islamic precepts by good example." No one knows, however, if these actions which educate by setting a good example cover the weapons which were discovered in Djebel Bou Kournine and in Zramedine; no one knows if they cover the materials and tapes which were designated to provide training for the general uprising and general disobedience!

But to state that lessons given in mosques, such as those given by Rached Ghannouchi in ibn 'Arus Mosque and elsewhere by other advocates of Islam, are not to be considered attempts to overthrow the government means that MTI leaders who object to "official Islam" and reject the imams who are appointed by the state to lead public prayers and provide religious instruction in mosques are very much like that man who did not like the curriculum at an elementary school. Believing himself to be better and more knowledgeable than the teacher, he

walked into the school, fired the teacher, and took his place. If the experience of such advocates becomes so common that anyone who believes himself to be better than an imam, a teacher, a physician, or a policeman would take that person's place, society will become chaotic. There are laws in the country, and within those laws there is division of labor. Anyone who wishes to do any job which he believes he can do, including that of an imam for a mosque, should work within the system and observe the laws that are in effect. In other words, he should file his application with the oversight department which has the authority to look into his application and make a decision on it.

Thus, the idea behind this legitimacy which comes from the masses and which MTI is calling for becomes evident. It seems that it actually represents a legitimacy that comes from public chaos and from not recognizing the laws which are in effect in the country. This is demonstrated by the fact that the statement which touched upon all of MTI's positions did not even mention once the name of the head of state. It also avoided using such terms as "Bourguiba's regime" and referred only to the ruling party. Does MTI not recognize the legitimacy of the head of state? Does it not recognize the government's legitimacy and the regime's legitimacy? Does it want to avoid friction with these institutions? The statement makes it obvious that MTI does not recognize these institutions as legitimate since it clearly defined MTI's reservations on Section 57 of the constitution which stipulates that the prime minister become the head of state in case that position becomes vacant. MTI also does not recognize Paragraph 4 of Section 39 which stipulates that President Bourguiba serve as head of state for life. And yet, MTI's statement goes on to say that it is committed to the republican system. But is the tendency referring to the current republican system or some abstract one? The statement also says that "The constitution is the principal authority on regulating political life in the country." But then it denies that by expressing, on the one hand, reservations on sections of the constitution, and affirming that "MTI derives its legitimacy from its Islamic plan, its popular power, its independent decisions, its revolutionary institutions, and its own bylaws." If, on the other hand, we compare such a view with what Rached Ghannouchi or movement leaders had written in the past, the contradiction becomes even more blatant. Ghannouchi says, "If an Islamic state is established, God's precepts will be carried out, even if they have to be carried out by force." (See AL-MUSTAQBAL, 1/23/1981.)

Appealing for Sympathy

The aim of this ambiguity which enveloped the tendency's most important essential positions--its positions on legitimacy, on the constitution, on the republican system and on the elections--is to preclude such matters from discussion and to concentrate at the present time on going along with the slogans which are being proclaimed. This is because MTI thinks that slogans about democracy and socialism are imported. After indulging in such ambiguities, the statement then attempts to win the sympathy of other political forces by asserting that the movement, which has been fighting for organized public action, for freedom, and for human rights, has been treated unfairly. It then proceeds to thank those other forces which supported it. This too is an interim tactic because MTI realizes quite well that these political forces are actually struggling for democracy and for freedom. MTI realizes that these forces are

very sensitive to such slogans and to human rights slogans as well. But it seems that MTI forgot about its positions on these Tunisian political forces. These positions may be described briefly by saying that the tendency believes that dealings with such movements ought to depend on what is happening at a particular stage because these movements are affiliated with the existing regime and are ultimately hostile to MTI. That is why they have to be used on an interim basis for the purpose of turning MTI into the country's most important political force. MTI could then do without alliances with the rest of the other political forces in the country, and it would have to move against them. What is happening at the university represents the future of MTI's relations with other political forces. These positions were printed in an article in the French magazine, QUESTION, which is published in Paris. The tendency did not issue a denial.

At the end of its analysis of the situation in Tunisia, the statement suggests that an effort be made to establish a national pact to regulate political and social relations. Without being subjected to any guardianship or containment of any form the masses would have the deciding word on that pact. "No effort would be made to carry out joint action for national salvation" based on that pact. No one knows why MTI is calling for a democratic pact between all political movements in the country. Does MTI want to lay down the foundations and rules for democratic interaction to avoid violence, or is all this activity and effort, which is being made to establish and set up a national pact for saving the nation, nothing more than a demand to establish a national salvation government and an attempt to set forth a new pattern for the regime, for the laws, for the constitution, and for the legitimacy of a public referendum? The most likely answer to that question is that MTI is calling for a public referendum on the legitimacy of the current power structure, current laws, and a new socio-political plan in the country. That is, it is calling for a referendum on a new model for the state. But how useful would talking about public action, legitimacy, the masses, etc., be after that, when MTI is giving us a choice between two solutions? We can either accept a public referendum on a new plan for the state and society, or accept a general uprising. This choice is contained specifically in MTI's statement. And all the sweet talk about democracy, freedom, and Islam, however, is nothing more than a cover.

The Gulf War

The best evidence that this constitutes distortion, deliberate ambiguity and a determined attempt to insult the people's intelligence can be seen in that position on the Iraq-Iran war and on Iran. Reading about that position in the statement would suggest to the reader that MTI is now completely opposed to the regime in Iran and that it has absolutely no relations with it. The statement suggests that charges that MTI has connections with Iran are false. The statement says, "Our movement supported the revolution of the Muslim people of Iran against the Shah's tyranny and oppression. This was a revolution to liberate people from despotism inside the country and from foreign hegemony. Such support does not at all mean that MTI approves of everything that is going on in Iran. For example, MTI does not approve of the state's sectarian character; it does not approve of sectarian intolerance; nor does it approve of the political model which is based on the authority and infallibility of the imam whose authority supersedes all constitutional authorities including that of

the people themselves. We appreciate the fact that the true value of a revolution is measured by the benefits it brings to its people. And that is something which only the people of Iran can determine and judge."

What is understood here is that the objection by Tunisia's religious movement to the Iranian regime manifests itself in one point only: the theologian's rule and the view toward other Islamic denominations. This dispute has been known for years; it has been discussed at length several times by leaders of the religious movement in Tunisia and by Iranian officials, who disagree among themselves about dealing with that religious tendency in Tunisia. Consequently, this does not constitute criticism of the Iranian regime from the religious tendency. The religious tendency in Tunisia avoids dealing with the Iranian experience: it does not talk about the suppression of liberties there, and it does not discuss the crimes that are committed in that country against the opposition, etc. MTI dismisses all that by saying that is something "which only the Iranian people can determine and judge."

On the Iraq-Iran war the statement says, "Bringing this war to an end is an Islamic and a human duty. Accordingly, the religious tendency opposes the protraction of this war." The statement also says, "Islam rejects injustice and aggression. He who initiates aggression is more unjust. It is therefore necessary that the aggressor be identified and held responsible." The statement also says, "On the basis of the same principles we oppose any form of guardianship on the people, and we oppose any attempt in any form that is made to force choices and a social pattern on the people because that would be inconsistent with respecting the people's wishes." That pronouncement remains ambiguous because the statement did not identify the party that was trying to force choices on the other party. But that position on the Gulf war which is presented by the statement as a neutral, new position is in fact a rehash of the Iranian position about which an agreement had been reached in Tehran. Is the religious tendency deceiving the Tunisian man in the street, thinking that he does not know what is going on in Iran? Or has this religious tendency found that ambiguity and intimidation are better tactics at this stage?

At any rate, if this religious tendency wanted to hide facts and spread ambiguities by means of a lengthy statement, it has failed. But if it wants to be consistent with what it claims is its concern for freedom, legitimate action and other matters, it will have to proclaim clearly, unequivocally and distinctly its respect for all the laws which are in effect in the country. It will also have to proclaim its respect for all existing social and political choices and its opposition to all forms of violence. It will have to abandon its claim that it is carrying the beacon and banner of Islam in an Islamic society. And it will have to consider elections the only way for political representation. As far as Iran is concerned, the religious tendency will have to condemn internal conditions in that country, or at least, proclaim an unequivocal position on those conditions and call for an end to the war. And it will have to condemn the party that refuses to end this war--one that is being fought between two Muslim peoples--on the basis of Security Council resolutions.

PEOPLE'S CONGRESS LOCAL CONVENTIONS LAUD GOVERNMENT EFFORTS

Sanaa AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 22 Jun 87 p 2

[Excerpts] Ta'izz, al-Bayda', Ibb, Saba'--The first ordinary session's local conventions concluded their proceedings yesterday in the Ta'izz Governorate subdistricts of al-Salw, al-Qubaytak, Khadir, al-Wazi'iyah, al-Salam, Mawiyah, Hasha', and Shar'ab; in al-Bayda' Governorate subdistricts of Dhi Na'im, al-Tafah, and al-Sawadiyah; and in the Ibb Governorate subdistrict of Mudhaykhirah. The proceedings were held within the framework of the first ordinary session of the General People's Congress' local conventions in the subdistricts, cities, and provincial capitals and in the capital municipality's districts.

These subdistricts' local conventions examined, in 2 days, the session's agenda, which included extensive literature and documents connected with the General People's Congress' activities and structures and with the future actions of the local conventions and the mini-committees, as well as with numerous issues concerning the citizens in these areas and with the means to deal with these issues.

After a thorough discussion of andaa free democratic dialogue on all the topics and issues presented to the members, these subdistricts' local conventions issued numerous resolutions and recommendations capable of crystallizing the principle of broad popular participation in political and developmental action in order to enhance this participation.

National Loyalty Is Honorable Principle

The conventions denounced all cases of lackeyhood and subservience as acts of national treason and as deviations from our people's consensus, embodied in the national charter.

In this respect, emphasis has been put on the statement underlined by the charter that national loyalty is an honorable principle that is totally incompatible with subservience in any form.

Struggle and Future-building Procession

The tributary conventions expressed deep appreciation for the preparation and training given the political action leaderships through the courses organized

by the National Charter Institute. The conventions recommended that these courses be increased to include all members of the People's General Congress in all areas. They also praised the positive results produced by the political enlightenment seminars and stressed the need to expand these seminars and to spread them to all areas and hamlets so as to strengthen awareness of the charter and to enhance popular action in order that it may achieve the goals and objectives of our people's struggle procession to build a bright future for our beloved country.

The local conventions also lauded our political leadership's efforts and interest in modernizing and developing our armed forces and security forces and training and preparing their members to keep pace with the developments of the age through the military colleges, institutes, and schools.

They have also appreciated the political leadership's step to modernize local government and to boost it with qualified and competent elements capable of understanding the citizens' issues and solving their problems. The conventions have also expressed high appreciation for the eagerness of our political leadership, embodied in brother Colonel 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, the leader president and general secretary, to probe the masses' issues and all the provinces' needs for service and development projects and to hear the citizens' opinions and suggestions through the president's meetings with all sectors of the people's masses in the blessed Ramadan evening sessions. They lauded the results produced by these evening sessions.

Major Accomplishments

These subdistricts' local conventions urgently demanded the restoration of Yemeni unity, termination of the partition inherited by our people in both parts of the homeland from the ecclesiastic regime and from the hateful British colonialists and highly appreciated our political leadership's efforts to contain the painful January events in the southern part of our homeland and the serious and sincere steps being taken by this leadership to restore unity to the two parts of Yemen--a unity which is the fate and destiny of our people--through peaceful and democratic means.

The local conventions also highly appreciated the major accomplishments achieved by our country in recent years, especially the reconstruction of the great and historical Ma'rib Dam, the extraction of oil wealth, and the laying of pipelines from Ma'rib al-Jawf Basin to the export outlet on the Red Sea. They lauded our political leadership's emphasis on exploiting the oil revenues to serve the comprehensive economic and social development programs and to enhance the development of the agricultural sector in its capacity as the fundamental mainstay of our national economy.

The local convention expressed appreciation for the state and government efforts to develop and modernize the agricultural sector to make it possible to achieve self-sufficiency in agricultural products.

In this regard, the conventions recommended the increased construction of dams, and the opening of branch offices of the Agricultural Cooperative Loan

Bank in the subdistricts so that soft-term loans may be advanced to farmers and that agricultural equipment and machinery and the spare parts they need may be sold through the bank.

They also stressed the need for the private sector to invest in the agricultural sector and set up agricultural projects beneficial in serving the local industries and in dispensing with the imported raw materials on which the conversion industries are founded.

The local conventions also lauded the economic course embraced by our political leadership to overcome the latest economic developments and expressed appreciation for the special steps taken to curtail the importation of luxury goods, to rationalize spending, to supply essential consumer goods and materials, and to deliver them to citizens in all parts of the republic at uniform prices and through the supply establishments.

They also praised the state and government efforts to combat greed, exploitation, excesses, and monopolization.

In this regard, the local conventions urged all our citizens to cooperate with the state and to support the official agencies' efforts in this area. They also urged Yemeni expatriates to contribute effectively to the scheduled economic development plans.

The local conventions further lauded the great accomplishments achieved for our people in the areas of education, health services, electricity, potable water, and telecommunications. Through these accomplishments, the blessing of the immortal 26 September revolution has spread to all parts of our beloved country.

The conventions also recommended the increased establishment of vital projects in the rural areas, such as preliminary and preventive health projects, secondary education projects, and male and female teachers' institutes.

The local conventions appreciated greatly the clear course followed by our country's foreign policy in the Arab, Islamic, and international spheres, considering that our country has worked ceaselessly to unite the Arab ranks, to renounce the disputes between the brothers, and to abide fully by the Arab charters, especially by the Arab joint defense charter which considers any attack on any Arab country an attack on the Arab nation.

On this basis, our country has exerted efforts to support and bolster the Arab world's primary and central issue, namely the Arab Palestinian people's issue, materially and morally and has supported the Palestinian people's just and legitimate struggle against the usurping Zionist presence and to liberate their land and set up their state on their national soil under the leadership of the PLO, their sole legitimate representative.

The conventions also denounced the continued Iraq-Iran war between the two neighboring Muslim peoples and have called for ending this war and for settling the differences between the two neighbors through negotiations that insure the two countries' interests and foil the opportunity for the Arab and Islamic nation's enemies, who are this war's beneficiaries.

The conventions lauded Iraq's responses to the mediations seeking to end this destructive and losing war. They urged the Iranians to respond to the peace mediations seeking to end the war and to allow reason and logic to rule.

The local conventions blessed our country's efforts in the Islamic Conference Organization and in the Nonaligned Movement, our country's role in these organizations, and our country's support for the national liberation movements struggling for their freedom and sovereignty.

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SOVIET SOLUTION COULD REPORTEDLY INVOLVE SACRIFICING NAJIB

London KEYHAN in Persian 9 Jul 87 P 16

[London KEYHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mesbahzadeh]

[Text] Negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union for putting and end to the Iran-Iraq war and resolving the Afghanistan issue still continue. In the meantime, the Afghanistan regime which is supported by the Soviet Union, likewise is seeking to create a coalition government. Among the personalities who were invited by Dr Najibullah, the president, to participate in the coalition government, was Mohammad Zahir Shah, former monarch of Afghanistan who was ousted after the bloodless coup d'etat of 1973 and who lives in Italy hence. Although as a result of the opposition of the leaders of a few extremist groups to the formation of a coalition government, Mohammad Zahir Shah also rejected Najibullah's invitation, nevertheless negotiations concerning the issue have not come to an end yet. Christian Roche, roving editor of the French magazine, L'EXPRESS, who has recently returned from Peshawar, has prepared a report about the probable return of Mohammad Zahir Shah and other relevant issues of which some segments will appear below.

Once Najib is on record to have said: I don't know why the western press call me Dr Najibullah or General Najib. It is a long time now that my party comrades call me Najib. Only Najib, that is all.

The Soviet Union also refer to him as Najib. He is the man who was appointed as of May 1986, as the leader of the Afghanistan regime by the Kremlin officials. Formerly, Najib was the head of the State Information Service of Afghanistan [Khad] and the reason for his appointment was that it seemed he was more amenable to the Soviet Union than Babrak Karmal, former president of the DRA and secretary general of the Communist Party of Afghanistan.

Now that one year has elapsed since comrade Najib became the leader of Afghanistan he cannot claim that he has achieved good results. The cease-fire which was announced by the government of Afghanistan on January 15, was likewise denounced by the resistance groups. Western diplomats say that almost on a daily basis, one helicopter or an airplane belonging to the Afghan government or that of the Red Army is downed by the missiles of the opposition groups. These guerrillas use either the British-made Blow Pipe missiles or its counterpart, the U.S.-made antiaircraft Stinger. On June 11, the guerrillas downed an Afghan passenger plane in which 35 people lost their lives. Among the casualties there were some Soviet army officers and their family members.

The formation of a National Reconciliation Commission which was another subterfuge by the Kremlin, did not get anywhere. Notwithstanding all this, the government of Afghanistan expresses satisfaction for this policy. During the past few months 21,000 resistance fighters [Mujaheddin] have put down their arms and reconciled with the government; likewise 60,000 refugees from the five million Afghans who either live in Iran or Pakistan, have returned to their homes. Of course this plan has had its setbacks. For instance, the official in charge for the execution of the National Reconciliation Plan was murdered in Qandahar by some members of resistance groups. He was the fifth high-ranking government official who was killed in the line of duty.

Bad Days for the Little Gorbachev [Karmal]

According to the leader of an opposition group, Najib has lost his supporters from among the Soviet officials and they do not trust him any more. This was a statement made by Abdulhaq who is in charge of the Islamic Party in Kabul. He expresses the view that Babrak Karmal or the little Gorbachev is having an unpleasant time these days.

This is also confirmed by the officials of the western embassies in Kabul. His hurried trip to Moscow on May 4 was the prelude to new events. Although it was mentioned that Karmal had gone to Moscow for medical reasons, yet it is said that he is under house arrest there. After his departure there were some demonstrations and several incidents of explosions in Kabul. Contrary to Najib, Babrak Karmal has become known as a national personality by his supporters. It is said because of these nationalistic sentiments, the Soviet government recalled Babrak to Moscow and ever since he has been under house arrest.

On April 27 [anniversary of the Saur revolution] Karmal's supporters were intending to assassinate Najib but they failed to carry out their mission. Both Babrak Karmal and Najibullah Khan belong to the Parcham's Communist Party. On the aforementioned day some members and other followers of Khalq group--who are opposed to the Parcham group--poured into the streets chanting such slogans as: 'Long live Karmal,' 'Down with Najib,' and clashed with the military and security police. As a result of this incident some people were arrested and put in prison. Thereafter it was announced that 40 of the arrested individuals--of whom some were close relatives of Karmal and a few student followers--were executed in the prison and the government announced that those individuals had committed suicide.

Saying Shoo to an Elephant [bishop of a chess-game]

After this uproarious incident, the Soviet Union strongly aired its protest to Najib and treated him disaffectionately. Thereafter, rarely anyone has seen Najib smile at all. In Kabul they refer to him as a man who never laughs or smiles and in the arena of political chess, the Soviets decided to withdraw their bishop [Najib] and instead enter the king into the play.

Mohammad Zahir Shah who is 72 years old and who has been living in Rome nearly 14 years, had expressed his readiness to return to Afghanistan in order to do something for the freedom and independence of his country; however he has had certain suggestions which have not met with approval by the Kabul's government.

Now the question is: Is Moscow ready to sacrifice its party brother or not?

One has to wait and see.

12719

CSO: 4640/143

TEHRAN RECRUIT REPORTEDLY REVEALS TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

Paris L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI in French 11-17 Jun 87 pp 16-18

[Article including interview with Lotfi by Frederic Ploquin: "Khomeyni's Iran Became Detestable to Me"; first paragraph is L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI introduction]

[Text] A Tunisian recruited by Tehran to promulgate Islamic fundamentalism among North Africans in France abruptly defected to the other side. And it was to the police that he turned, making possible an impressive round-up of terrorists. His story follows.

"I was a dyed-in-the-wool Khomeynist," says Lotfi, the man responsible for touching off the scandal. It was his confession that prompted the arrests in pro-Iranian circles that began in March in the Paris region. It was his decision to go over the other side, to "hand over" Iran, that enabled French counter-espionage agencies to make a successful strike. He is a deserter of sorts, in any case, a mole.

Since the last time he crossed, with some difficulty, the border of his adopted country, Khomeyni's country, this young Tunisian has pursued a single goal. To prove that Iran is directly implicated in the attacks which shook France in March and September of 1986. His collaboration with the DST paid off: a series of arrests, the discovery of explosives and drugs and valuable tapes recorded using the most sophisticated bugging techniques. These last leave no room for doubt about Iran's involvement. By spilling his secrets, Lotfi has enabled the government to avoid bloody incidents. And, with the passing of time, he has become the key personality in the investigation. After revelations like these, it is difficult to stubbornly close one's eyes to Iran's responsibility.

One day, Lotfi contacted us. To testify. To make the facts known. And also as a precaution. Before withdrawing to a safe place, he gave us this account of his "struggle", alone against a State. He did not do it for money, but because he believed in it. He is 30 years old and is fully aware of the subtleties of French politics. This is no accident: Sent by the Iran of the ayatollahs, his mission was to preach Tehran's Islam to the Arabs of France and to study the political scene. Among his assets were a knowledge of Persian, Arabic, English and French.

L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI: How were you "converted" by the French police?

LOTFI: It was I who contacted the French police. My religion, my political ideas, everything compelled me to mount an operation against Iran. I considered it an Islamic duty.

[Question] How did the first contact go?

[Answer] I had an 8-hour conversation with members of the Ministry of the Interior. I clearly told them that I was able to help them arrest those who planted the bombs. They were visibly hesitant. I let them know that I was ready to contact another state if they were not interested.

[Question] What were your conditions?

[Answer] I made three demands. 1) That France promise not to spare Iran and that, consequently, it be ready to directly implicate that country. 2) That my safety be guaranteed and that I be provided a minimal sum of money with which to seek refuge. 3) That my anonymity be guaranteed. If no agreement could be reached, I was really prepared to manage alone. I even demanded a signed contract. To no avail.

[Question] What were you proposing?

[Answer] To get back into touch with the people I knew were involved in terrorism. I therefore requested, and obtained, the means to set up a Koranic school. The DST would have preferred a simple infiltration operation.

[Question] Why did you decide to break your "contract" with Iran and go over to the other side?

[Answer] I wanted to serve Khomeyni and I did. But in the end I realized that people like us, foreigners...

[Question] What do you mean by "foreigners"?

[Answer] They are Persian, I am an Arab. They treat us like dogs. They actually considered me, an Arab, a pawn. I suddenly found myself in a terrorist country. A country that wants to destroy Islam, in the name of Islam.

[Question] So, for you, Khomeyni's Iran suddenly changed from being seductive to despicable?

[Answer] Exactly. In reality, the mullahs dream only of money and power. They want to colonize Iraq, Syria and finally Israel. They project a poor image of Islam.

[Question] How did your relations with Iran begin?

[Answer] I left Tunisia in 1979, the day Khomeyni left France. I lived through the first months of the revolution in Tehran. I was 25 years old and

a true believer. For 6 years I studied Islam with the greatest professors in Qom.

[Question] How did you live?

[Answer] I translated Koranic literature into French. And I was assigned to provide ideological instruction to French and English-speaking foreigners.

[Question] And then you were sent to France?

[Answer] I arrived here at the end of 1984. I had a specific job: to bring my North African compatriots to Shi'ism. I was paid around 30,000 dollars a year (180,000 French francs) for this, which I received via the United States, Lebanon, sometimes Iran. I set up a clandestine school in the Parisian suburbs. I was supposed to send the better elements to Iran, which I never did.

[Question] At the end of 1985, you were taken into custody during a police operation directed against fundamentalist circles, is that right?

[Answer] It was in Tours, but my papers were perfectly in order. I was quickly released and left for Iran with my wife and children. It was at that time that the Iranians decided to use me to establish a school in Iran, this time for the purpose of providing military training. I knew that terrorism was contrary to the tenets of Islam. But I played the game, making contacts everywhere.

[Question] When was your last trip to Iran?

[Answer] I returned to France at the beginning of last March. During the winter, I had been arrested, then interrogated by Iranian intelligence agencies, who even confiscated my passport. I left for the Turkish border by bus, with my wife and children, on the pretext of escaping the war. I was supposed to return very soon. Naturally, the Iranians tried to corner me at customs. I had to grease the palm of several civil servants on both sides of the border, give a sedative to one of my children, do some scheming, etc. A nightmare. I was in tears. I continued by bus to Istanbul, then by train to France. The day after my arrival, I contacted the DST in Tours. Then I was driven to Paris.

[Question] Did you do it out of spite?

[Answer] The Iranians believe they are going to take revenge on the Arabs, whom they accuse of having shattered the Persian empire. I wanted at all costs to show them that this would not be so easy. You know, oddly enough, they remind me of the extreme right in France. Like it, they are anti-Zionist, anti-Arab, and like the Nazis, they consider themselves representatives of a "pure" race. It was too much, too much for me.

[Question] When you went to see the French police, you told them you had enough information to uncover pro-Iranian terrorist networks. How did you gain access to such a level within the Iranian state?

[Answer] During my last stay, persuaded that the Iranian revolution was a failure and terrified by the corruption of the mullahs, I managed to gain access to a certain number of secret files. I compiled information on Iran's work in France, and also in Indonesia, Iraq and Kuwait. I was introduced to several high-level state dignitaries.

[Question] How did you convince your French contacts that Iran was directly implicated in the attacks?

[Answer] Actually, although everything is decided in Iran, it is the Lebanese Hizballah which is in charge of implementing the decisions. To demonstrate this, I asked the DST to plant mikes in every corner of the building in the 12th arrondissement which I had arranged to rent. I had long conversations there with Fu'ad 'Ali Salih, head of the Paris network. The result was a 30-page text which leaves no room for doubt. In the days that followed, Jacques Chirac and others got themselves armored cars. Iran, which was convinced it was untouchable, found itself trapped. Certain that I had been sent by Tehran, Fu'ad hid nothing from me.

[Question] You risked your life to pull this off. Any regrets?

[Answer] Several times, I thought France was not prepared to go through with it. My relations with the Ministry of the Interior were on the verge of breakdown several times. I was afraid they would abandon me. Finally, the arrests were made. Then my country, Tunisia, broke off relations with Iran. I feel that I achieved my goal. And just in time: the terrorists were planning to attack a nuclear plant. I will really have won when Western countries begin to organize an economic blockade of Iran.

Those Felled by Lotfi

Lotfi was no idler. In particular, he had to expend considerable energy to convince his contacts, i.e., the secret services. To directly implicate Iran in the attacks could only be done with the approval of the prime minister. Diplomatic reservations nearly toppled the affair on a number of occasions. The Quai d'Orsay was strongly opposed. The Americans, who were let in on what was happening, resorted to the use of a lie detector before being convinced of the truth of the "mole's" revelations. Yet, in less than a month, the entire terrorist network has fallen. Lotfi has come out of it with a "bonus" of a million French francs--much less than he demanded--following an indescribable round of haggling, during the course of which an attache-case stuffed with bank notes wandered from one hotel to the next.

Everything began 21 March with a raid before the entrance of the building in which Lotfi had rented an apartment, in the 12th arrondissement. On his initiative, the locale was to have housed a small, clandestine Koranic school, complete with rotary printing press and prayer room--the best way of regaining the confidence of his former stooges from Qom, Iran's holy city. Among those caught red-handed that day--they were moving explosives--was Fu'ad 'Ali Salih, the central character. Salih is a 29-year-old Tunisian, an adherent of the Lebanese Party of God, whom Lotfi met in Iranian universities and who made two trips to Beirut in 1986. Several compatriots accompanied him: a taxi-driver,

a small shopowner who was going to set up a new channel for the importation of explosives and the owner of a Gaithe-Du restaurant. All of them knew Fu'ad who recruited them, but they did not know each other. Two mini-networks side by side, with only the taxi offering the services to all.

The next phase of the operation took place on April 17. Two Moroccans, Badaoui and Omar Agnaou, were arrested. Fu'ad had kept their names secret until then (his last card, just in case). The explosives used in September are said to have been manufactured in the Paris of the first. His cover was a math student, DEA level. The police discovered detonator spare parts at his residence. Fu'ad, who stayed at different people's homes, was seen at his. As soon as they were arrested, they made full confessions.

In a third phase, just after the new directives issued by the sinister, but no longer as obscure, CSPPA (Support Committee for Arab Political Prisoners), which has promised France a "very hot" summer, the police finally discovered explosives buried in the Fontainebleau forest. It was 26 May. American technical assistance had to be requested. It was a nice find: 8.5 kilos of C4, a plastic that was used in the 1982 attacks in Paris in September, 1982. And on top of that, a big surprise. The garbage bin dug up from the forest contained 6.5 kilos of drugs: heroin, cocaine, caffeine--a very valuable cocktail valued at 5 million francs.

Finally, there was the 3 June raid: 11 arrests throughout the French territory. A blow to the fundamentalist anthill. All the presumed leaders of Khomeynist propaganda, the ideological and very probably logistical foundation of the movement. That same day, the doors of the Kremlin-Bicêtre community center, mosque and bookstore, a meeting place for the higher echelons within the fundamentalist group, which was frequented by most of the terrorists arrested, were sealed off. A register of "persons" was confiscated.

Nonetheless, there are still two persons missing from the picture: a Lebanese suspected of having fabricated and perhaps planted explosive devices, and an Iranian. Curiously, the name of the Lebanese appeared in the papers, enough for him to flee. "Bassem", today in a safe place in Lebanon, was the pseudonym of the person who served as the liaison between the network in France and the Hizballah. According to investigators, it was he who had the Lebanese passing through under his wing and directed them toward Fu'ad.

The second, who is none other than the master who sat in the Iranian Embassy in Paris, Gorji Vahed, also slipped out the back way. He was seen by the police, but on the morning his residence was searched, he was already in Geneva. The question is: was he a well-known "protector?"

If so, it was probably someone who did not approve of the manner in which the investigation was conducted. Someone who considered the arrest of the Iranian "diplomat" too costly in geopolitical terms.

That is a shame for the investigation. The police laboratory is currently examining a gray BMW that appeared in the investigation. Moments before the car had just turned over to Vahed. It is said that the car was used by the

national of Lebanese descent and nephew of a Hizballah leader in Lebanon, is suspected of having acted as controller of the network for the embassy, more specifically, for Gorji Vahed. Moreover, the BMW may have been used in the attack that claimed 7 victims in front of the Tati store in the rue de Rennes, 10 September 1986. Evidently, a hard-line policy toward Iran does not yet have unanimous support in Paris.

4019/22

REASONS FOR ATTENTION TO NORTHERN, CENTRAL FRONTS EXPLORED

London KEYHAN in Persian 16 Jul 87 p 4

[London KEYHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mehrzadeh]

[Text] The United States of America announced that on 15 July (24 Tir, yesterday) it will protect Kuwaiti oil tankers, which have raised the American flag for the sake of security against the Islamic republic. With this act there is a great likelihood that the Iran-Iraq war will take on a new dimension, even to the point of drawing in other Persian Gulf nations and making an international crisis out of a regional one, involving the major powers and the superpowers.

In order to bring our esteemed readers up to date on the situation at the war fronts and a possible clash between the Islamic republic and America, we interviewed Brigadier General Asad Behbudi on the subject. With his knowledge of the situation at the fronts and the care with which he follows the war, he has great understanding of this situation.

Question: Previously the Iranians operated primarily on the southern fronts and the length of time of those operations was considerable. How is it that now in less than three months numerous operations have been carried out on the northern and central fronts?

Brigadier General Behbudi: In my view, Iranian operations have moved from the southern front to the central and northern fronts for the following reasons: First, the casualties taken were completely disproportionate with the results gained in the operations called Karbala Four, Five, and Eight, carried out in the Basrah area. For example, the Iraqis announced that Iranian casualties during Karbala Four—during which the island Um al-Rasas was attacked—were something on the order of 90,000. Even if this figure is grossly inflated, even Western military circles have said that Iranian casualties were close to 25,000.

All three of these operations were carried out by the revolutionary guards, but with air and artillery support. Indications are that the Iranians suffered 70 to 80 thousand casualties. Iranian casualties were especially high during Operation Karbala Five—which continued for almost 50 days with a singular intensity, so that they did not commit the 100,000-man Mohammad Army to this operation, sending the 135,000-man Mehdi Army to the front at that time instead. In the face of these heavy casualties, the success that was achieved was very slight: in all three of these operations the Iranians were only able to advance eight to nine kilometers between Shalamneh and Basrah, and along a narrow strip of land.

Shalamcheh-Basrah Advance Stopped

Second, Iranian operations in the south, especially along the Shalamcheh-Basrah route, have reached a dead end. For this reason, during Operation Karbala Eight, after six days of combat and heavy casualties, the Iranians remained where they had been during Karbala Five without advancing even one or two kilometers, which attacking forces usually gain in the first stage of an attack. This is why the Iraqi army invited foreign correspondents to visit the operational areas and see with their own eyes that the Iranian operation had gained nothing. There is a military reason for the fact that operations at this part of the front have reached a dead end, mostly having to do with the characteristics of the combat area, the natural conditions and the lay of the land. These things dictate the type of military operations. There is not enough space along the Shalamcheh-Basrah passage to utilize a major force. Even now Iranian and Iraqi forces are facing each other along a limited front—meaning on a corridor, or a hell, situated between a fish canal and the Shatt al-Arab River. The fish canal, the artificial lakes behind it, and the Shatt al-Arab do not permit much maneuvering. Both sides must therefore attack head-on, and since both sides at this limited front have assembled large forces with maximum mobility, because of the solidity and great depth of the Iraqi defenses, breaking through there and advancing is not easy.

Moreover, Iranian numerical superiority, even with acceptance of the risk of human wave attacks, has been thwarted, since the Iraqis have concentrated most of their forces in this area because of the sensitivity of Basrah. During Operation Karbala Five the Iranians said that 100 Iraqi brigades are positioned in this area. This force, with support personnel, is about 300,000 persons, and it is not much different from Iranian troops in the area in terms of ability. Moreover, Iraqi air, armor and fire support superiority for this great force do not permit the Iranians to break the Iraqi line and make significant advances, as shown during operations Karbala Four, Five, and Eight, when they had no such success.

In view of these factors, I think that the leaders of the Islamic republic have now come to accept the counsel of military men, who had not recommended such operations, but only after suffering all these casualties and losses.

Can Iran Win at the Northern Front?

Question: Very well. Can the transfer of operations to the north—especially in the area of Iraqi Kordestan—bring victory for Iran?

Brigadier General Behbudi: If you mean a decisive victory, the defeat of the Iraqi army and a military overthrow of Saddam, the answer is absolutely no. In my view, this war cannot lead to a significant military victory without destruction and annihilation for both nations, Iran and Iraq. Notice that after six years of war, whether at the northern, central or the southern fronts, the war still continues along the border, or a few kilometers inside or outside it. This establishment and maintenance of position shows clearly that there is no possibility of carrying out extensive military operations to take important Iraqi cities or a strategic objective. None of the little cities and heights the Iranians have taken during this period along the border, and which they have called strategic objectives in their war statements, are strategic in nature. A military objective may be called strategic when its occupation changes the course of the war; even if it does not lead to a decisive victory, it must at least be a major step in that direction. For example, the little city of Ma'ut which the Iranians took during Operation Nasr Four, making much of its strategic importance, has no strategic value because it has made no change in the outcome of the war and it

will not lead to a decisive victory. Of course it is a victory which must be welcomed, because this and other Iranian victories, taken together, can strengthen Iran's hand in its bid for war reparations from Iraq.

Here I must stress the point that the transfer of operations from the southern front to the northern front will not lead to a decisive victory, but it gives the Iranians some advantages:

1. It has delivered Iran from the dead end of the operations in the south.
2. It reduces Iraqi armor and air superiority.
3. It allows the Iranians to effectively conduct irregular operations, carried out by combatants of Iraqi Kurdistan, in support of regular operations, to scatter the Iraqi infantry over an extensive, insecure mountainous area, and to inflict greater casualties on it.
4. It reduces Iranian casualties, because the mountains do not allow a huge force to be employed.
5. It increases the pressure on Iraq and greater territory—albeit unimportant—is taken by the Iranians, which puts Iran in a stronger position for claiming war reparations.

Having explained all these factors, I must say that the chances of taking or controlling a strategic objective at the northern front are much less than they are at the southern front, because the most important strategic objectives in the area, Kirkuk and Mawsil, are hundreds of kilometers from the Iranians. In view of the casualties and problems that the Iranians had during the last five years trying to occupy or control Basrah, which is only 20 kilometers away from them, it is obvious how unlikely and far from reality is the probability of their taking objectives so far away and over such difficult terrain.

Both Kirkuk and Mawsil are strategic in nature. Kirkuk is the Northern Iraqi center for the production and export of oil through Turkey to the Mediterranean sea, and Mawsil is the hub of Iraqi communications with Europe and its logistical support route for that nation's army in the war with Iran.

Question: General, when you listed the advantages to moving operations to the northern front, you mentioned the increased Iraqi casualties and you said that the Iranians are taking more territory. Why?

Brigadier General Behbudi: You see, Iraq is not equal to Iran in terms of manpower—which is one of the strategic factors in war. Iraq's population is about one-third of Iran's. Evidently Iran is making tactical use of this factor; with its human wave attacks, it is disregarding the strategic aspect of manpower. Iraq, however, is mindful of its strategic nature: it wants to take fewer casualties so it can continue the war longer. Therefore, when it loses a position that is neither sensitive nor strategic, it does not try to take it back, or if it does and there is the likelihood of heavy casualties, it stops the operation and the area consequently remains in Iranian hands. It must be noted that Iraqi casualties are greater when they try to hold territory. There is therefore no doubt that it is very costly for them to try to hold positions in the mountainous areas of Kurdistan.

Question: Have operations also taken place at the central fronts?

Brigadier General Behbudi: Yes. Operation Karbala Nine in the Qasr-e Sarmeh area, Nasr Two in the Halaleh and Nay Hazar areas (between Sumar and Mehran) and Nasr Three in the Fekken area north of Fekken all took place at the central front. In view of the attacking units which were announced as a brigade in Nasr Two and a battalion in in Nasr Three—along with the number of these operations—which were conducted in seven series of offensive campaigns at the central and northern fronts over a period of three months—I think the Iranian aim is to scatter the Iraqi infantry along the entire 1,300-kilometer Iran-Iraq front, so that if they attack Basrah again they will be able to make use of the time it takes the Iraqis to transfer, assemble and disperse their troops at the Basrah front. I believe that the irregular operations Fath and 'Ashura were also planned for this reason, to make it likely that the Iraqis would transfer and concentrate their forces where the Iranians were attacking and make the necessary time available to them.

How Will Iran React to the American Navy?

Question: What is your view of the Persian Gulf and the movement of Kuwaiti ships under the American flag? Will America do this? And how will Iran react?

Brigadier General Behbudi: The Iranians have said repeatedly that they will pay no attention to any country's flag and that they will stand against American adventurism in the Persian Gulf. The Americans have also said that they will allow 11 Kuwaiti tankers to fly the American flag and they will naturally make use of support from American warships. In my view both sides have committed themselves, and measures taken by either one will likely prompt a response from the other. Just one important point must be noted here: One must see what America's political objective is in the Persian Gulf, and what military and political steps it is taking to reach this political objective.

In my view, America's political objective is to continue serving its own interests by maintaining the status quo. This means that the Iran-Iraq war should end, or at least not spread to other countries, that Iran should not win decisively, and that the Soviets should not get a foothold in the Persian Gulf. If the United States can achieve this goal through political means, it will never endanger itself in the Persian Gulf. This is why it is trying, by signing a resolution in the Security Council—which would include sanctions—to persuade Iran to abandon its hostilities with Iraq.

I think that if the United States is not successful in this, or if it cannot dissuade Iran from attacking tankers through diplomatic means and secret talks, it is highly likely that it will allow Kuwaiti tankers to fly the American flag under the protection of American warships in the Persian Gulf. If this happens the ball will be in Iran's court and their reaction will very likely be a hostile one against the Americans.

Question: In that event, what will America's military objective in the area be?

Brigadier General Behbudi: I think they will begin by attacking Iran's sea, air and naval ports, bases, and they may block the export of Iranian oil.

Question: What are Iran's options for confronting American military measures?

Brigadier General Behbudi: In my view the Iranian navy has shown great capability in the last six years and has successfully fulfilled its strategic responsibility for keeping Iranian ports open and facilitating Iranian maritime commercial exchanges. In addition to all this, early in the war on 7 Azar 1359 [28 November 1980] it destroyed the Iraqi navy and in one day it sank 13 Iraq

warships. Despite all this, I do not think it is capable of facing America's great and heavily-equipped vessels. It must be especially remembered that a navy is completely vulnerable without air support. In November 1980 it was air support that helped the navy to distinguish itself. After six years of casualties and losses, the Iranian air force is no longer able to support the navy effectively, or to face the American air force in the air. The recent successful response by Saudi Arabian F-15s with the help of the radar and guidance of American AWACS—which led three years ago to the downing of an Iranian phantom—is the reason for the vulnerability of the Iranian air force and navy in an unequal war. However, because of this vulnerability the Iranians have threatened the Americans with another kind of war, involving the use of suicide boats and planes.

9310

CSO: 4640/0155

POW SAYS 800 IRAQI DESERTERS SHOT IN PAST 2 MONTHS

LD201108 Tehran IRNA in English 1024 GMT 20 Jul 87

[Text] Bakhtaran, 20 Jul, (IRNA)--Some 800 Iraqi soldiers were sent before firing squad during the past two months on the orders of Iraqi ruler Saddam Husayn, for having deserted the war fronts twice.

This was disclosed by an Iraqi reserve POW who was injured and captured in the recent operations of the Muslim forces of Iran in Sumar, Western fronts, Saturday.

'Ali Qamar Saleh, 35, a personnel of Battalion 417, brigade 1st of Division 16 of the Second Iraqi Corps, captured along with 70 others, said that these days people in various provinces of Iraq were witnessing execution of deserting military personnel.

Referring to the maltreatment of the families of deserting personnel by the Ba'athist Armed Forces, he said that worst possible crimes would be committed on them to force the deserters to report to the army.

Other Iraqi POWS admitted said that in less than four hours after an attack by Iraqi battalions which were supported by heavy artillery fire, Muslim forces of Iran in a blitz counter attack took over a number of heights, killing all the forces stationed there.

Many reserve POWS said that they had served in the Iraqi Army from three to five and a half years.

Iraq launched an attack in Sumar region Saturday morning which, together with subsequent Iraqi counterattacks, was completely routed and its forces sustained heavy losses in man and equipment.

/12624

CSO: 4600/286

IRI ADMITS TO EXISTENCE OF AIDS AMONG POPULACE

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 2 Jul 87 p 6

[London KEYHAN in Persian: founder and publisher Dr. Mesbahzadeh]

[Text] Three weeks ago the Islamic republic officially admitted that the AIDS disease has been spread to our country. Dr 'Ali Reza Marandi, the Khomeyni regime's minister of health and medical education, admitted that two cases of AIDS have been seen in Iran. Both persons became infected with this dangerous virus as the result of the infusion of infected blood, and both died. However, he tried to portray these as exceptional cases and dismiss the subject.

The reality is that AIDS has existed in Iran for months, and that there are more cases of it than the two claimed by this minister. Numerous international reports, including the World Health Organization Report and the comments and testimony of several physicians working in Iran, confirm the infection of a number of our compatriots with AIDS. Contrary to practice in most of the world's countries, this important matter, related to society's health and well-being, has also become a political football, and Islamic republic officials say everything about AIDS except the danger of it infecting the nation and the extent of its spread in Iran. For officials of Ayatollah Khomeyni's government, it was difficult to admit that in the "divine" society there are diseases and illnesses related to 'Western corruption'. The regime's propaganda—which is always accompanied by contamination, joking and political attacks—has portrayed AIDS as the result of the general debauchery of the West's pleasure-seekers and homosexuals. More interestingly, the regime has claimed that American and world imperialism have created AIDS to fight the oppressed people of the Third World, and that they have spread its virus in the oppressed nations, especially Africa! The Tehran newspaper KEYHAN wrote in an editorial in the month of Bahar (20 February – 20 March 1987): An invisible item has recently appeared among the export products of the United States of America to other nations of the world. This item is a mysterious medicine and the illness that comes with it is a feature of American society. American officials, who vainly by themselves find a cure for this terrifying disease, have sought to answer the problem by expanding it beyond their own borders!

The interesting thing is that this kind of political propaganda concerning this fatal disease started almost at same time in the Islamic republic as it did in Libya. Last March Colonel Qaddafi claimed in a revolutionary speech that the AIDS virus was first created by making genetic changes in microbes in other viruses in an American military laboratory—which was operating secretly to develop biological weapons—and was sent to Africa and revolutionary nations by various means. The West's press and news agencies—which have been astonished by the onset of a series of simultaneous political propaganda campaigns in the radical nations concerning AIDS—have pursued the subject and found the source of the propaganda in the conference of non-aligned

The second was held on 1989 in London by the newspaper LIBERATION, covering the 1989 epidemic. At the conference of journalists, in Istanbul, a statement suddenly began circulating according to which America had covered the AIDS virus with its military bacteriological laboratories. In that mysterious statement it was claimed that American army researchers at Fort Detrick, after making AIDS into a deadly contagious agent in Africa in blood for the use of their armies. It quickly became known that that statement was written by a retired academic who would have been employed at Humboldt University in East Germany, and had probably been recruited by a special KGB disinformation office of the participation of non-aligned nations. Before that the copy of this statement had been printed in the New York newspaper PATRIOT - which is known for having special relations with the Soviet Union's secret services. There the reason for the spread of AIDS in America used was said to be an error by American military physicians, who had tested the virus they made up themselves at Fort Detrick. One of these prisoners came to New York after release and confirmed the spread of AIDS.

It was, notwithstanding these seemingly peaceful games in the Islamic republic – which should be a playground for use and leisure – one of the lines of our people – the spread of AIDS. Today is a very serious problem. All of the conditions for the spread of this dangerous and deadly, incurable virus exist in Iran today: the widespread addiction to narcotics, especially heroin and morphine, which causes the spread of the illness through contaminated injection; the shortage of syringes and their reuse by addicts; the lack of effective hygienic conditions; the widespread presence of intravenous drug use; and, most important of all, the matter of the war, which produces tens of thousands of wounded every month who receive blood transfusions where the virus can be transferred through blood transfusions.

It is hard enough to find a more serious threat to the spread of AIDS to be of catastrophic dimensions in their lands and very much add the danger of casualties to this disease is even greater than that of the third, impetuous, African civil wars and famines, even a closed and isolated nation such as the Soviet Union has made severe decisions concerning the control of entry and the undertaking of various experiments on persons suspected of being infected with HIV. The Islamic Republic has been gathering to find a solution that will confront this 'plague' of the 21st century.

Onward, has not helped trained Muslims appear to be very watchful in their intercourse with Europeans. The Islamic Science Alliance and the education necessary to prevent and treat 1000 different types of diseases, and to control those, this serious and immediate danger for animal propaganda against the West and Americans.

in a more subtle way that the interviewees in the two surveys of the chief theologian have thought of as "accepting AIDS is to state that AIDS is not a disease".

BRIEFS

NON-OIL EXPORTS TO TURKEY--Ankara, 15 Jul (IRNA)--Turkey has approved an appendix to a Tehran-Ankara economic protocol, increasing the volume of Iran-Turkey trade exchanges to two billion dollars annually. According to the appendix, Turkey will import dollars 68 million worth of Iranian dried fruits, minerals, etals, manufactured goods and construction implements. Iran and Turkey signed the protocol in May for cooperation in oil exploration and exploitation, lay of gas pipes, transportation, exploitation of natural resources and communication. [Text] [Tehran IRNA in English 1400 GMT 15 Jul 87 LD] /12624

INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION FIGURES--During the first 2 months of the current Iranian year, plants under the aegis of the Ministry of Industries increased their production of sugar by 89 percent; paper by 3 percent; chinaware by 24 percent; tile by 13 percent; wires and cables by 11 percent; light bulbs by (?13) percent; and medicinal pills and capsules by 74 percent, in comparison with the same period last year. [Summary] [Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 0430 GMT 17 Jul 87 NC] /12624

HOUSING LOANS TO WORKERS--The Central News Unit reports during a news conference on the occasion of social insurance week, the managing director of the social insurance organization stated that since the beginning of the current Iranian year, more than 100 billion rials in loans have been extended to insured workers through workers' cooperatives. He added that the organization intends to pay 5 million rials in housing loans to each member of the workers' cooperatives who have received land. He said the organization has invested over 100 billion rials in various industries. Referring to the benefits enjoyed by the daughters of deceased workers, he said the organization has issued a new circular according to which they will continue to be covered by insurance until their marriage, and not until the age of 18, as was the previous practice. On unemployment benefits, he said that a bill has been prepared which, if approved by the cabinet, will pay up to 22,000 rials for a period of 1 year to single workers, and up to 40,000 rials for a period of 2 years to married workers in exchange for 3 percent insurance premiums payable by employers. [Summary] [Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 0430 GMT 17 Jul 87 NC] /12624

BARITES EXPORT INCREASE--The Barites Company operates under the aegis of the Mines and Metals Ministry with the collaboration of 15 mines and 3 factories for the production of industrial powders including barites, bentonite, and ferrous chemicals, and caters to all the requirements of the National Iranian Oil Company [NIOC] for drilling purposes. In the past year, more than 2,500 tons of salt, 500 tons of barites and bentonite, and 200 tons of calcium carbonate were exported to Persian Gulf countries and more than \$100,000 of foreign exchange was earned. An agreement has been signed for the export of 10,000 tons of salt to African and Persian Gulf states. The total earnings of the mines, and the factories affiliated to them, amounted to 2.5 billion rials in the past year. [Summary] [Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 0330 GMT 19 Jul 87 NC] /12624

INDICTMENT OF IRANIAN CULTURAL ATTACHE--Turkey's military prosecutor has issued an indictment against Habibollah Shahshahani, the Islamic Republic's cultural attache in Izmir, accusing him of smuggling and distributing the English-language version of the banned KAYHAN newspaper. If the court successfully proves this charge, Shahshahani will be sentenced to 12 years in prison. We recall that the Turkish-language version of KAYHAN, which is published in Tehran and smuggled into Turkey, calls for Turkish girls to riot against the government and urges them to wear Islamic dress as an expression of opposition against Turkey's legal government. Our costrugglers report from Turkey that the Turkish government has forbidden female university students from wearing Islamic dress and male students from growing beards. [Text] [(Clandestine) Iran's Flag of Freedom Radio in Persian 1630 GMT 17 Jul 87 NC] /12624

ISLAMIC-MARXIST ORGANIZATION REPORTED--It is being reported in Tehran circles that some former deputies of the Islamic Majlis, including clergymen and members of the [ward indistinct] and the Fedaiyan -- Majority Group, have established a secret organization named Ardikhah [thought]. It appears that former Majlis Deputy Fazel Faruki is an active member of this new organization. This group, which professes to hold Islamic-Marxist views, is currently [involved] in preparing itself for the upcoming elections. [Text] [(Clandestine) Iran's Flag of Freedom Radio in Persian 1630 GMT 17 Jul 87 NC] /12624

SEVENTH REFINERY TO BE INAUGURATED IN ARAK--The National Iranian Oil Company has invited foreign engineering firms to submit their proposals for the construction of an oil refinery in Arak. The proposed refinery will have the capacity refining 135,000 barrels of oil per day. According to the weekly economic publication MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC DIGEST, on the 17th of this month of June the National Iranian Oil Company asked 17 construction companies via telex to submit their proposals by the 20th of June. The companies contacted by the National Iranian Oil Company to send their proposals for construction of this refinery include the M. W. Klug company (England), Krupp-Koppers and Bechtel (America), Foster-Wheeler and Techni-Petrol (Italy), Lurgi, Fluor Corp., and Linde (West German, and several other French and Japanese companies. The MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC DIGEST added: The Arak refinery, which has been called the seventh refinery, will refine crude oil from Ahvaz and Asmara. The National Iranian Oil Company will make a final selection on the firm to build the Arak refinery by the end of 1987. Petroleum affairs experts predict that it will take about 40 months to reconstruct the Arak refinery. In part of its article, the MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC DIGEST wrote: The National Iranian Oil Company also plans to build another refinery by the mid-90s. The capacity of this refinery will also be 135,000 barrels a day. The oil needed for this refinery will come from the heavy oil wells of Dezful. [Text] [Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 2 Jul 87 p 8] [London KEYHAN in Persian: founder and publisher Dr. Mostafazadeh] 9210

AIR MARSHAL ASGHAR KHAN VIEWS AFGHAN PROBLEM

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 12 Jul 87 p 6

[Text]

ABBOTTABAD, July 11: Air Marshal (Retd) Asghar Khan, chairman, believes that direct talks with Afghanistan and Soviet Union are necessary for a peaceful settlement of the Afghan issue and the return of Afghan refugees now in Pakistan. He also says that better relations with Soviet Union can only develop if Pakistan adopts a truly neutral position between the super powers and has good relations with both of them i.e., the United States and the Soviet Union. "This is likely to happen only after Pakistan stops acting as a client state of a super power."

The Tehrik chief was recently in Murree where he addressed a public meeting. There he talked to The Muslim in some detail on important national issues, including budget, Pakistan's dependence on donor countries, Afghan problem vis-a-vis Pakistan's stand and our relations with Soviet Union, etc. etc.

Commenting on how Gen. Zia has been successful in perpetuating his rule over an unwilling nation the Tehrik chief said that Soviet Union's move into Afghanistan, United States support to him, exploitation of Islam by him and his repressive policies are some of the things that have helped Gen. Zia to retain political power for so long. Moreover, he thinks that PPP's conduct during its rule between 1972 to 1977 had shaken people's confidence in democratic institutions which, in a way, helped an unrepresentative man to continue in power for a decade now.

Excerpts from the interview:

Q. What is your opinion about the "inept" handling of federal budget which drove the whole nation to protest against it. Do you believe that this has brought to surface disturbing weaknesses in the government particularly regarding

its perception of common man's viewpoint? Are you satisfied with the revised budget?

Ans. The public outcry against the budgetary proposals proves the unrepresentative character of the regime. The withdrawal of the original budget and the presentation of a revised budget within a period of one week makes a mockery of budget making and shows how incompetent the regime is. The rejection of the budget by the people of Pakistan is in fact a rejection of the government which approved the original budgetary proposals in its cabinet meeting. But the government continues in office against all moral and political norms. The revised budget has not altered the basically oppressive taxation structure, non-productive expenditure pattern, rampant corruption, heavy dependence on foreign loans and deficit financing.

Q. Do you feel that the World Bank, IMF and other western financial institutions govern the fiscal policies of Pakistan? If it is so how does it damage our economy and what is its precise nature? How can we get rid of this situation?

Ans. The vested interests ruling the country comprising feudal bureaucratic and big business interests with strong links with politically ambitious generals do not want to change the status quo. They look for the easy way out of seeking foreign loans for financing investment in the country. A massive mobilisation of internal resources by drastically changing the decadent socio-economic structure is possible. Such a strategy would necessitate basic changes such as land reforms, curbing luxury imports, promoting local industry, drastically cutting wastage and corruption in government expenditure and reforming the out-dated

and oppressive tax structure. Only then can we reduce our dependence on financial institutions like the World Bank and IMF as well as donor countries. The conditions the donor agencies generally impose with the loans they give, are not always conducive to the promotion of local industry. Moreover conditions such as withdrawal of subsidies and increasing user charges reduce real incomes of the poorer sections by increasing prices of essential items. Heavy dependence on foreign loans besides imposing a financial burden in the form of debt-servicing also entails a political cost in that the recipient has to compromise its sovereignty and independence.

Q. You have advocated direct talks with Afghanistan. Do you believe that such talks can lead to a successful ending of the Afghan problem including the withdrawal of Russian forces and return of 3 million Afghan refugees?

Ans. Yes. I believe that talks with Afghanistan and the Soviet Union are necessary for a peaceful settlement of the Afghan issue and the return of the Afghan refugees now in Pakistan.

Q. Masses in Pakistan have generally a soft corner for Russia while the rulers have always gravitated towards America? Do you have any proposals to promote closer ties between Russia and Pakistan on equal and reciprocal basis?

Ans. Better relations with the Soviet Union can only develop if Pakistan adopts a truly neutral position between the super powers and has good relations with both of them i.e. — the United States and the Soviet Union. This is likely to happen only after Pakistan stops acting as a client State of a super power.

Q. What is your opinion regarding the standing of your party on

the popularity ladder? If elections are held today how many seats your party expects to win in the Assembly?

Ans. This is something about which claims by political parties and political leaders are meaningless. We are a national party and are working to the best of our ability and resources. Because of our untarnished past and our progressive and realistic programme we expect the people to support us.

Q. Much has been written and said about the personality clash between you and the late Z.A. Bhutto. When you entered the political arena after retirement from service you put your weight on the side of Bhutto. Would you have joined PPP if Bhutto had been more tactful in dealing with you?

Ans. There was no personality clash with Z.A. Bhutto. My differences with him and his party were based on principle. His approach and that of his party was in my opinion opportunistic and against the interests of Pakistan. He conspired with a military dictator for the break-up of Pakistan because he could not rule over the whole country. He and his party made false promises which he had no intention of fulfilling and therefore, did not try to carry them out. His party let loose a reign of terror which the people have still not forgotten.

It is wrong to say that when I entered politics, I put my weight behind Z.A. Bhutto. He was then in jail and his party was in an embryonic stage. I came into politics to speak on behalf of the poor and oppressed people — a role I am still playing. The PPP has often tried to give the erroneous impression that I came into politics merely to secure Bhutto's release. The suggestion being that after achieving this I should have gone back.

I could never have joined Bhutto or the PPP because I

knew that because of the feudal character of the leadership of the party it would not fulfil its promises to the people.

Q. You are charged with misjudging things on many occasions. For instance you founded and changed political parties. You supported the army take-over in the wake of 1977 movement against Bhutto regime. You believed Gen. Zia's words about holding elections in the country. But you were proved wrong and in consequence of your perceptions you remained under detention for over four years. Do you have to say anything in defence of your policies?

Ans. I do not have to defend my political past. I have been consistent in opposing oppression and exploitation. I opposed the repressive regimes of Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Bhutto and I am opposing Zia-ul-Haq. I have never compromised with evil. I opposed Yahya Khan's martial law and did not become a minister in his government. I opposed military action in East Pakistan when others welcomed it. I have opposed Zia-ul-Haq's martial law from the very first day and was placed in detention by him for over five years. It is not true that I ever reposed confidence in General Zia-ul-Haq. Your question is based on misinformation, the inference is untrue. I came into politics in 1968 and the Tehrik-i-Istiqal was formed in 1970. We have been struggling for the people's rights ever since. Your question about changing political parties is wholly misplaced. Mr. Jinnah changed his party when he left the Indian National Congress to join the Muslim League and Z.A. Bhutto left Ayub Khan's Convention League to form his PPP. And what about the galaxy of opportunist leaders who have always scuttled their parties to join the party in power. Leaving a party is no crime if it is done in the national

interest. Principles and the country's interests are important. If one stays with a political party for personal benefit, for exploiting the people, it is nothing to be proved of and if one leaves it to join a party that is working selflessly for the people's good it is something to be lauded.

Q. What is your opinion about PPP and its guiding light Ms Benazir Bhutto? Do you believe that PPP can sweep impartial elections as is openly said by a number of top leaders in the country and foreign observers also?

Ans. There is no need for me to say any thing about the PPP or its leader. Their politics is their business and they have a perfect right to go to the people in any manner they wish. I do not share the view that the PPP can win in a fair election because I have faith in the people's judgment and in their ability to judge the past performance of political parties and to draw conclusions about what to expect from them in the future.

Q. What are the special qualities in Gen. Zia that has helped him remain in power for over ten years despite popular disliking against his regime which stifled democracy in Pakistan?

Ans. There are many reasons for General Zia-ul-Haq's success in staying in power for ten years. The Soviet move into Afghanistan, United States support to him, his exploitation of Islam and his repressive policies are some of the things that have helped him to retain political power for so long but the most important and the least talked about thing is the unfortunate experience that the people of Pakistan have had with the elected Government of PPP between 1972 and 1977. The conduct of the PPP during those years was so dismal that the people's confidence in democratic institutions has been shaken.

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CSO: 4600/280

ECONOMIC COOPERATION PACT WITH IRAN, TURKEY VIEWED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 12 Jul 87 p 7

[Article by Abdul Majid Khan]

[Text]

The Economic cooperation organisation with Pakistan, Iran and Turkey as its members, formerly known as regional cooperation for Development (RCD) is now about 27 years old. However, not much has been done to integrate in to a solid bloc with 200 million population and rich regional resources and strategic geographical position. What has been done for mutual no lasting significance and not with the support of the peoples and businessmen of the three member countries. There have been complaints of foreign interference in the internal affairs of the three countries which have stood in the way of economic integration and rapid growth.

However, a ray of hope has come to light that in a recent meeting of the foreign ministers of the three member countries that a pilot project should be launched in the field of foreign trade which would involve the tariff preferential treatment of selected commodities amounting to \$ 100 million for exchange between the three member countries. This would be a beginning of a much desired development in the field of foreign trade and ultimately complete economic integration provided that the process is pursued with political commitment and systematically.

PRESENT INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE

There has been some expansions in exchange of merchandise among the three member countries of ECO. However, the advance in trade has been meagre and much below the scope of development. It has further been observed that this expansion has not taken place as

a result of the efforts of the organisation but due to bilateral requirements. Table shows the share of Intra-regional exports and imports in the total exports and imports of the ECO member countries during 1978, 1981 and 1984.

TABLE: Economic Cooperation Organisation - Intra Regional Trade during 1978, 1981 and 1984 (value \$ million)

From this facts and figures in the table 1 and from some well known facts it may be said safely that:

1. Iran tops the list of ECO member countries both in imports and exports, followed by Turkey and then Pakistan.

2. Iran is the most important exporter of crude petroleum and petroleum products of the ECO member countries while the other two member — Pakistan and Turkey are import important importers of petroleum and products.

3. Also, for the present, the exports of crude petroleum and petroleum products account for most of the exports of Iran. Other exports of Iran, although there is bright scope of expansion, are now limited. In the long run, non-oil exports of Iran may become important.

4. Pakistan and Turkey are important exporters of non-oil products including food and other consumer goods, industrial raw materials and capital goods. On the other hand, Iran is the most important importer of non-oil merchandise among the three ECO member countries.

5. In case of the end of the Iran-Iraq war sooner or later the reconstruction of the economy would

be an important problem and development actively of Iran. Her imports of capital goods, building materials and industrial raw materials along with agricultural inputs would rise. Also, the exports of her non-oil merchandise would expand. Some of these products such as aluminium, copper, and products of the petro-chemical industries would be needed by Pakistan and Turkey.

6. Present Government of Iran has an independent economic policy best suited to the national interest of the country since 1979. This is why she has been seeking economic cooperation with other Muslim countries, particularly Pakistan and Turkey. The increase in her imports from these two countries is an evidence.

Further Scope: Iran exports crude petroleum and petroleum products and the share of these two items in her total exports is significant. Exports of other items agricultural products, mineral products and a few manufactures is extremely small. In her total exports of \$ 15 to 20 billion a year, the value of non-oil exports does not exceed a few million dollars. Most of the primary commodities exports of the three countries are similar. But there are some primary commodities which can be exchanged among the three ECO member countries. Pakistan and Turkey can export to Iran food grains and pulses some other food items, raw cotton and other raw materials. Pakistan can export rice to Turkey and can import from there metals, metal products and chemical products.

Both Pakistan and Turkey can import from Iran crude petroleum

and Petroleum products, petrochemicals, aluminium, other non-ferrous metals, zeera black, and zafran. All the three member countries with varied climate can exchange some fruits and vegetables. For the present, there is considerable scope for exchange of manufactured goods. Iran can export road vehicles and products. Pakistan and Turkey can export cotton yarn, textiles and textile products to Iran. All the three countries can exchange industrial machinery and machine tools transport equipment including road vehicles, railway equipment, and sea vessels. All the three ECO members produce and export several types of capital goods or their parts. They can also collaborate in the manufacture of parts and their assembly into industrial machinery, power plants, transport equipment and other capital goods.

In this respect it may be pointed out that technologically Turkey leads both Pakistan and Iran. She is ahead of the other two member countries in agricultural production, food processing, processing of the other agricultural products, and livestock products such as hides and skins, raw wood, fish canning and preservation. She is also ahead of Iran and Pakistan in mining and quarrying and processing of minerals. In some agricultural activities, Pakistan leads Iran and Pakistan. Iran too enjoys some advantage over Pakistan and Turkey in some fields. The ECO, member countries can exchange technological know how to accelerate their economic growth and welfare of their people.

Exports	1978	1981	1984
1. Total			
Iran	21,954	9,655	15,136
Pakistan	1,490	2,881	2,566
Turkey	2,288	4,696	6,725
Grand total	25,732	17,232	24,427
2. Intra Regional			
Iran	451	422	1,337
Pakistan	62	168	285
Turkey	53	252	898
Total	566	862	2,520
2 as % of 1			
Imports			
3. Total			
Iran	19,533	12,951	15,343
Pakistan	3,285	5,631	5,852
Turkey	4,600	8,932	10,500
Grand total	27,418	27,514	31,695
4. Intra Regional			
Iran	88	426	1,267
Pakistan	18	25	73
Turkey	505	503	1,430
Total	611	954	2,770
4 as % 3	2.2	3.5	8.7

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CSO, 4600/280

INDUSTRIAL UNITS WITH SOVIET HELP SAID IN PLANNING

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 12 Jul 87 p 7

[Text]

KARACHI, July 11: Negotiations are underway for setting up 40 industries with Soviet supplier credit in the private sector, the leader of the 23-member Pakistan delegation to USSR Aziz Zulfikar said here today.

He was addressing a news conference at the FPCCI office on his eve of his departure for the Soviet Union. The delegation leaves here tomorrow for Islamabad enroute to Moscow.

Mr. Zulfikar, who was assisted in his Press conference, by S.N. Inam, Chairman, FPCCI's Pak-Soviet Trade Committee said the Soviet Union has offered co-operation in setting up 350 industries in the Sixth Five Year Plan.

The FPCCI President said the visit of Pakistan's trade delegation to Moscow would increase this country's exports to Soviet Union and may also pave the way for

joint ventures in the private sector in view of the interest shown by USSR. Bulk of the members of the delegation are exporters.

Mr. Inam revealed that Pakistan's exports to the Soviet Union in 1985-86 amounted to 66 million US dollars and the imports were

somewhat less than exports. The balance of trade has been in favour of Pakistan. Trade between the two countries is conducted through barter.

The delegation would sign an agreement on economic and trade co-operation on behalf of the Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry with the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

The proposed agreement provides that the two sides would take all the opportunities within competence to promote strengthening and expansion of trade and economic links.

The two sides will exchange systematically information data on economy, foreign trade, alterations to the trade legislation, trade rules, customs, and protection of patents (inventions) trade marks and industrial designs. Each side will help the other in organising symposia, reports and lectures of the experts in different fields.

The FPCCI and the USSR Chamber would help each other in organising participation in international fairs held in Pakistan

and USSR. The two sides would also favour exchange of delegations of business circles as well as delegation of technical experts.

The FPCCI President Aziz Zulfikar said the Pakistan delegation was visiting the Soviet Union at the invitation of the USSR since Russians were interested in promoting trade joint ventures including transfer of technology.

During the nine-day visit the Pakistan delegation would hold talks with President of the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry E.P. Pitovranov, sign the agreement for economic and trade co-operation, attend a seminar on prospects of enhancing Pak-Soviet trade.

It will also visit the industrial units. Individual business from both sides would also hold talks on concrete business proposals.

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CSO: 4600/280

PAKISTAN-ALGERIA JOINT COMMISSION PLANNED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 8 Jul 87 p 8

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, July 7: Pakistan and Algeria signed an agreement to set up a Joint Commission for trade, economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation in Algiers on July 4, a message received here today.

The agreement was signed on behalf of Pakistan by Dr. Mahbubul Haq, Minister of Commerce and Planning and Development and by Mustapha Benzaza, Minister for Posts and Telecommunications who is also the Co-Chairman of the Commission from Algerian side.

The Algerian Minister for Posts and Telecommunications expressed the hope that with the signing of the agreement, "the brotherly and friendly relations between Pakistan and Algeria will be cemented further and there would be new scope for increase of cooperation between the already existing friendly relations between the two countries."

While appreciating the Algerian Minister's feelings, Dr. Mahbubul

Haq conveyed the President and Prime Minister's felicitations to the Algerian President; the Prime Minister and the people of Algeria for celebrating their 25th anniversary of independence in a befitting manner.

Tracing the history of the epic struggle which culminated in the achievement of its independence after a heroic struggle with a loss of one and a half million human lives and immeasurable economic loss the Minister said that the Algerian struggle touched the heart of each and every Pakistani.

Before the signing ceremony, talks were also held between Dr. Mahbubul Haq and Mustapha Benzaza, in which matters of mutual interest especially cooperation in the field of telecommunications were discussed. They also exchanged views on increasing the cooperation between the two countries.

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CSO: 4600/279

FOREIGNERS IN KARACHI SAID TO NUMBER HALF A MILLION

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 12 Jul 87 pp 1, 8

[Article by Kamran Khan]

[Text]

KARACHI, July 11: At least half a million foreigners are currently settled in the country's business capital Karachi without having legal documents to stay in Pakistan. Highest number of illegal immigrants have come from Bangladesh followed by the Indians, Iranians, Burmese, Vietnamese, Sri Lankans, Africans and those who escaped from the Afghan refugee camps in the NWFP and Baluchistan. This has revealed in interviews with the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation's former councillors and the officers posted in many of Karachi's 55 police stations.

Most of the officials in the police and other security agencies consider these aliens as a security hazard but none of these organisation has complete data on the illegal immigrants. This has left the Karachi police stations and the councillors as the only source on the foreigners living in many Karachi localities.

In Karachi one has to spend only Rs. 200 to Rs 600 to get a home delivery of national identity card and passport. It will be significant to note that many Bangladeshis, Indians and Sri Lankans are today the holders of the plastic coated I.D. cards and the green passport. After Wednesday's clash between the two rival Iranian groups Islamabad has ordered a survey of all foreigners living in Karachi. Similar hasty orders had also been issued last year when four Palestinians had seized a Pan Am Jumbo killing 21 passengers. No follow-up of those orders was made till the latest terrorist strike on the country's soil by the foreigners.

Apart from few Hundred Iranians registered with the United Nation High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and 660 registered

with the Karachi Police's Foreign Registration Department, every week Karachi received batches of dozens of Iranians who flee their country due to various reasons.

The influx of Iranians is mostly concentrated in Karachi's densely populated Baghdadi and Kalakot area where a number of new hotels have sprung up during the last three years to cater the escaped Iranians. The hotel owners in Karachi's Baghdadi area received their customers through Baluch contacts who help these Iranians cross borders into Pakistan. During a random survey today this correspondent found that at least 400 Iranians were living in three Baghdadi hotels.

The better off Iranians quickly shift to rented flats and bungalows in the Gulshane Iqbal and PECHS area of Karachi. They stay in these places until a Western country give them a visa. Many rich Iranians who want to stay in Pakistan for a while have moved to Lahore and Islamabad. Lahore fashionable Liberty Market in Gulberg provides a familiar sight of the Iranian. Recently new restaurants have sprung up there for the exclusive use of Iranians.

The vast concentration of anti-Iranian revolutionaries in Pakistan has obviously irked the Iranian government, which is now closely watching the Iranians involved in the anti-government propaganda. But the Iranians are not the only security hazard in Karachi. Hundreds of Africans from Nigeria, Tanzania, Congo, Zaire and Ethiopia reach Karachi every month to act as heroin carriers to the West. Many of them who fail to get in touch with their contact in Karachi can be seen in business offices begging for few coins. A number of them have been arrested by the city police for being involved in crimes. Their willingness to

cooperate as free agents had come into light during the interrogation of the Libyan Ahmed Ammar, but only top immigration authorities in Islamabad can answer as to why these Africans are allowed into the country without proper Pakistani visa.

In the last couple of years Bangladeshis have reached Karachi in thousands. Now most of them are employed as house servants and bearers in hotels and restaurants. Interviews with some Bangladeshis in Karachi's Moosa Colony (a residential locality of about 15,000 Bengalis—revealed that some of the Bengalis have reached Pakistan from West Bengal.

Most difficult to locate are the Indians who have arrived from Uttar Pradesh and southern India. These Indians who usually do not report their stay in the city to the police stay with their relatives in Karachi and other parts of the Sind before getting I.D. card, domicile and finally employment. Sometime even in government departments officials in the Sind Home Department believe that at least 20 per cent of visiting Indians never go back. They however, concede that the Indians are most difficult to trace unlike Bangladeshi and Iranians whose concentration is restricted to no more than 12 Karachi localities.

The Afghans who fled from their camps a few years back have now merged into the local population. Some 300 of those who escaped from the refugee camps are

now running cloth shops in Karachi Rabi Centre, Panaroma, Centre and Lucknow Cloth Market. Many of these are also involved in the transport business. Although it is very rare that an Afghan is figured in any crime in the city, but it is generally believed that many of them are involved in drug trafficking. According to the top PNCB and Customs sources in Karachi Afghans who are involved in drugs are mostly those who came before 1979 and are called 'Kochis'.

The police and councillors in Karachi are fully aware that Karachi's 'Gedar' Colony in Landhi and some adjoining areas is famous for their Burmese and Vietnamese inhabitants. These aliens also do petty jobs as house servants, but unlike others they do not have the I.D cards.

No less than 3,000 illegal immigrants from Sri Lanka are presently living in cheap hotels in Karachi's Saddar and Napier Road areas. According to the provincial excise officials in Karachi the Sri Lankans are involved in the illegal sale of liquor. Their involvement in the sale of drugs was also uncovered during several raids conducted by the police and excise.

Despite such hazards due to the presence of lots of illegal immigrants, the situation is not likely to improve as diplomatic sources in Karachi indicate that none of the country would be ready to accept these persons as their nationals.

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CSO: 4600/280

JASARAT NOTES FAILURES OF ZIAUL HAQ'S RULE

BK201455 Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 5 Jul 87 p 3

[Editorial: "Ten Years' Achievements"]

[Text] The beginning of another imposition of marital law in Pakistan was marked on 5 July 1977. If Bhutto's civilian martial law is also taken into account, it marked the fourth martial law declared in the 30-year history of our beloved motherland. That time, the chief martial law administrator was General Mohammad Ziaul Haq, who also takes credit for enforcing the longest martial law in Pakistan's history and for restoring democracy in the country while maintaining his own presidency. Even though he is no longer the chief martial law administrator, he does continue to be chief of the army staff and president of the country. Today marks the start of his 11th year as president, and there is a strong possibility that he will set a record for being the longest ruling president in the country's history. Before him, president General Mohammad Ayub Khan, the person responsible for imposing the nation's first martial law, took the credit for ruling the country the longest, but he could not complete his 11th year. The people filled the streets to express their opposition and he had to leave the same way he had come, that is, he had come by imposing one martial law and left by imposing another. The tyranny and oppression of his martial law against the nation is indescribable. However, President Ziaul Haq made arrangements for the future while at the zenith of his power and has apparently handed over the executive powers to a civilian government.

General Ayub Khan had announced the celebration of the completion of his 10-year reign as a decade of development, which actually added fuel to the fire and incensed the people when they learned that they had struggled for survival for 10 years and were still under a despotic regime. Therefore, the decade of development was really a decade of downfall. No such announcement has come from president General Mohammad Ziaul Haq, because he learned a lesson from that past experience, plus the fact that he is quite different from President Ayub Khan, President Yahya Khan, and President and Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Even his staunchest opponents agree that he is as cool and collected inside as he appears on the outside. Even 10 years ago, all speculation about him and his ability to impose martial law proved wrong, and now he has already completed a decade of swimming in the vast ocean of politics. In one respect, president Ziaul Haq's 10-year reign has been both immensely turbulent and immensely peaceful. These two things may seem paradoxical, but, in fact, the

Zia government has faced a number of major challenges on both the domestic and foreign fronts. Any one of these challenges could have shaken his government, but Ziaul Haq patiently stuck to his position and there was peace at least at the government level. In the past, whenever political parties jointly launched a movement, the existing government was changed. During Zia's regime, the Nine-Party Alliance--the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy--did everything it could, but did not succeed. Instead, it strengthened the people's confidence in the government. In the meantime, the country saw the influx of Afghan refugees as a result of the Afghanistan crisis, relations with the United States were revived, tension with India reached its highest point, the Siachen Glacier issue was raised, and there was a massive deployment of Indian troops along the Pakistani border. However, President Zia continued to deal with every issue one by one and created an image for himself outside the country of "Mr Cheerful."

However, if we review the domestic situation of the past 10 years, we come to realize the bitter truth: that we have regressed instead of moving forward. President Ziaul Haq took the reins of power into his hands with only the one-point program of enforcing the Islamic system in the country. There was a movement for the enforcement of the Islamic system throughout the country against the rule of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. His throne was shaken, and the chief of the army staff took advantage of the opportunity and, believing that the people's voice was one with his, he joined the people in pledging to establish the Islamic system in the country. However, when he announced the lifting of martial law in December 1985, he admitted that he had failed in enforcing the Islamic system. In fact, he has not only failed to establish the Islamic system, but has also failed in every way to ensure the well-being and welfare of the nation. There has been an unbounded increase in corruption, bribery, theft and robbery, kidnapping, and all other kinds of crimes; but worst of all is that to keep the government in power, extensive harm has been done to political parties--the standard-bearers of Islam, the supporters of the Federation of Pakistan--which in turn has strengthened the ideas of regionalism, provincialism, and separatism. The government has continued to propagate Islam and the ideology of Pakistan, but, practically speaking, it has not only provided total freedom but also encouragement to the worst enemies of Pakistan and its ideology. The most glaring example of this is seen in the adulation of Chaffar Khan and company and of G.M. Syed. Their boldness has grown to such an extent that they now talk openly of breaking up Pakistan while the proposal to prosecute the opponents of the ideology of Pakistan is still under government consideration. The president visited a person [G.M. Syed] who has written a book entitled "Pakistan Should Break Now." And the latest news is that when G.M. Syed was to leave for India with the consent of the government, the president himself bade him farewell by phone and offered his services in the event of any complications.

Wali Khan continues to strike at the roots of Pakistan's ideology both within and outside the country. There is a flood of literature against the Islamic ideology, while the president continues to advise the youth to seek guidance from Islam and Pakistan's ideology. What the young generation sees is the government according all kinds of honor and respect to those who talk nonsense against Pakistan, against its ideology and its founders, and, above all, against Islam. On the other hand, the treatment meted out by the government

to those who have abiding faith in religion and love for Islam is also known to all. There is a growing tendency among the youth to deviate from Islam and Pakistani ideology and slogans are openly being raised against the country and the religion. Following the government's announcement in December 1985 of its failure and its earlier admission that the evil of bribery has spread during the martial law regime, we should not expect any improvement in the situation now. However, it is not too late. If the president displays the same statesmanship and farsightedness that he did to prolong his rule, there is no reason why he cannot achieve some success. Otherwise, the net achievement of his 10-year rule is: Do not disturb or provoke anybody; let everybody do what they want; rule quietly; and prolong your regime as long as possible. The strategy that has been applied efficiently so far is: Keep everything pending even if it is the implementation of Islamic laws or the Islamic law bill. The president has often reiterated: Remain steadfast in your faith and do not meddle with other people's faith. He has applied the same dictum to his government as well: Do not catch anyone even if he is an enemy of Islam, Pakistan, or its ideology, but maintain your firm grip on the government. Consequently, the people are still where they were 10 years ago.

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CSO: 4600/278

BENAZIR DEMANDS END TO 'POLITICIZATION' OF ARMY

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 8 Jul 87 pp 1, 8

[Text]

KARACHI, July. 7: Ms Benazir Bhutto, the PPP Co-Chairperson has again demanded the stepping down of General Mohammad Ziaul Haq from the office of the President of the country and Chief of Staff of the Army.

She said, There is a charge that Generals are being bashed. I would only say that it was time country bashing was stopped.

Speaking at a reception today given by Qazi Ghani, who re-joined PPP after a brief association with Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi's NPP, Miss Bhutto read out a prepared text which ran into 14 pages and has been described by the political observers here as her major policy statement before she leaves for London in the next few days.

The PPP leader touched almost all the aspects of this national life but the main and dominating theme was the politicisation of the army and fall of Siachen.

Elaborating on her demand she said that the PPP in the interest of the country has demanded the army to be delinked from politics.

In this context she made a casual reference to the new Vice-Chief of Staff who she felt enjoys a reputation of a professional soldier. But she observed that it was not a solution. "General Zia should leave the Office of the Chief of Staff not only because his constitutional term has finished long ago, but also because his time of retirement has come. She said that it is essential to delink army from politics and to let the army to be run by professional man whose services are devoted whole time to their profession and sacred duty of defending the frontiers".

She asserted that the people of Pakistan had never let down their army and recalled the touching scheme of love and affection by men and women for their brethren in uniform during 1965 war and later the emotional reception

given to the prisoners of war of 1971 whose release was secured by the Late Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

Similarly, she said that people of Pakistan went without bread, food and clothing to equip the armed Forces. In fact the people have offered sacrifices at every turn and in every budget with a forbearance which finds few equals, if any, in the world, she reminded.

Miss Bhutto also criticised the apathy shown by the Members of National Assembly in turning down a motion raised on vital issue of Siachen Glacier, by Sheikh Mohammad Rashid early this month.

Siachen issue, she observed was a matter which has not been given the strategic importance it deserved and blamed the government of deliberately keeping the nation in total dark on this vital issue.

She informed the audience that Siachen has been under Pakistan's effective control since the first ceasefire on January 1, 1949. After that it was incorporated as part of Pakistan's Northern Region. Geographically speaking, Siachen is the biggest glacier in Asia and the second biggest in the world.

India, she said realised the strategic importance of this glacier during its 1962 war with China. The vulnerability of its defences vis-a-vis Pakistan in the absence of Siachen was revealed to it in 1965 and 1971 wars. But India could never capture it till the present time because of obvious reasons.

She blamed that the government never knew that India had been landing its well-trained mountain troops in the Siachen Area. They captured two passes strategic for Pakistan's defence, namely Sia La and the Bilaford La on the extreme western edge of the glacier, enabling Indian soldiers to block entry into the area from Pakistan controlled positions.

According to the general information available about the Siachen issue, Miss Bhutto regretted that the Indians were reported to have completed their mission without a bullet being fired from Pakistan. The fall of Siachen was kept a well-guarded secret, she said. She went on to add, "Nobody had come to know how Pakistan lost about 18,000 square kilometres of its strategic land."

She quoted an Indian General M.L. Chibber who after capturing the area, made claims that it was an integral part of India and his troops have been repulsing effectively every attempt by the Pakistani soldiers to recapture it. Indians, she said, besides, have been refusing to talk about the Siachen issue as according to them it formed part of Jammu and Kashmir.

Speaking on the general issues, she lamented that gun has become a symbol of authority in Pakistan.

Summing up the implications of last 10 years rule in Pakistan, she said the unity of the country has been undermined, society has been fragmented, Drugs have been introduced, Illiteracy has risen and tracks of lands lost without care for "grass does not grown there".

She also rebuked the claim being made of the economic progress in the country and that inflation was well under control. If so, she argued, why was there a chronic shortage of water in Karachi, prolonged periods of load-shedding and growing lawlessness in the country.

As for the PPP, she said, along with other like-minded parties, it was working for the establishment of Pakistan based on law, justice and freedom.

She summed up, "We are seeking a political democratic and free Pakistan where sovereignty belongs to the people, where there is egalitarianism not only in terms of economic and political equality but human equality".

The reception was also addressed by the Central Convener of the MRD Fatehyab Ali Khan, Mushir Pesh Imam, Mir Hazar Khan Bijarani, President of Sind PPP and Qazi Ghani.

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CSO: 4600/279

MUSLIM LEAGUE OFFICIAL TALKS ABOUT LOCAL ELECTIONS

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 8 Jul 87 p 1

[Article by Ashraf Hashmi]

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, July 7: Local bodies polls in all the four provinces of the country will be held as per schedule and there is no question of any postponement of them. This was stated here by the PML Secretary General Iqbal Ahmad Khan.

Talking to The Muslim he said the local bodies are a provincial subject and the Provincial Governments are to conduct these polls. He, however, said that all the provincial governments are to submit their elections schedule to the federal government as soon as possible. These schedules would then be processed and with the approval of the Prime Minister, who is also the President of the ruling party, a final date of these polls would be announced. In no case these elections are to be postponed, he said and added that they would be held some time during the last quarter of the current year, most probably, immediately after the month of Muharram which falls in September this year.

The new voters list which he said was currently under print would be available by July 15 and its copies would be sent to all the deputy commissioners by August 15 for holding the local bodies polls.

The PML Secretary General also denied reports published in a section of the Press that the elections of the Muslim League would also be postponed. Describing

these reports as having no basis Iqbal Ahmad Khan said that elections to the primary level of the ruling party will be completed by the end of this month. Immediately after the elections of primary units of the party the process would be started for holding national and provincial level party polls which he said would be completed by the end of next month.

Denying any grouping in the party he said the PML stood solidly behind its leader Mohammad Khan Junejo and has proved its unity in crucial moments. It never felt shaky in representing the views of the people and its government always upheld its commands and wishes. Citing the recent example of the national budget he said it was not the opposition which in any way contributed to the revision of the budget but it was the ruling party itself which being conscious of the people prevailed upon its government to withdraw all taxes.

The party, he said, has full confidence in its leader Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo who always respected the wishes of his party.

The forthcoming local bodies polls will be the first to be held under a civilian government after 1958. In the local bodies elections held in 1983, 71,767 members were elected to 4106 union councils 87 District/Agency councils, 12

Municipal corporations 118 Municipal Committees, 285 Town Committees and 39 Cantonment Boards in the country.

The prevailing composition of the local bodies structure is as under:

Rural Areas: Union Council — For a population of 8000 to 15,000 and it may have 8 to 15 members.

Tehsil/Taluka Council — A unit of local government at sub-district level. The Chairman of Union Councils and members of District Councils falling within a Tehsil/Taluka are ex-officio members and elect a Chairman from among themselves.

Zila/District Council — for each district there is a Zila/District Council comprising such members or members as may be determined on the basis of population.

Urban Areas: Town Committee — a town committee as a whole may represent a population of 5,000 to 10,000.

Municipal Committee — As the range of population of a Municipal Committee is wide, its membership varies depending on population.

Municipal Corporation — Constituted in large cities. There are 12 municipal corporations in the country.

Metropolitan Corporation — In the city of Karachi, a metropolitan corporation has been constituted.

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PLANNING MINISTER LAUDED FOR CANDOR ABOUT PROJECTS, DEFECTS

Karachi JANG in Urdu 8 Jun 87 p 3

[Editorial]

[Text] While giving information on the sixth and seventh 5-year plans and certain other important development projects, the federal minister for planning and trade, Dr Mahbubul Haq, made some remarks that are not expected from a senior member of the government in a country like ours. For example, in a very candid and forthright manner the doctor admitted that the objective of doubling the literacy rate by 1990 cannot be achieved and that it can at best be raised to 35 percent. The doctor said that a real increase in literacy can only be achieved by extension of the primary school system and not through nontraditional methods. He emphasized once again that without taxing agriculture, it will not be possible to increase savings on a national level and reduce dependence on foreign loans. As far as the question of the theft and embezzlement of government revenues is concerned, his stand in this connection has always been clear; he has been saying for some time that our bureaucracy embezzles 40 billion rupees from the nation every year. Now giving more details, the doctor said that out of the national revenues, 20 billion rupees are embezzled by the Income Tax Department and 40-50 billion rupees by the Customs and Excise Department. Thus, in these two sectors alone, the nation stands to lose almost 70 billion rupees every year. Dr Mahbubul Haq said that in the field of hydroelectric power, our country has the natural capability of producing 20,000 megawatts of electricity, but due to the lack of resources, he was sorry to note, we are utilizing only 20 percent of this capability. In the sixth 5-year plan, compared with the goal of increasing electricity production by 3,800 megawatts, an increase of only 2,000 megawatts, or about half, could be realized.

By itself a failure in government planning is not remarkable. Between planning and implementation, there stand many factors and stages that directly affect the project. The fact is that these things often happen, even in the most developed countries of the world. The difference is that in those countries, far from concealing such failure the ruling group presents it to the people without minimizing it. In contrast, in our country the people do not get an inkling of the real state of affairs.

Clearly, under these conditions a gulf of distrust between the government and the masses is only natural, and this very distrust ultimately produces many complex problems. It must be admitted that since Dr Mahbubul Haq joined the present government, he has on several occasions pointed out the basic defects in the structure and working of the traditional administration, along with the intolerable losses to the country and the nation therefrom. Moreover, the proposal to convert black money into white money and the revolutionary and beneficial national decision to act on it was also the product of the doctor's fertile brain. Similarly, behind the recent steps to reduce the imbalance in international trade in a realistic way, one can see the doctor's deep national feeling and commitment. Most of all, the doctor's praiseworthy practice of acquainting the nation with the correct and true state of affairs instead of misleading it by providing incorrect information is an outstanding characteristic. While describing as worthy of public acclaim and support the government's positive and constructive projects--such as providing electricity to villages, construction of roads to link farms with markets, inoculation of children to save them from deadly diseases, the 7-marla scheme, and giving ownership rights to the residents of unrecognized townships--he also expressed his own heartfelt happiness and satisfaction at the success of these schemes. In the course of the press conference, the doctor affirmed that only by controlling the embezzlement of government revenues and by taking revolutionary steps to increase savings on a national level can we end our dependence on foreign loans. The doctor also disclosed that the question of setting up legal and administrative restrictions in order to reduce unproductive expenditure is under consideration. These and other such proposals that Dr Mahbubul Haq has brought before the public from time to time in his capacity as a member of the federal cabinet speak for his spirit of service and his greatness. We believe that on a national level full advantage should be taken of all such great people, who in addition to the spirit of public service are also equipped with the necessary knowledge and experience. Dr Mahbubul Haq has done a lot of work under the leadership of Prime Minister Junejo. The doctor is held in good repute by commercial, industrial and business circles, and the people also appreciate his programs and his way of working. In the broad interests of the country and the nation, the doctor should be afforded an opportunity to work with more authority and confidence so that he may extend his program. The realistic attitude regarding the working of the government that the doctor has exhibited right from the start, despite his being in the government, is a clear indication of his sense of responsibility, and in order to bring about necessary national-level changes in our affairs we need this way of working.

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BUDGET, POLICIES OF JUNEJO GOVERNMENT CRITICIZED

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 15 Jun 87 p 3

[Article by Abdul Karim Abid]

[Text] There remains no doubt now that the government of Prime Minister Junejo has failed. This administration never received the support of the masses, but it enjoyed the cooperation of special groups. Now the situation is that on the one hand, members of his own party, the so-called Muslim League, are disappointed and lack confidence in him. On the other hand, the capitalists, traders and all of the urban sector are unhappy and angry. While the landowners are happy that they have escaped agricultural taxes, restlessness and distrust are growing even in the interior rural areas, and, taking the form of regional frustration, this is giving rise to ever new demands and discords. Punjab is the biggest, most powerful and most prosperous province, but even there on the whole and at every level, there is a feeling of loss. Karachi, which is the biggest industrial center in Pakistan, having suffered from serious racial conflicts, has acquired not only a new look but even a new nature, and this change has produced new headaches. The gravity of the situation in the interior of Sind is known to everyone. There is a crisis everywhere, and the government by its thoughtless actions is ceaselessly adding fuel to the fire. As a result, resentment against the government is increasing by leaps and bounds.

Because of this failure of the Junejo government, there is apprehension and anxiety even at the top level. Our real rulers are wondering what to do next. One idea put forward is that the Muslim League alone cannot run the government and that a coalition government representative of all the influential groups in parliament should be constituted. Another proposal under consideration is that through elected candidates and by certain other cautious means, the public should be given the welcome news of new elections, and in the meantime a caretaker government should be set up which should have the support and consent of politicians. The parties which are at present outside the parliament and which have given up after fruitless struggles are also agreeable to such a political formula, so it is thought that advantage should be taken of this opportunity. As a last resort, a new revolution could be announced, the present political system discarded, a new scenario drawn up and the old actors replaced by new ones.

It is clear that if the Junejo government is to be saved, it cannot be done without large-scale changes; if the prime minister is to be eased out, this will have to be preceded by the settlement of political matters with other parties. One proposal is that of Pir Pagaro that General Ziaul Haq should remain the ministry chief but the presidency should be given to Pir Pagaro, while the post of prime minister could go to Mr Jamali from Baluchistan or else to someone from Frontier Province. But the boundless ambitions of Pir Pagaro are not likely to be realized.

One major reason for the failure of the Junejo government is the presence of a flaw in its inception. The flaw is that neither the masses and nor prominent people voted for his party, nor did the parliament freely elect him prime minister. His party, the Muslim League, was formed through undemocratic means, and his prime ministership was secured through undemocratic methods. He did not come to power as a result of his own plans or on his own authority. Rather, he owed his power to a stray chance. He was not a substance, but only a shadow. But the people thought that if cake was not forthcoming, even bread would be welcome. Let us accept this shadow, they thought; it might lead to progress. A large group of people believed that the Junejo government would prove to be a bridge to the goal of democracy. But the manner in which he is sticking to his determination to remain in authority until 1990 has disappointed those who expected good things from him. The fact that Miss Benazir is forging close ties with the opposition to the Junejo government is an indication of this disappointment. Benazir's reaching out to Fakhar Imam Abida and Javed Tasmai shows that one dream has been shattered and another is in the making. Surely even this new relationship is only a castle in the air, but even if nothing materializes, at least it will lead to the formation of new groups which will sap the strength of the Junejo government, and the stage will have been set for these new groups.

Junejo has never had political stature, but he was welcomed on the basis of the expectation that he would create a democratic climate in the country. Certainly, he did take steps toward democracy, even though the background to these democratic steps was the command of the U.S. leaders to stage a democratic show so that they could convince their people, prominent members of the House and Senate as well as their West European allies and public that they have set Pakistan on the road to democracy. But whatever the background, Mr Junejo deserves credit for the fact that along with martial law the emergency laws were abrogated, and in the ruined garden of politics, one began to sense the blossoming of spring. But this prospect gradually began to fade away, and it became clear that the goal was still far off. The threat of registration to political parties, the maintenance of ancient oppressive press laws, the restrictions on advertisements, the insistence on keeping up the old rules and regulations of the martial law era, and especially the working of government in Sind and Karachi exposed the democratic claims. The individuals and groups the government advanced in the name of the Muslim League had no democratic credentials of their own. Followers were made of the opportunists of the former People's Party, and when the scandal of their misdeeds became public, the impression gained ground among people in political circles that disorder, racketeering and plunder were rife in the name of democracy. And under this system, the

government is not prepared even to disclose the names of those who embezzled huge amounts from the banks. Nor does the government have the courage to touch these big sharks.

The Junejo government has destroyed the hope of economic improvement with even more ruthlessness than the manner in which it crushed the hope of democracy. In this connection, the new budget has outdone Herod. The way the nation has raised a protest against the budget is an indication not only of the intensity of the people's feelings against the budget but also of their lack of confidence in the government. It is incredible that a budget should be thoughtlessly introduced, and then later regret should be expressed over it. After witnessing the unparalleled way the government has been humiliated by this budget, no one should insist on burdening the people with this fiasco of a government up to 1990.

The Junejo government received much of its support from those who were eager for enforcement of Islam and Shar'iah. This is so because the entire new system was founded on the premise that we would enforce Islam. But as with democracy, on the issue of Shar'iah, too, the government's treachery became apparent. Prime Minister Junejo himself said in London that as long as he is present, he will not permit the Shar'iah bill to be enforced. If the government had any differences over the Shar'iah bill, it should have introduced and gotten approval of its own Shar'iah bill. But even in the name of Islam and Shar'iah, treachery was committed, and those who had high hopes from the government in this regard realized their mistake. It came home to them that enforcement of Islam cannot be achieved through this government. Therefore we will have to go back to the masses and launch a powerful and revolutionary movement which may topple the present government and bring to the forefront people who are committed to enforcement of Islam.

When the Junejo government came to power, the moderate democratic and Islamic elements argued, in the face of severe opposition from the opposition political parties, that we should for the time being welcome the end of martial law and accord the Junejo government an opportunity to redeem its promises on Islam and Shar'iah. This opportunity was provided. The Junejo government wasted it. Apart from this, this government has failed in running day-to-day affairs, in maintaining normalcy and in keeping up law and order, and some solution will have to be found soon to deal with the conditions resulting from this failure. To overlook these problems is in nobody's interest. If a political solution to the failures of the Junejo government is not found, the situation will go on deteriorating and finally a nonpolitical solution will emerge that will push the country and the nation into further difficulties. That is why it is imperative that we find and implement a political solution to the problem before a calamity occurs.

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UNITY REPORTEDLY DEMONSTRATED AT MRD MEETING

Karachi AMN in Urdu 22 Jun 87 p 3

[Editorial]

[Text] The Karachi meeting of the MRD barely started when the pipe dreamers began to envision its breakup and disunity, and they predicted that this time the MRD will surely and indeed definitely break up into fragments. But now, after 2 days have elapsed, the MRD remains intact and has decided that in the proposed all-party conference, three categories of parties should not be invited to participate. First, the Junejo Muslim League, which instead of having its roots in the masses was created by the powers above and which is confined to national and provincial assemblies. Second, the Jamaat-i-Islami, which was the quickest to kiss and make up with the martial law administration and which after a period of 9 months tumbled out much like the birth of an innocent baby from the womb of its mother. Third, the party or parties which torpedoed the political agreement between the Pakistan People's Party and the Pakistani National Alliance and which insisted that the armed forces intervene and take over power by toppling the elected government.

This is what happened, and even after the passage of 10 years these events and the role of certain self-styled politicians has not faded from people's memories. During this period, some parties left the MRD. It is said that some of these parties are now attempting to rejoin the MRD. Later there will be a discussion on the reasons behind this move.

Far from breaking up, the MRD has disclosed a new policy, rooted in the power of the people, the four basic points of the MRD's manifesto will be expanded to accommodate programs for the social and economic progress of the masses. The MRD has also decided to improve its organizational structure so as to make it more effective and efficient, and to this end workers' and peasants' organizations will be included. For the first time since the MRD was set up, it has been recognized that the masses should be given an opportunity to play a greater role in the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy, for without them no party can dare call itself a people's party. To accomplish this a four-member committee has been appointed.

In regard to the question of a storm over Pakistan People's Party leader Benazir Bhutto's contacts with the parliamentary opposition, Benazir distributed

copies of her speech among members of the High Command before the meeting began. It became clear from the address that these contacts did not mean that the present National Assembly had been recognized. Nowhere does the text of the address suggest that an understanding has been reached between Benazir and the parliamentary opposition. So the furor was comparable to that over Maulana Fazalul Rahman's meeting with Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo and the participation of Nawabzada Nasirullah Khan in the ceremony held to present a book about Pir Pagaro, and in all three cases the matter concluded in talks.

The MRD High Command approved resolutions on many issues, and by the time the meeting concludes many more resolutions may be discussed, but there has been no sign of a breakup in the party. Nor has there been any indication of those differences that had been so confidently predicted for many days. In particular, all the predictions of the newspapers that receive government support in the form of advertisements turned out to be false; their position is very much like that of dogs barking at the moon.

Now let us talk of those elements who, out of pride, left the MRD. If there has been a breakup anywhere, it has been in the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal of Asghar Khan. No one knows when Asghar Khan's secretary general, Mashir Ahmed Pesh Amam, left the party, but at present he is organizing a nonpolitical party called the National Patriotic Front. It is not yet clear what this party intends to do. Some sort of fragmentation constantly goes on in the Tehrik. Having become powerless, perhaps Mr Khan realizes that he had made a mistake in quitting the MRD. The Tehrik's initiative to rejoin the MRD could be the result of this realization. But the haste in this connection could also be the result of the realization that despite his retirement from the air force, Asghar Khan could be court martialled for writing letters to the chiefs of military services suggesting that they should topple the elected government.

If there can be any complaint against the MRD, it is that it has not paid any attention to one aspect of the present situation, and that is that by making the powerless provinces dependent on the federal government for every single penny, in the course of the last 10 years the federal system has been reduced to a "one unit" system. There are in the MRD many senior politicians who got the "one unit" system scrapped through a political struggle. One wonders why these senior politicians tolerated this situation in silence. The intentions of the rulers make it clear that if conditions remain the same, even the concept of provinces will be made to disappear before long. They are clearly moving toward a unitary system of government, and they are committing the same offense as they did against the supporters of confederation. There is no one to object to their attempts, whereas the supporters of confederation are being taken to court on the charge of rebellion.

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ANP LEADER WARNS ABOUT KALABAGH DAM

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 12 Jul 87 p 8

[Text] Peshawar, 11 Jul--The ANP central leader, Haji Ghulam Ahmad Bilour has urged the rulers not to push the Pakhtoons to the wall to force them to choose their separate ways like the Bengalis.

In a press statement, he said the insistence of the government to construct Kalabagh Dam despite persistent opposition by the Pakhtoons showed that the ruling classes cared little for the welfare and progress of the smaller nationalities. He wanted to know as to why the alternate dam at Basha was not being built in place of the controversial Kalabagh Dam.

Haji Bilour observed that anti-Pakhtoon rhetoric had intensified ever since veteran Pakhtoon leader Bacha Khan fell seriously ill. He claimed that Pakhtoons were not only being kept industrially backward but were also being deprived of their agriculturally fertile Peshawar valley by building Kalabagh Dam. He said Punjab was being provided 45,000 cusecs of water from Indus River to irrigate 45 lakh acres of land but the federal government was hesitating to give 10,762 cusecs of water to Dera Ismail Khan in NWFP. He lamented that Gomai Dam could not be built in 40 years since independence but several big barrages were constructed elsewhere.

The ANP leader quoted figures to claim that Pakhtoons had only a two percent share in industries in Pakistan while its natural resources like hydroelectricity, wood, tobacco, salt, emerald, topaz, China clay and many other minerals were controlled by the federal government. He also referred to inadequate Pakhtoon representation in federal services.

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CSO. 4600/280

ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES TERMED HALF-HEARTED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 12 Jul 87 p 4

[Editorial]

[Text]

WHEN the 19-MNA Federal Anti-Corruption Committee, headed by Lt. Gen. Majeed Malik was set up in January last, he pledged to combat "this empire of institutional corruption" without fear or favour, and lay all the facts before the public, and sweep nothing under the carpet. But over six months after the committee started its work no pillar of this empire has been knocked down and no action has been taken in respect of one major scandal in which the Committee has completed its enquiry which relates to a major Army land sale in Faisalabad in which a serving Lieutenant General was allegedly involved. The report was sent to the Prime Minister some weeks ago but nothing has come of that so far.

Gen. Majeed has said in Karachi that following the recent investigations "we caught a big fish". But he will not name the fish in the national interest, he says. National interests will really be served by exposing such fish and preventing other fish from gobbling down the national wealth or public funds in this criminal manner and not by covering them up. But contrary to his initial commitment of laying all the facts before the public, he is now using the old cloak of national interest to cover the big but foul fish.

Gen. Majeed initially came up with a long list of landmark scandals from bungling in Chashma Right Bank Canal to large bad debts of banks and the purchase of computers by PIA and cheap sale of DC-10s and costly purchase of old Boeings by the national airline, but he has not been able to earn the gratitude of the nation by achieving anything much so far. May it be noted that the initial life of the committee is for only one year. If he really wants to do some good work, the committee of 19 should

split up into five or six sub-committees, and each one pre-occupy itself with a major scandal or two. And what happened to the special cell to be set up in each ministry under the orders of the Prime Minister to help the FACC ?

Is Gen. Majeed now finding it too tough to cope with the "empire of institutional corruption" as in each ministry and major corporation the officers tend to gang up when they face some kind of anti-corruption enquiry? Of course, the authority of the committee is only to investigate a scandal and make its recommendations to the Prime Minister. But if the Prime Minister does not act quickly his image may be compromised and the Committee will lose its efficacy and join the ranks of earlier committees who promised to bring down corruption. So Gen. Majeed ought to become systematic in his work and produce better results and, of course, the Prime Minister has to act on its recommendations promptly, regardless of how well-connected a guilty official or a group is.

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CSO: 4600/280

DOKHE Khabba Hammer Murders Said Solved, Suspect Arrested

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 3 Jul 87 pp 1, 8

[Article by Masroor Hussain]

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, July 2: Two years after the gory, inhuman Dokhe Khabba murders the police today claimed it had caught the killer who is a slim 55-year old resident of Hazara district. He and his men killed in all 69 men, women and children with blunt weapon.

The motive of the killing was not ascertained by the interrogation team set up by the police. And involvement of any foreign power as generally believed, has not been established.

Addressing a Press conference here this evening, the Inspector General, Police, Hafiz Sabih-ud-Din Jami, said he had the tendencies of 'Jack the Ripper' but he was not sexually pervert. The motive of killing was also not wealth. Such mentally pervert criminals get joy out of killing, he said.

The suspect is a notorious character of his area and had been on police record since 1953.

The IG categorically denied the involvement of any foreign

hand. He also refuted the reference of a Libyan terrorist group training some Pakistani young men and paying them heavy sums for committing the heinous crimes as reported by an Urdu daily.

Ghulab Khan was arrested in Taxila when he was trying to enter a house in the dark of the night with the motive of killing. He was apprehended by the residents and later handed over to the police. On interrogation he confessed that he was involved in the killing by hammer strikes and ripping off human bodies.

The police have taken into custody five other suspects and are probing into the chances of their involvement.

The IG who flew into Rawalpindi from Lahore last night on hearing the news said he was morally and legally convinced that the person apprehended by the police and accused of killing the large number of people with the help of a hammer was Ghulab

Khan.

The suspect was not shown to the Press. But the IG said 'I am sure we have nabbed the right person'.

He said hundreds of suspects including some political activists were brought into the massive interrogation carried out by the police but all were discharged after no evidence was found against them.

At the same time the IG said Ghulab Khan who had been behind the murder of 70 people was on the police record. He had never been called for interrogation.

Ghulab Khan, the IG said was a family man with two sons and four daughters. His relations with his wife were normal. Only last month, he said Ghulab Khan got his son married and invited all the notables of his area.

Ghulab Khan lived on stealing. According to police records he was involved in minor theft cases in his areas. Then he turned into a robber and waylaid people on the main road. He was notorious in his area.

Ghulab Khan is admitted in a hospital in Rawalpindi for some treatment. The police however did not disclose the name of the hospital nor his ailment.

The IG police said within the next three weeks the whole mystery would be unveiled and all the killers unmasked.

PAKISTAN

SOUTH ASIA

BRIEFS

AGRICULTURE PACT WITH PRC--Pakistan and China signed an agreement in Faisalabad today on the transfer of knowledge and technology in the field of agriculture and for conducting mutual study tours. Under the agreement, both countries will extend their sphere of scientific cooperation in the fields of agricultural education, research, and allied discipline. [Text] [Karachi Domestic Service in English 1600 GMT 23 Jul 87 BK] /9365

CSO: 4600/278

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